Carnap on unified science

Unified science is a recurring theme in Carnap's work from the time of the Aufbau until the end of the 1930's. The theme is not constant, but knows several variations. I shall extract three quite precise formulations of the thesis of unified science from Carnap's work during this period: from the Aufbau, from Carnap's so-called syntactic period, and from Testability and Meaning and related papers. My main objective is to explain these formulations and to discuss their relation, both to each other and to other aspects of Carnap's work.     

Signs, toy models, and the a priori: from Helmholtz to Wittgenstein

The Marburg neo-Kantians argue that Hermann von Helmholtz’s empiricist account of the a priori does not account for certain knowledge, since it is based on a psychological phenomenon, trust in the regularities of nature. They argue that Helmholtz’s account raises the ‘problem of validity’ (Gültigkeitsproblem): how to establish a warranted claim that observed regularities are based on actual relations. I reconstruct Heinrich Hertz’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Bild theoretic answer to the problem of validity: that scientists and philosophers can depict the necessary a priori constraints on states of affairs in a given system, and can establish whether these relations are actual relations in nature. The analysis of necessity within a system is a lasting contribution of the Bild theory. However, Hertz and Wittgenstein argue that the logical and mathematical sentences of a Bild are rules, tools for constructing relations, and the rules themselves are meaningless outside the theory. Carnap revises the argument for validity by attempting to give semantic rules for translation between frameworks. Russell and Quine object that pragmatics better accounts for the role of a priori reasoning in translating between frameworks. The conclusion of the tale, then, is a partial vindication of Helmholtz’s original account.     

The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn't been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton's fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.     

破碎的系统观

论文讨论了:1、中国传统系统观的基本特征,它们是,普遍主义的大一统的系统观;基础主义和整体主义的系统观;2、科学实践哲学和新经验主义科学哲学蕴含的多元主义的地方性系统观;3、多元主义地方性系统观对于系统科学的意义。     

Forecasting with more than one model

This paper comprises an editorial review for the Special Issue on Combining Forecasts. It gives a background to the current growth of interest in this topic and speculates upon some of the reasons for this popularity. Some of the main methodological issues in practice are also described.     

Gravity’s cause and substance counting: contextualizing the problems

This paper considers Newton’s position on gravity’s cause, both conceptually and historically. With respect to the historical question, I argue that while Newton entertained various hypotheses about gravity’s cause, he never endorsed any of them, and in particular, his lack of confidence in the hypothesis of robust and unmediated distant action by matter is explained by an inclination toward certain metaphysical principles. The conceptual problem about gravity’s cause, which I identified earlier along with a deeper problem about individuating substances, is that a decisive conclusion is impossible unless certain speculative aspects of his empiricism are abandoned. In this paper, I situate those conceptual problems in Newton’s natural philosophy. They arise from ideas that push empiricism to potentially self-defeating limits, revealing the danger of allowing immaterial spirits any place in natural philosophy, especially spatially extended spirits supposed capable of co-occupying place with material bodies. Yet because their source ideas are speculative, Newton’s method ensures that these problems pose no threat to his rational mechanics or the profitable core of his empiricism. They are easily avoided by avoiding their source ideas, and when science emerges from natural philosophy, it does so with an ontology unencumbered by immaterial spirits.     

Newtonianism and religion in the Netherlands

In the early eighteenth century Newtonianism became popular in the Netherlands both in academic (Boerhaave, ’sGravesande, Van Musschenbroek) and non-academic circles. The ‘Book of Nature’ was interpreted with the help of Newton’s natural philosophy and his ideas about a providential deity, thereby greatly enhancing the attractiveness of physico-theology in the eighteenth-century United Provinces. Like other Europeans the Dutch welcomed physico-theology as a strategic means in their battle against irreligion and atheism. Bernard Nieuwentijt, Johan Lulofs, Petrus Camper, and Johannes Florentius Martinet were prominent experts in the field. Combining Newtonian notions with Leibnizian optimism and romanticist trends, physico-theology remained popular in the Netherlands well into the nineteenth century.     

Associationism without associative links: Thomas Brown and the associationist project

There are two roles that association played in 18th–19th century associationism. The first dominates modern understanding of the history of the concept: association is a causal link posited to explain why ideas come in the sequence they do. The second has been ignored: association is merely regularity in the trains of thought, and the target of explanation. The view of association as regularity arose in several forms throughout the tradition, but Thomas Brown (1778–1820) makes the distinction explicit. He argues that there is no associative link, and association is mere sequence. I trace this view of association through the tradition, and consider its implications: Brown's views, in particular, motivate a rethinking of the associationist tradition in psychology. Associationism was a project united by a shared explanandum phenomenon, rather than a theory united by a shared theoretical posit.     

Is Newton a ‘radical empiricist’ about method?

Recently, some Newton scholars have argued that Newton is an empiricist about metaphysics—that ideally, he wants to let advances in physical theory resolve either some or all metaphysical issues. But while proponents of this interpretation are using ‘metaphysics’ in a very broad sense, to include the ‘principles that enable our knowledge of natural phenomena’, attention has thus far been focused on Newton’s approach to ontological, not epistemological or methodological, issues. In this essay, I therefore consider whether Newton wants to let physical theory bear on the very ‘principles that enable our knowledge’. By examining two kinds of argument in the Principia, I contend that Newton can be considered a methodological empiricist in a substantial respect. I also argue, however, that he cannot be a ‘radical empiricist’—that he does not and cannot convert all methodological issues into empirical issues.     

亚里士多德的理论化方式和理性路线

亚里士多德的第一哲学既是关于世界之本体的学说,也是关于知识的思想理论体系;从而形成了通向关于世界(或宇宙)知识的理性路线,并且导向了他的逻辑理性方式。在自然哲学方面,他将对自然世界的解释和使解释作为永恒的和必要的知识这两个目标统一了起来。因此,在他的科学研究中,存在着基于观察的逻辑归纳方法和基于(主要是常识性的)共识的逻辑演绎方法两条方法论路线。亚里士多德对经验证据的接受,标志了认知境界的重大转换,从而对科学理性主义的生长做出了贡献。