拟环面限制Leibniz代数

把拟环面限制李代数的性质推广到限制Leibniz代数, 得到了拟环面限制Leibniz代数的一些重要性质, 并利用这些性质给出了拟环面限制Leibniz代数交换性的几个充分条件.     

Leibniz代数的通用包络代数

把李代数通用包络代数的性质推广到Leibniz代数, 给出了Leibniz代数L的通用包络代数U(L)的定义, 并利用该定义得到了U(L)的生成元集, 确定了U(L)的唯一性定理和U(L)模结构定理, 证明了通用包络代数U(L)的存在性.     

和谐与贯通——莱布尼茨的STS活动及启示

STS是二战前后兴起的新兴领域和学科,其根本特征是科学、技术、社会三者相互渗透所形成的复合性超学科理念。而这早在莱布尼茨的科学活动中就有许多体现。莱布尼茨的STS活动可以分为理论和实践二个方面。在理论活动方面,他坚持整体的科学理念,开展跨界性的学术研究和对科学的人文性理解;在STS实践方面,他通过建立广泛的学术联系以及推动学术共同体的建设来开展科学、技术与社会的综合活动。这既有个体思想与立场、治学特点和风格的原因,也有研究范式和非学院化的社会身份的原因。由于莱布尼茨的手稿在生前大部分没有公布,结果导致了罗素所说的隐显两个"莱布尼茨"的存在。今天,研究莱布尼茨既要去挖掘和"发现",又要去推动和实践他的理想。     

Theoretical construction in physics – The role of Leibniz for Weyl's ‘Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft’

This paper aims at closing a gap in recent Weyl research by investigating the role played by Leibniz for the development and consolidation of Weyl's notion of theoretical (symbolic) construction. For Weyl, just as for Leibniz, mathematics was not simply an accompanying tool when doing physics—for him it meant the ability to engage in well-guided speculations about a general framework of reality and experience. The paper first introduces some of the background of Weyl's notion of theoretical construction and then discusses particular Leibnizian inheritances in Weyl's ‘Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft’, such as the general appreciation of the principles of sufficient reason and of continuity. Afterwards the paper focuses on three themes: first, Leibniz's primary quality phenomenalism, which according to Weyl marked the decisive step in realizing that physical qualities are never apprehended directly; second, the conceptual relation between continuity and freedom; and third, Leibniz's notion of ‘expression’, which allows for a certain type of (surrogative) reasoning by structural analogy and which gave rise to Weyl's optimism regarding the scope of theoretical construction.     

定积分不等式的几种典型证法

介绍定积分不等式的几种典型证法。     

Leibniz and the post-Copernican universe. Koyré revisited

This paper employs the revised conception of Leibniz emerging from recent research to reassess critically the ‘radical spiritual revolution’ which, according to Alexandre Koyré’s landmark book, From the closed world to the infinite universe (1957) was precipitated in the seventeenth century by the revolutions in physics, astronomy, and cosmology. While conceding that the cosmological revolution necessitated a reassessment of the place of value-concepts within cosmology, it argues that this reassessment did not entail a spiritual revolution of the kind assumed by Koyré, in which ‘value-concepts, such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim’ were shed from the conception of the structure of the universe altogether. On the contrary, thanks to his pioneering intuition of the distinction between physical and metaphysical levels of explanation, Leibniz saw with great clarity that a scientific explanation of the universe which rejected the ‘closed world’ typical of Aristotelian cosmology did not necessarily require the abandonment of key metaphysical doctrines underlying the Aristotelian conception of the universe. Indeed the canon of value-concepts mentioned by Koyré—meaning, aim, perfection and harmony—reads like a list of the most important concepts underlying the Leibnizian conception of the metaphysical structure of the universe. Moreover, Leibniz’s universe, far from being a universe without God—because, as Clarke insinuated, it does not need intervention from God—is a universe which in its deepest ontological fabric is interwoven with the presence of God.     

Supervenience and (non-modal) reductionism in Leibniz’s philosophy of time

It has recently been suggested that, for Leibniz, temporal facts globally supervene on causal facts, with the result that worlds differing with respect to their causal facts can be indiscernible with respect to their temporal facts. Such an interpretation is at variance with more traditional readings of Leibniz’s causal theory of time, which hold that Leibniz reduces temporal facts to causal facts. In this article, I argue against the global supervenience construal of Leibniz’s philosophy of time. On the view of Leibniz defended here, he adopts a non-modal reduction of time to events, a form of reductionism that entails a strong covariation between a world’s temporal facts and its causal facts. Consequently, worlds discernible with respect to their temporal facts must be discernible with respect to their causal facts, and worlds discernible with respect to their causal facts must be discernible with respect to their temporal facts. This position strongly favors the standard identificatory reduction of time to causation often imputed to Leibniz.     

The “dynamics” of Leibnizian relationism: Reference frames and force in Leibniz's plenum

This paper explores various metaphysical aspects of Leibniz's concepts of space, motion, and matter, with the intention of demonstrating how the distinctive role of force in Leibnizian physics can be used to develop a theory of relational motion using privileged reference frames. Although numerous problems will remain for a consistent Leibnizian relationist account, the version developed within our investigation will advance the work of previous commentators by more accurately reflecting the specific details of Leibniz's own natural philosophy, especially his handling of the dynamical interactions of plenum bodies.     

Forces and causes in Kant’s early pre-Critical writings

This paper considers Kant’s conception of force and causality in his early pre-Critical writings, arguing that this conception is best understood by way of contrast with his immediate predecessors, such as Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, Georg Friedrich Meier, Martin Knutzen, and Christian August Crusius, and in terms of the scientific context of natural philosophy at the time. Accordingly, in the True estimation Kant conceives of force in terms of activity rather than in terms of specific effects, such as motion (as unnamed Wolffians had done). Kant’s explicit arguments in the Nova dilucidatio for physical influx (in the guise of the principle of succession) are directed primarily against the conception of grounds and existence held by Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier, and only secondarily against Leibniz (by asserting the priority of bodies over mind rather than vice versa). Finally, Kant’s reconciliation of the infinite divisibility of space and the unity of monads in the Physical monadology is designed to respond to objections that could be raised naturally by Wolff and Baumgarten.     

一类W（0,1）李代数的中心扩张的Leibniz2-上循环

李代数是一类特殊的Leibniz代数．李代数的Leibniz中心扩张得到了广泛的研究．但是仍有许多李代数的Leibniz中心扩张尚未确定．确定了一类W（0,1）李代数的一维中心扩张的所有的Leibniz2-上循环,从而确定了这类李代数的Leibniz中心扩张．