“中层性质”的因果力与稳健性论证

"中层性质",例如化学、生物学、生态学等特殊科学关涉的物的性质,是否具有因果力,向来是科学哲学中还原主义与反还原主义争论的焦点问题。在为中层性质拥有自发的、不可还原的因果力辩护的论证当中,基于干预主义因果理论的稳健性论证,相较于传统论证具有一定的优势:中层性质的因果力来自于中层的因果共变的稳健性,因而独立于底层,进而能够回应因果排他问题。但进一步分析稳健性论证所提供的案例表明,事实上,稳健性所依赖的中层性质对底层性质的反馈性约束作用才是中层性质具有因果力的关键理由,然而该反馈性约束作用不普遍适用于所有的中层性质;换言之,并非所有中层性质都具有独特的因果力。     

基于语料库的西藏白皮书内的专名翻译研究

西藏白皮书的编写与发布在外宣工作中占据着重要位置,而其中西藏专名翻译规范性的重要性也较为突出。本文使用语料库的技术,对西藏白皮书内的专名翻译进行了分析。在专名的翻译过程中,存在着一名同译、一名多译、增译与省译并存、音译与意译并存等多种翻译现象与翻译方法。有鉴于此,文内提出应规范转写方案,审定西藏专名,统一翻译方法。     

基于因果岭回归的多数据源科研主题识别方法

为了有效解决多数据源科研主题的识别问题,基于因果岭回归建立了一种新的多数据源科研主题识别方法.该方法首先给出了多数据源科研主题识别关键参数(如主题词的引用权重、状态密度)的评价指标;同时根据科研主题形态特征建立了特征函数,并基于因果岭回归给出了具体识别方法;最后,通过仿真实验深入研究了影响该识别方法的关键因素.结果显示,与朴素贝叶斯、KNN算法和MGe-LDA算法相比较,该方法在价值引用量、引用权重和前沿主题相似度等方面具有较大优势.     

综合类期刊2012-2014年载文作者群统计分析--以地方科学院主办的科技期刊为例

应用文献计量学的方法，对?河南科学?、?山东科学?、?广西科学?、?甘肃科学学报?2012—2014年的载文量、基金论文比、作者地域分布和所属单位的分布、论文作者数、合著率进行了统计和对比分析，为提高?甘肃科学学报?今后在综合类期刊中的排名、促进自身发展提供参考。     

开放科学及建构的制度逻辑

科学与技术是两种不同的制度模式,前者属于科学共和国"Republic of Science",后者属于技术王国"Realm of Technology",两者具有天生的互补性。开放科学作为一种非市场化的激励制度,提出一套基于优先权的报酬体制,强调在知识产权保护前提下追求创新知识社会福利的最大化,对于催生高质量的研究和创新(Research&Innovation)至关重要。本文在阐述开放科学起源、发展与理论内涵的基础上,重点从公共资助、累积创新、知识产权保护和知识分工四个方面,深入探究了开放科学建构的制度逻辑。     

Extensional scientific realism vs. intensional scientific realism

Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while intensional realism is not, to the pessimistic induction. I reply that if extensional realism overcomes the pessimistic induction at all, that is because it implicitly relies on the theoretical resource of intensional realism. I also argue that extensional realism, by nature, cannot embed a criterion for distinguishing between believable and unbelievable theories.     

赵九章科学研究的系统性思想刍议

著名的"两弹一星"元勋赵九章是一位"领军型"的科学家。他不但是科学研究领域中的多面手,而且在在科技管理、科技攻关方面具有出色的能力。他系统性的科学研究思想今年看来仍没有过时,对今天的科技界仍颇具启发和借鉴意义。他的"任务带学科,学科促任务"的思想,他的教育与科研结合的思想,他立足生产实践的科研思想,以及"鸡爪变鸭掌"的系统性思想都是科学研究的宝贵精神财富。     

Scientific progress as increasing verisimilitude

According to the foundationalist picture, shared by many rationalists and positivist empiricists, science makes cognitive progress by accumulating justified truths. Fallibilists, who point out that complete certainty cannot be achieved in empirical science, can still argue that even successions of false theories may progress toward the truth. This proposal was supported by Karl Popper with his notion of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Popper’s own technical definition failed, but the idea that scientific progress means increasing truthlikeness can be expressed by defining degrees of truthlikeness in terms of similarities between states of affairs. This paper defends the verisimilitude approach against Alexander Bird who argues that the “semantic” definition (in terms of truth or truthlikeness alone) is not sufficient to define progress, but the “epistemic” definition referring to justification and knowledge is more adequate. Here Bird ignores the crucial distinction between real progress and estimated progress, explicated by the difference between absolute (and usually unknown) degrees of truthlikeness and their evidence-relative expected values. Further, it is argued that Bird’s idea of returning to the cumulative model of growth requires an implausible trick of transforming past false theories into true ones.     

设立战略家工作室，创建世界一流思想库

思想库建设的核心是出新思想和出战略思想家。思想是个人创造的，需要十年磨一剑，往往以学术专著的形式发表。运用开放式评价与“成果＆amp;行为”创新人才评鉴法可以及时识别战略思想家，为他们设立战略家工作室，形成战略家工作室网络，创建世界一流思想库。     

A different kind of revolutionary change: transformation from object to process concepts

I propose a new perspective with which to understand scientific revolutions. This is a conversion from an object-only perspective to one that properly treats object and process concepts as distinct kinds. I begin with a re-examination of the Copernican revolution. Recent findings from the history of astronomy suggest that the Copernican revolution was a move from a conceptual framework built around an object concept to one built around a process concept. Drawing from studies in the cognitive sciences, I then show that process concepts are independent of object concepts, grounded in specific regions of the brain and involving unique representational mechanisms. There are cognitive obstacles to the transformation from object to process concepts, and an object bias—a tendency to treat processes as objects—makes this kind of conceptual change difficult. Consequently, transformation from object to process concepts is disruptive and revolutionary. Finally, I explore the implications of this new perspective on scientific revolutions for both the history and philosophy of science.