Strong Time-Consistent Core for a Class of Linear-State Games

Time consistency is an important property of any solution to a cooperative dynamic game.If the solution satisfies this property, players do not need to revise it and break a cooperative agreement.Strong time consistency is a stricter property which is applicable to cooperative set solutions. In this paper, the authors examine a class of linear-state games which come into use in many applications of dynamic games. Considering the core as the solution of the game, the authors provide sufficient conditions for its strong time consistency. In case of its inconsistency, the authors show how core elements can be realized using a strong time-consistent imputation distribution procedure.     

Cooperation in two-stage games on undirected networks

In the paper, cooperative two-stage network games are studied. At the first stage of the game, players form a network, while at the second stage players choose their behaviors according to the network realized at the first stage. As a cooperative solution concept in the game, the core is considered. It is proved that some imputations from the core are time inconsistent, whereas one can design for them a time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. Moreover, the strong time consistency problem is also investigated.