建筑创作活动中的创新能力剖析

建筑创作活动具有艺术与工程的双重属性 ,本文从建筑创作活动的特点出发 ,综合广义的创造力研究成果 ,从建筑创作的思维特点、建筑师的个性特征、建筑创作过程、建筑创作成果、建筑创作的源泉等方面来剖析建筑创作能力的特征和内涵     

论科学发展观的系统思维特征

当代系统思维作为反映现代科学研究方法论内在要求的社会思维范式，具有自身思维的开放性、复杂性、整体性和协调发展性等基本特点。当代系统思维是科学发展的思维基础。科学发展观本质上是属于系统思维发展观，具有发展思维的开放性、人之主体性、人之动因与目的性、发展形式的多样性、整体的协调性和有序调控性等系统思维特征及其时代内涵。     

《庄》、《骚》浪漫主义之比较

作为浪漫主义珍品，《庄》、《骚》同受荆楚文化和古代神话的影响，都具有奇伟超拔的想象，都显示出一种独立不群的个体人格，另外，在艺术手法方面也有相似之处。但《庄》、《骚》浪漫主义精神产生的思想基础不同，思维方式也不一样，对神话的接受形式亦多有差异。     

关于高校德育创新问题的思考

德育创新是当前高校德育工作的重点。树立创新的德育教师观和学生观对强化有效的德育举措十分重要，德育创新必须注重马列主义、爱国主义、人生价值观和心理素质的教育，结合信息技术和手段，积极探讨德育新途径。     

论认识的主体性原则

随着认识论本身不断发展,思维的建构性揭示出认识是反映、反思与建构的统一.人类活动的最基本原则是主体性原则.马克思在哲学上所完成的革命性变革,关键在于提出了以实践为基础的主体性原则.     

Web Quest在计算机技能教学中的应用研究

在校园网络迅速发展的今天，基于探究性学习理论的网络主题探究学习模式Web Quest得到了越来越多的教育者关注。把Web Quest引进计算机技能课教学中，探索出了一条适合计算机教学的Web Quest模式。     

Can the behavioral sciences self-correct? A social epistemic study

Advocates of the self-corrective thesis argue that scientific method will refute false theories and find closer approximations to the truth in the long run. I discuss a contemporary interpretation of this thesis in terms of frequentist statistics in the context of the behavioral sciences. First, I identify experimental replications and systematic aggregation of evidence (meta-analysis) as the self-corrective mechanism. Then, I present a computer simulation study of scientific communities that implement this mechanism to argue that frequentist statistics may converge upon a correct estimate or not depending on the social structure of the community that uses it. Based on this study, I argue that methodological explanations of the “replicability crisis” in psychology are limited and propose an alternative explanation in terms of biases. Finally, I conclude suggesting that scientific self-correction should be understood as an interaction effect between inference methods and social structures.     

Inconsistent idealizations and inferentialism about scientific representation

Inferentialists about scientific representation hold that an apparatus's representing a target system consists in the apparatus allowing “surrogative inferences” about the target. I argue that a serious problem for inferentialism arises from the fact that many scientific theories and models contain internal inconsistencies. Inferentialism, left unamended, implies that inconsistent scientific models have unlimited representational power, since an inconsistency permits any conclusion to be inferred. I consider a number of ways that inferentialists can respond to this challenge before suggesting my own solution. I develop an analogy to exploitable glitches in a game. Even though inconsistent representational apparatuses may in some sense allow for contradictions to be generated within them, doing so violates the intended function of the apparatus's parts and hence violates representational “gameplay”.     

Silent performances: Are “repertoires” really post-Kuhnian?

Ankeny and Leonelli (2016) propose “repertoires” as a new way to understand the stability of certain research programs as well as scientific change in general. By bringing a more complete range of social, material, and epistemic elements into one framework, they position their work as a correction to the Kuhnian impulse in philosophy of science and other areas of science studies. I argue that this “post-Kuhnian” move is not complete, and that repertoires maintain an internalist perspective. Comparison with an alternative framework, the “sociotechnical imaginaries” of Jasanoff and Kim (2015), illustrates precisely which elements of practice are externalized by Ankeny and Leonelli. Specifically, repertoires discount the role of audience, without whom the repertoires of science are unintelligible, and lack an explicit place for ethical and political imagination, which provide meaning for otherwise mechanical promotion of particular research programs. This comparison reveals, I suggest, two distinct modes of scholarship, one internalist and the other critical. While repertoires can be modified to meet the needs of critical STS scholars and to completely reject Kuhn's internalism, whether or not we do so depends on what we want our scholarship to achieve.