Variations in Variation and Selection: The Ubiquity of the Variation-and-Selective-Retention Ratchet in Emergent Organizational Complexity, Part II: Quantum Field Theory

If the general arguments concerning theinvolvement of variation and selection inexplanations of ``fit'' are valid, then variationand selection explanations should beappropriate, or at least potentiallyappropriate, outside the paradigm historisticdomains of biology and knowledge. In thisdiscussion, I wish to indicate some potentialroles for variation and selection infoundational physics – specifically inquantum field theory. I will not be attemptingany full coherent ontology for quantum fieldtheory – none currently exists, and none islikely for at least the short term future. Instead, I wish to engage in some partiallyspeculative interpretations of some interestingresults in this area with the aim ofdemonstrating that variation and selectionnotions might play a role even here. Ifvariation and selection can survive in even asinhospitable and non-paradigmatic a terrain asfoundational physics, then it can surviveanywhere.     

The influence of chronic nicotine treatment on stress-induced gastric ulceration and emptying rate in rats.

Ten-day treatment with nicotine (5, 25 or 50 micrograms/ml drinking water) dose-dependently intensified gastric ulceration induced by cold-restraint, and emptying rate. Stomach contractions produced by graded doses of bethanechol i.v. were elevated further by nicotine treatment. It is suggested that chronic nicotine administration produces hypersensitivity of the gastric muscarinic receptors; stomach hypermotility contributes to the ulcer-worsening action of the alkaloid.     

Pierre Duhem’s virtue epistemology

Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is central to his philosophy of science, given that it is what allows scientists to decide between competing theories. Scientists must use good sense and have intellectual and moral virtues in order to be neutral arbiters of scientific theories, especially when choosing between empirically adequate theories. I discuss the parallels in Duhem’s views to those of virtue epistemologists, who understand justified belief as that arrived at by a cognitive agent with intellectual and moral virtues, showing how consideration of Duhem as a virtue epistemologist offers insights into his views, as well as providing possible answers to some puzzles about virtue epistemology. The extent to which Duhem holds that the intellectual and moral virtues of the scientist determine scientific knowledge has not been generally noticed.