Thought styles and paradigms: A comparative study of Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn

At first glance there seem to be many similarities between Thomas S. Kuhn’s and Ludwik Fleck’s accounts of the development of scientific knowledge. Notably, both pay attention to the role played by the scientific community in the development of scientific knowledge. But putting first impressions aside, one can criticise some philosophers for being too hasty in their attempt to find supposed similarities in the works of the two men. Having acknowledged that Fleck anticipated some of Kuhn’s later theses, there seems to be a temptation in more recent research to equate both theories in important respects. Because of this approach, one has to deal with the problem of comparing the most notable technical terms of both philosophers, namely “thought style” and “paradigm”.This paper aims at a more thorough comparison between Ludwik Fleck’s concept of thought style and Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm. Although some philosophers suggest that these two concepts are essentially equal in content, a closer examination reveals that this is not the case. This thesis of inequality will be defended in detail, also taking into account some of the alleged similarities which may be responsible for losing sight of the differences between these theories.     

Scientific realism and the semantic incommensurability thesis

This paper reconsiders the challenge presented to scientific realism by the semantic incommensurability thesis. A twofold distinction is drawn between methodological and semantic incommensurability, and between semantic incommensurability due to variation of sense and due to discontinuity of reference. Only the latter presents a challenge to scientific realism. The realist may dispose of this challenge on the basis of a modified causal theory of reference, as argued in the author’s 1994 book, The incommensurability thesis. This referential response has been the subject of a charge of meta-incommensurability by Hoyningen-Huene et al. (1996), who argue that the realist’s referential response begs the question against anti-realist advocates of incommensurability. In reply, it is noted that a tu quoque rejoinder is available to the realist. It is also argued that the dialectical situation favours the scientific realist, since the anti-realist defence of incommensurability depends on an incoherent distinction between phenomenal world and world-in-itself. In light of such incoherence, and a strong commonsense presumption in favour of realism, the referential response to semantic incommensurability may be justifiably based on realism.     

油页岩粉尘层着火的理论模型与实验研究

为了解油页岩粉尘着火爆炸危险性,利用化学反应动力学、传热学以及Thomas热自燃理论,建立了稳态条件下粉尘层着火的不对称理论模型.利用热板测试装置测试了我国4大产地油页岩粉尘层的最低着火温度,结果介于503~613 K,最低着火温度随粉尘层厚度的增加而降低,不同产地油页岩粉尘着火温度高低依次为:抚顺桦甸龙口茂名,与油页岩挥发分含量成反相关.利用测试结果确定了油页岩粉尘层燃烧动力学参数值,代入不对称着火理论模型,计算得到相应厚度粉尘层的临界着火温度,和实验结果对比,误差在10%以内,为预测生产过程油页岩着火危险性提供了可行的理论方法.     

敲破传统的外壳,注入时代的内涵--简论托马斯·阿奎那的自然法思想

自然法是西方政治文化中的核心观念,在其发展过程中经历了不同的形态。托马斯·阿奎那对中世纪的自然法概念进行了梳理,结束了这一概念在使用过程中的混乱,并赋予了这一概念以典型的中世纪特色。在阐述其自然法思想的过程中,他强调了理性的作用,指出了自然法的可变性,并最终把私有制纳入了自然法的内涵。这对缓和教会与国家的关系、社会经济的发展、自然权利观念的成长和理性主义都有着十分重要的意义。     

试论哈代悼亡诗的艺术

悼亡诗是哈代诗歌中最富有独特、真切的生命体验与审美体验的部分,也是哈代诗歌中情感最真挚风格最朴素的部分。无论是对亡故的妻子还是手足情深的妹妹或者友人,诗人都怀有一种深沉而绵长的情感。而尤以悼亡妇诗歌最为感人至深。诗人以冷静与克制的语言来捕捉与叙写细微而富有生活气息的意象与情节,在短暂与永恒中体味情爱的况味与生命的无常。对昔日情爱的追思与生命的不可往复的怅恨的结合,体现诗人对生命的独特思考同时也给诗歌蒙上了一层宗教性的神秘色彩。     

Kuhn, Popper, and the Superconducting Supercollider

The demise of the Superconducting Supercollider (SSC) is often explained in terms of the strain that it placed on the federal budget of the United States, and change in national security interests with the end of the Cold War. Recent work by Steve Fuller provides a framework to re-examine this episode in epistemological terms using the work of Kuhn and Popper. Using this framework, it is tempting to explain the demise as resulting from the overly Kuhnian character of its proponents, who supposedly argued for its construction by appealing to the importance of testing the predictions of a specific paradigm (i.e. the Standard Model). On this reading, the SSC case appears as an example of how Kuhn’s paradigm-driven view of science was invoked to keep science closed and autonomous from society. I argue that the SSC episode should not be viewed as giving support to the displacement of Kuhn’s view of science for Popper’s, and that such a displacement is detrimental to the project of integrating discussion on science into the public sphere. Drawing upon Rouse and Wimsatt, I argue that understanding paradigms as practices blunts some criticisms against Kuhn’s model, and that his model should play an important epistemological role in the aforementioned project.     

Incommensurabilities in the work of Thomas Kuhn

I distinguish between two ways in which Kuhn employs the concept of incommensurability based on for whom it presents a problem. First, I argue that Kuhn’s early work focuses on the comparison and underdetermination problems scientists encounter during revolutionary periods (actors’ incommensurability) whilst his later work focuses on the translation and interpretation problems analysts face when they engage in the representation of science from earlier periods (analysts’ incommensurability). Secondly, I offer a new interpretation of actors’ incommensurability. I challenge Kuhn’s account of incommensurability which is based on the compartmentalisation of the problems of both underdetermination and non-additivity to revolutionary periods. Through employing a finitist perspective, I demonstrate that in principle these are also problems scientists face during normal science. I argue that the reason why in certain circumstances scientists have little difficulty in concurring over their judgements of scientific findings and claims while in others they disagree needs to be explained sociologically rather than by reference to underdetermination or non-additivity. Thirdly, I claim that disagreements between scientists should not be couched in terms of translation or linguistic problems (aspects of analysts’ incommensurability), but should be understood as arising out of scientists’ differing judgments about how to take scientific inquiry further.     

A revolution without tooth and claw—Redefining the physical base units

A case study is presented of a recent proposal by the major metrology institutes to redefine four of the physical base units, namely kilogram, ampere, mole, and kelvin. The episode shows a number of features that are unusual for progress in an objective science: for example, the progress is not triggered by experimental discoveries or theoretical innovations; also, the new definitions are eventually implemented by means of a voting process. In the philosophical analysis, I will first argue that the episode provides considerable evidence for confirmation holism, i.e. the claim that central statements in fundamental science cannot be tested in isolation; second, that the episode satisfies many of the criteria which Kuhn requires for scientific revolutions even though one would naturally classify it as normal science. These two observations are interrelated since holism can provide within normal science a possible source of future revolutionary periods.     

西南鼠耳蝠7种组织乳酸脱氢酶(LDH)同工酶的比较

采用聚丙烯酰胺不连续凝胶垂直板电泳和日本岛津CS9000双波长薄层扫描仪,研究了西南鼠耳蝠7种组织的乳酸脱氢酶同工酶（LDH）,结果表明：西南鼠耳蝠7种组织LDH同工酶谱有较大的差异,其分布和含量具有组织特异性。     

Associationism without associative links: Thomas Brown and the associationist project

There are two roles that association played in 18th–19th century associationism. The first dominates modern understanding of the history of the concept: association is a causal link posited to explain why ideas come in the sequence they do. The second has been ignored: association is merely regularity in the trains of thought, and the target of explanation. The view of association as regularity arose in several forms throughout the tradition, but Thomas Brown (1778–1820) makes the distinction explicit. He argues that there is no associative link, and association is mere sequence. I trace this view of association through the tradition, and consider its implications: Brown's views, in particular, motivate a rethinking of the associationist tradition in psychology. Associationism was a project united by a shared explanandum phenomenon, rather than a theory united by a shared theoretical posit.