How to infer explanations from computer simulations

Computer simulations are involved in numerous branches of modern science, and science would not be the same without them. Yet the question of how they can explain real-world processes remains an issue of considerable debate. In this context, a range of authors have highlighted the inferences back to the world that computer simulations allow us to draw. I will first characterize the precise relation between computer and target of a simulation that allows us to draw such inferences. I then argue that in a range of scientifically interesting cases they are particular abductions and defend this claim by appeal to two case studies.     

Careful with those scissors,Eugene! Against the observational indistinguishability of spacetimes

We discuss Manchak (2009a)'s result that there are locally (but not globally) isometric universes observationally indistinguishable from our own. This theorem makes the epistemic predicament of modern cosmology particularly problematic and the prospects of ever gaining knowledge of the global structure of the universe rather unlikely in the context of general relativity. We argue however that this conclusion is too quick; indeed, Manchak's theorem deploys spacetimes which are not physically reasonable, since they have features which are not the product of any physical process. This ultimately rests on the fact that local isometry between two spacetimes is not sufficient to guarantee that they are both physically reasonable. We propose an additional condition to properly define when a spacetime is physically reasonable, and we show that Manchak's spacetimes do not satisfy this further demand.     

一般原型—模型论的理论体系（Ⅳ）：在原—模关系上定义,改造与推广函数论和微积分

通过一般原型－模型论的原－模关系公理对该理论的内容体系作了大致的概括和描术这，从而可以显示出一般原型－模型论的广阔研究范围与普适范围。     

也论恩格斯与马克思哲学思想的差异——读《提纲》、《终结》和俞吾金的《差异》

俞吾金先生的《论恩格斯与马克思哲学思想的差异—从<终结>和<提纲>的比较看》一文实际上将马恩的哲学思想对立起来,该文认为这种对立有待商榷。由于所要解决的问题等的不同,《提纲》和《终结》在形式和内容等方面有差异是理所当然的,二者的根本观点是一致的。     

The stage on which our ingenious play is performed: Kant's epistemology of Weltkenntnis

This paper focuses on Kant's account of physical geography and his theory of the Earth. In spelling out the epistemological foundations of Kant's physical geography, the paper examines 1) their connection to the mode of holding-to-be-true, mathematical construction and empirical certainty and 2) their implications for Kant's view of cosmopolitan right. Moreover, by showing the role played by the mathematical model of the Earth for the foundations of Kant's Doctrine of Right, the exact relationship between the latter and physical geography is highlighted. Finally, this paper shows how, in Kant's view, the progress of physical geography can be assured if and only if the free circulation of human beings is established and regulated by law. Therefore, examining the mutual relationship between the theory of Earth and the foundations of right opens new perspectives on the relationship between epistemology and practical philosophy within Kant's system.     

Computer models and the evidence of anthropogenic climate change: An epistemology of variety-of-evidence inferences and robustness analysis

To study climate change, scientists employ computer models, which approximate target systems with various levels of skill. Given the imperfection of climate models, how do scientists use simulations to generate knowledge about the causes of observed climate change? Addressing a similar question in the context of biological modelling, Levins (1966) proposed an account grounded in robustness analysis. Recent philosophical discussions dispute the confirmatory power of robustness, raising the question of how the results of computer modelling studies contribute to the body of evidence supporting hypotheses about climate change. Expanding on Staley’s (2004) distinction between evidential strength and security, and Lloyd’s (2015) argument connecting variety-of-evidence inferences and robustness analysis, I address this question with respect to recent challenges to the epistemology robustness analysis. Applying this epistemology to case studies of climate change, I argue that, despite imperfections in climate models, and epistemic constraints on variety-of-evidence reasoning and robustness analysis, this framework accounts for the strength and security of evidence supporting climatological inferences, including the finding that global warming is occurring and its primary causes are anthropogenic.     

Naturalized epistemology, or what the Strong Programme can’t explain

In this paper I argue that the Strong Programme’s aim to provide robust explanations of belief acquisition is limited by its commitment to the symmetry principle. For Bloor and Barnes, the symmetry principle is intended to drive home the fact that epistemic norms are socially constituted. My argument here is that even if our epistemic standards are fully naturalized—even relativized—they nevertheless can play a pivotal role in why individuals adopt the beliefs that they do. Indeed, sometimes the fact that a belief is locally endorsed as rational is the only reason why an individual holds it. In this way, norms of rationality have a powerful and unique role in belief formation. But if this is true then the symmetry principle’s emphasis on ‘sameness of type’ is misguided. It has the undesirable effect of not just naturalizing our cognitive commitments, but trivializing them. Indeed, if the notion of ‘similarity’ is to have any content, then we are not going to classify as ‘the same’ beliefs that are formed in accordance with deeply entrenched epistemic norms as ones formed without reflection on these norms, or ones formed in spite of these norms. My suggestion here is that we give up the symmetry principle in favor of a more sophisticated principle, one that allows for a taxonomy of causes rich enough to allow us to delineate the unique impact epistemic norms have on those individuals who subscribe to them.     

Chemistry in the French tradition of philosophy of science: Duhem, Meyerson, Metzger and Bachelard

At first glance twentieth-century philosophy of science seems virtually to ignore chemistry. However this paper argues that a focus on chemistry helped shape the French philosophical reflections about the aims and foundations of scientific methods. Despite patent philosophical disagreements between Duhem, Meyerson, Metzger and Bachelard it is possible to identify the continuity of a tradition that is rooted in their common interest for chemistry. Two distinctive features of the French tradition originated in the attention to what was going on in chemistry.French philosophers of science, in stark contrast with analytic philosophers, considered history of science as the necessary basis for understanding how the human intellect or the scientific spirit tries to grasp the world. This constant reference to historical data was prompted by a fierce controversy about the chemical revolution, which brought the issue of the nature of scientific changes centre stage.A second striking—albeit largely unnoticed—feature of the French tradition is that matter theories are a favourite subject with which to characterize the ways of science. Duhem, Meyerson, Metzger and Bachelard developed most of their views about the methods and aims of science through a discussion of matter theories. Just as the concern with history was prompted by a controversy between chemists, the focus on matter was triggered by a scientific controversy about atomism in the late nineteenth-century.     

安慰剂效应中的方法论挑战与身心关系

安慰剂和安慰剂效应是现代科学研究方法论的重要组成部分。对安慰剂效应的新的科学研究表明,安慰剂效应是真实存在的生理现象,且表现出主体性和情境性,这给科学研究对医疗有效性的检验带来了方法论上的挑战,给关于自我实现的信念、预期与反思意识中的身心关系等问题带来知识论上的挑战。文章提出,意义响应为回应这些挑战提供了可能的视角。从意义响应出发,从病人的主体性和社会文化体验来考查医疗过程,沟通了文化、心理和生理的身体,可以解决安慰剂效应在定义、方法与机制解释方面的模糊和混杂,避免条件反射、预期理论等在安慰剂效应的解释中对身体和心理非此即彼的强调带来的矛盾,并启发生物医学研究在证据判断上关注实践者。     

一般原型—模型论的理论体系(Ⅱ)

通过一般原型—模型论的同型公理（及模型公理）对该理论的内容体系作了大致的概括和描述，从而可以显示出一般原型—模型论的广阔研究范围与普适范围