行动者网络理论的工程哲学意蕴——布鲁诺·拉图尔思想研究

行动者网络理论(Actor-Network Theory,简称ANT)从研究科学家和工程师的行动过程展开对科学的研究。由于这个行动过程的异质性、集成性、组织性,因而实际上是把科学知识的生产作为工程来研究。ANT人类学研究方法的外衣下蕴含着丰富而深刻的工程哲学思想。探究ANT中的工程哲学思想对工程哲学的研究具有重要的理论意义。     

Science, truth and history, part II. Metaphysical bolt-holes for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge?

Historians of science have frequently sought to exclude modern scientific knowledge from their narratives. Part I of this paper, published in the previous issue, cautioned against seeing more than a literary preference at work here. In particular, it was argued—contra advocates of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK)—that a commitment to epistemological relativism should not be seen as having straightforward historiographical consequences. Part II considers further SSK-inspired attempts to entangle the currently fashionable historiography with particular positions in the philosophy of science. None, I argue, is promising. David Bloor’s proposed alliance with scientific realism relies upon a mistaken view of contrastive explanation; Andrew Pickering’s appeal to instrumentalism is persuasive for particle physics but much less so for science as a whole; and Bruno Latour’s home-grown metaphysics is so bizarre that its compatibility with SSK is, if anything, a further blow to the latter’s plausibility.     

Historicism and the failure of HPS

This paper suggests that the failure to integrate history and philosophy of science properly may be explained by incompatible metaphysics implied by these fields. Historians and sociologists tend to be historicists, who assume that all objects of research are variable in principle, while philosophers look for permanent and essential qualities. I analyse, how the historicists and essentialist approaches differ with regard to the research objects of general history, history of science and science itself. The implied historicism makes some radical pronouncements by Latour on ontological variance understandable. I will also consider, whether there could be something like a historicist philosophy of science. The historicisation of the natural world proves most challenging, but both certain traditional disciplines and some recent advances in physical and life sciences indicate compatibility with historicism. One should note that historicism does not alter how ‘truth’ is understood. Historicism does not question the reality of objects either; only their eternality.     

相对主义与实在论之间:拉图尔的关系主义分析

本文从本体论、认识论及目的论的视角入手对拉图尔的关系主义的本质进行探析,进而试图阐明拉图尔关系主义的生成过程及机制,并对其关系主义进行全面的评述。     

拉图尔社会学的历史认识论检视——走向反思社会学

对拉图尔描述取向的联系社会学,学界多从本体论的角度予以检视,其社会学对主体极的忽视往往被遮蔽了.尽管拉图尔排斥认识论,但是从历史认识论的角度来检视拉图尔社会学则可洞悉这一缺憾,并可揭示后期拉图尔从行动者网络理论(ANT)转向诸存在模式探究(AIME)的意蕴所在.经此转向之后,拉图尔与其对立者(诸如涂尔干、布迪厄以及众多...     

Putting a spin on circulating reference,or how to rediscover the scientific subject

Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of “circulating reference.” Unfortunately, Latour's alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour's diagrammatic representation of his theory, I discover a new space for a post-Kantian scientific subject, a subject brilliantly described by Ludwik Fleck. The neglected subjectivities and ceaseless practices of science are thus re-united.     

Actants and enframing: Heidegger and Latour on technology

A central issue in the philosophy of technology concerns the relationship between technology and the conditions under which technology develops. Traditionally, two main accounts are given of this relationship. The social constructivist approach considers technology to be largely determined by “social” factors (e.g. military interests, economic policy). By contrast, technological determinism describes technology as self-determinative, and as following its own independent aim of greater efficiency. This paper discusses two alternatives to these conceptions of technology, namely, the accounts offered by Bruno Latour and Martin Heidegger. It examines their common theses that our present misunderstanding of technology is due to a continued commitment to the subject–object distinction. The paper further compares their accounts, which attempt to overcome this distinction, and argues that ultimately both authors fail to find a role for human beings that is consistent with their contention that we need to develop a less anthropocentric understanding of the world.