Digging with ‘hands’: observations of food capture in the flying gurnard Dactylopterus volitans (Linnaeus, 1758)

ABSTRACT

Videofilms of a foraging flying gurnard (Dactylopterus volitans) were collected at Itaipu, Niterói, RJ, Brazil. Analysis revealed details of the use of anterior parts of the pectoral fins which act as digging ‘hands’ to access infaunal prey items that are subsequently captured by oral suction feeding. Each pectoral fin has two distinct sections articulated separately on the pectoral girdle. The digging ‘anterior pectoral fin’ mainly consists of segmented and flexible fin rays but has an anterior robust unsegmented ray that provides an edge to the ‘hand’, allowing penetration of the substratum. The huge ‘posterior pectoral fins’ are supported by unsegmented rays. Most digging episodes involved one ‘hand’ and consisted of 1–7 cycles of movement with frequencies 1.15–3.74 cycles s^?1. During a cycle, the ‘hand’ is moved forwards and medially above the substratum, then is twisted medially and simultaneously depressed so that the anterior unsegmented ray impacts and enters the substratum. The hand is then drawn backwards and laterally to disturb the substratum. To prevent upward pitching of the head during digging, the ‘posterior pectoral fins’ are both moved anteriorly and laterally to shift the centre of gravity forwards while the caudal and ?second dorsal fins continue to provide propulsive force.     

Pierre Duhem’s virtue epistemology

Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is central to his philosophy of science, given that it is what allows scientists to decide between competing theories. Scientists must use good sense and have intellectual and moral virtues in order to be neutral arbiters of scientific theories, especially when choosing between empirically adequate theories. I discuss the parallels in Duhem’s views to those of virtue epistemologists, who understand justified belief as that arrived at by a cognitive agent with intellectual and moral virtues, showing how consideration of Duhem as a virtue epistemologist offers insights into his views, as well as providing possible answers to some puzzles about virtue epistemology. The extent to which Duhem holds that the intellectual and moral virtues of the scientist determine scientific knowledge has not been generally noticed.