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A distinction is made between theory-driven and phenomenological models. It is argued that phenomenological models are significant means by which theory is applied to phenomena. They act both as sources of knowledge of their target systems and are explanatory of the behaviors of the latter. A version of the shell-model of nuclear structure is analyzed and it is explained why such a model cannot be understood as being subsumed under the theory structure of Quantum Mechanics. Thus its representational capacity does not stem from its close link to theory. It is shown that the shell model yields knowledge about the target and is explanatory of certain behaviors of nuclei. Aspects of the process by which the shell model acquires its representational capacity are analyzed. It is argued that these point to the conclusion that the representational status of the model is a function of its capacity to function as a source of knowledge and its capacity to postulate and explain underlying mechanisms that give rise to the observed behavior of its target. 相似文献
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The process of abstraction and concretisation is a label used for an explicative theory of scientific model-construction. In scientific theorising this process enters
at various levels. We could identify two principal levels of abstraction that are useful to our understanding of theory-application.
The first level is that of selecting a small number of variables and parameters abstracted from the universe of discourse
and used to characterise the general laws of a theory. In classical mechanics, for example, we select position and momentum and establish a relation amongst the two variables, which we call Newton’s 2nd law. The specification of the unspecified
elements of scientific laws, e.g. the force function in Newton’s 2nd law, is what would establish the link between the assertions
of the theory and physical systems. In order to unravel how and with what conceptual resources scientific models are constructed,
how they function and how they relate to theory, we need a view of theory-application that can accommodate our constructions
of representation models. For this we need to expand our understanding of the process of abstraction to also explicate the
process of specifying force functions etc. This is the second principal level at which abstraction enters in our theorising
and in which I focus. In this paper, I attempt to elaborate a general analysis of the process of abstraction and concretisation
involved in scientific- model construction, and argue why it provides an explication of the construction of models of the
nuclear structure. 相似文献
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