Kant and the scope of analogy in the life sciences

In the present paper I investigate the role that analogy plays in eighteenth-century biology and in Kant's philosophy of biology. I will argue that according to Kant, biology, as it was practiced in the eighteenth century, is fundamentally based on analogical reflection. However, precisely because biology is based on analogical reflection, biology cannot be a proper science. I provide two arguments for this interpretation. First, I argue that although analogical reflection is, according to Kant, necessary to comprehend the nature of organisms, it is also necessarily insufficient to fully comprehend the nature of organisms. The upshot of this argument is that for Kant our understanding of organisms is necessarily limited. Second, I argue that Kant did not take biology to be a proper science because biology was based on analogical arguments. I show that Kant stemmed from a philosophical tradition that did not assign analogical arguments an important justificatory role in natural science. Analogy, according to this conception, does not provide us with apodictically certain cognition. Hence, sciences based on analogical arguments cannot constitute proper sciences.     

Between Kepler and Newton: Hooke’s ‘principles of congruity and incongruity’ and the naturalization of mathematics

ABSTRACT

Robert Hooke’s development of the theory of matter-as-vibration provides coherence to a career in natural philosophy which is commonly perceived as scattered and haphazard. It also highlights aspects of his work for which he is rarely credited: besides the creative speculative imagination and practical-instrumental ingenuity for which he is known, it displays lucid and consistent theoretical thought and mathematical skills. Most generally and importantly, however, Hooke’s ‘Principles?…?of Congruity and Incongruity of bodies’ represent a uniquely powerful approach to the most pressing challenge of the New Science: legitimizing the application of mathematics to the study of nature. This challenge required reshaping the mathematical practices and procedures; an epistemological framework supporting these practices; and a metaphysics which could make sense of this epistemology. Hooke’s ‘Uniform Geometrical or Mechanical Method’ was a bold attempt to answer the three challenges together, by interweaving mathematics through physics into metaphysics and epistemology. Mathematics, in his rendition, was neither an abstract and ideal structure (as it was for Kepler), nor a wholly-flexible, artificial human tool (as it was for Newton). It drew its power from being contingent on the particularities of the material world.     

Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals

In recent papers and a book, Heather Douglas has expanded on the well-known argument from inductive risk, thereby launching an influential contemporary critique of the value-free ideal for science. This paper distills Douglas’s critique into four major claims. The first three claims provide a significant challenge to the value-free ideal for science. However, the fourth claim, which delineates her positive proposal to regulate values in science by distinguishing direct and indirect roles for values, is ambiguous between two interpretations, and both have weaknesses. Fortunately, two elements of Douglas’s work that have previously received much less emphasis (namely, her comments about the goals of scientific activity and the ethics of communicating about values) provide resources for developing a more promising approach for regulating values in science.     

21世纪冶金和材料制备学的发展及对策

21世纪中冶金学及材料制备学的发展在于两个方向。其一是信息论冶金学和材料制备学;其二是在若干外加物理场综合作用下的7台金和材料制备过程。前者意在创建冶金学及材料制备学的一个新的高度。所以,由基础研究到过程控制有5个平台包含在此概念之中。关于第二个方向,本文讨论了超强磁场、脉冲电磁场、脉冲电流、超声波、等离子体以及离子选择性高效透过膜的应用可能性。对企业的发展提出了一个建议：应懂得技术储备的重要。     

复杂性研究与系统思维方式

复杂性研究是人类认识史、科学史上的重大转折点，提出复杂性定义与特征及其研究的主要方向。对复杂性研究必须摒弃传统的思维方式，指出系统思维方式是适应复杂性探索的新思维方式。     

French historical epistemology: Discourse,concepts, and the norms of rationality

In recent years, analytic philosophers have begun to recognize the value of the French school of historical epistemology (as embodied by figures such as Jean Cavaillès, Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and Michel Foucault) for contemporary debates in the history and philosophy of science. This tradition, which some characterize as a ‘French’ approach to the philosophy of science, however, remains largely un-read by mainstream philosophers of science. This article offers an interpretation of this tradition, highlighting what the author takes to be its two central features: (i) its claim that scientific discourse is the object of epistemology and (ii) its claim that scientific concepts are the building blocks of scientific discourse.     

Value disputes in urban ecological restoration: Lessons from the Chicago Wilderness

As a practice to facilitate the recovery of degraded ecosystems, ecological restoration is an inherently value-laden endeavor. Urban ecological restoration further underlines the complexity of value-ladenness involved by situating restoration in politically, ethically, epistemically, and otherwise normatively heterogenous social contexts. One such context that is particularly rich in opportunities for both significant restoration projects and social disputes about the value of such projects is the Chicago Wilderness, a region comprised of a variety of ecosystems on public and private lands across Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. Here I offer a close reading of value disputes in the Chicago Wilderness among ecologists, practitioners, policymakers, activists, and journalists over the aims, methods, and constitutive activities of urban ecological restoration.     

The tragedy of the canon; or,path dependence in the history and philosophy of science

We have previously argued that historical cases must be rendered canonical before they can plausibly serve as evidence for philosophical claims, where canonicity is established through a process of negotiation among historians and philosophers of science (Bolinska and Martin, 2020). Here, we extend this proposal by exploring how that negotiation might take place in practice. The working stock of historical examples that philosophers tend to employ has long been established informally, and, as a result, somewhat haphazardly. The composition of the historical canon of philosophy of science is therefore path dependent, and cases often become stock examples for reasons tangential to their appropriateness for the purposes at hand. We show how the lack of rigor around the canonization of case studies has muddied the waters in selected philosophical debates. This, in turn, lays the groundwork for proposing ways in which they can be improved.     

The “dynamics” of Leibnizian relationism: Reference frames and force in Leibniz's plenum

This paper explores various metaphysical aspects of Leibniz's concepts of space, motion, and matter, with the intention of demonstrating how the distinctive role of force in Leibnizian physics can be used to develop a theory of relational motion using privileged reference frames. Although numerous problems will remain for a consistent Leibnizian relationist account, the version developed within our investigation will advance the work of previous commentators by more accurately reflecting the specific details of Leibniz's own natural philosophy, especially his handling of the dynamical interactions of plenum bodies.