我国商业银行防范网络安全风险的博弈模型

为探究骇客与商业银行的博弈信念,在分析骇客与商业银行对银行网络安全系统进行攻击与防御博弈时的成本和收益的基础上,运用信号博弈模型研究了骇客与商业银行博弈的状况.认为商业银行欲避免骇客进攻,需通过媒体将声誉维持在较高水平,使骇客相信对此银行进行攻击,所获得收益低于投入进攻的平均直接成本;理性的商业银行出于成本的考虑,会希望在提高声誉过程中所获得的边际利润与因骇客进攻而导致的银行损失相等.由此,监管当局应通过增加对商业银行网络安全情况检查的频率,增加对商业银行因网络信息安全风险导致损失情况的曝光力度等措施来迫使商业银行加大对网络安全的投入.     

教师教学模糊指标评价体系研究及算法设计

In order to improve the teaching evaluation effect,it is very significant to study the teachers evaluation indicator system and offer the algorithm of the evaluation methods.The teachers evaluation indicator system includes two parts:one part is the solid indicator of the teaching activities,that is,the fixed indicator;the other part is the Soft indicator of the teaching activities,that is,the Fuzzy indicator.The solid indicator contains lessons,hours,achievements,etc;the Fuzzy indicator consists of teachers qualification,teaching methods,student understanding and satisfaction,etc.,which can not be easily measured by fixed values.Fuzzy indicator holds an important position during teaching evaluation.Since there are no better indicator systems and quantified algorithm in higher education institutes these days,we will focus on studying the fuzzy indicator system here.