Overmathematisation in game theory: pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme against the Epistemic Programme

The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme (Interactive Epistemology). The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains this in terms of unjustified degrees of mathematisation in Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme. While this programme’s mathematical models were often inspired by purely mathematical concerns rather than the economic phenomena they were intended to model, the Epistemic Programme’s models were developed with a keen eye to the role beliefs and desires play in strategic interaction between rational economic agents playing games; that is, their interactive epistemology. The Epistemic Programme succeeded in developing mathematical models formalising aspects of strategic interaction that remained implicit in the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme (NERP) owing to an unjustified degree of mathematisation. As a result, the Epistemic Programme is the more successful theory.     

How to make value-driven climate science for policy more ethical

In previous works, I examine inferential methods employed in Probabilistic Weather Event Attribution studies (PEAs), and explored various ways they can be used to aid in climate policy decisions and decision-making about climate justice issues. This paper evaluates limitations of PEAs and considers how PEA researchers’ attributions of “liability” to specific countries for specific extreme weather events could be made more ethical. In sum, I show that it is routinely presupposed that PEA methods are not prone to inductive risks and presuppose that PEA researchers thus have no epistemic consequences or responsibilities for their attributions of liability. I argue that although PEAs are nevertheless crucially useful for practical decision-making, the attributions of liability made by PEA researchers are in fact prone to indicative risks and are influenced by non-epistemic values that PEA researchers should make transparent to make such studies more ethical. Finally, I outline possible normative approaches for making sciences, including PEAs, more ethical; and discuss implications of my arguments for the ongoing debate about how PEAs should guide climate policy and relevant legal decisions.     

Infrared metaphysics: radiation and theory-choice. Part 2

We continue our discussion of the competing arguments in favour of the unified theory and the pluralistic theory of radiation advanced by three nineteenth-century pioneers: Herschel, Melloni, and Draper. Our narrative is structured by a consideration of the epistemic criteria relevant to theory-choice; the epistemic focus highlights many little-known aspects of this relatively well-known episode. We argue that the acceptance of light-heat unity (and of the unified theory of radiation more generally) in this period cannot be credibly justified on the basis of common evaluative criteria such as simplicity and standard notions of explanatory power. Whether the consensus was justified by some other criteria remains an open question.     

Between relativism and pluralism: Philosophical and political relativism in Feyerabend's late work

Relativism is one of the most problematic terms associated with philosophical discourse, with Feyerabend considered among the most important twentieth century theorists subscribing to it. This paper provides a detailed overview of relativist positions advanced in Feyerabend's mid-to-late work and investigates the associated epistemic and political applications. Emphasis is placed on how Feyerabend supported certain aspects of relativism, and at what stage he rejected others. It is noted that Feyerabend had already imposed limitations on relativism in Farewell to Reason, in which he entertained the possibility of epistemic definition within stable contexts, and advanced the notion that opportunities and equality associated with political and cultural units could only be valid within a democratic system. In Conquest of Abundance, political relativism is largely discarded, while epistemological relativism is increasingly treated as an appeal for diversity in all areas.In this re-reading of his work, it becomes clear that Feyerabend was already advocating a moderate form of epistemic and political relativism in the middle of his career, which he subsequently developed in the direction of “ontological pluralism” in his later work. This paper thus shows that Feyerabend's relativism should not be completely rejected, but rather that it continues to offer interesting food for thought.     

Transparency and secrecy in citizen science: Lessons from herping

In this paper I will outline a worry that citizen science can promote a kind of transparency that is harmful. I argue for the value of secrecy in citizen science. My argument will consist of analysis of a particular community (herpers), a particular citizen science platform (iNaturalist, drawing contrasts with other platforms), and my own travels in citizen science. I aim to avoid a simple distinction between science versus non-science, and instead analyze herping as a rich practice [MacIntyre, 2007]. Herping exemplifies citizen science as functioning simultaneously within and outside the sphere of science. I show that herpers have developed communal systems of transmitting and protecting knowledge. Ethical concerns about secrecy are inherently linked to these systems of knowledge. My over-arching aim is to urge caution in the drive to transparency, as the concepts of transparency and secrecy merit close scrutiny. The concerns I raise are complementary to those suggested by previous philosophical work, and (I argue) resist straightforward solutions.     

对医疗领域中的认知不公正论证的反思

卡瑞尔和基德认为弗里克提出的"认知不公正"概念在医疗领域中也存在,她们论证了这一领域的证言不正义和阐释不正义.然而本文认为,医疗领域与认知不公正问题的典型领域存在显著差异,其差异主要在于专业知识的不对称,病人证言依赖于知识语境和医生能力.因而用认知不公正的概念来表述这些问题会一定程度掩盖其中更为深层的两类知识之间的交互...     

Lockean superaddition and Lockean humility

This paper offers a new approach to an old debate about superaddition in Locke. Did Locke claim that some objects have powers that are unrelated to their natures or real essences? The question has split commentators. Some (Wilson, Stuart, Langton) claim the answer is yes and others (Ayers, Downing, Ott) claim the answer is no. This paper argues that both of these positions may be mistaken. I show that Locke embraced a robust epistemic humility. This epistemic humility includes ignorance of the real essences of bodies, of the causal processes underlying the production of natural phenomena, and of God's method of creation. I show how this epistemic humility offers strong support for an agnostic response to the question of superaddition. Locke did not intend to claim that bodies either do or do not have properties unrelated to their real essences. Instead, his primary goal in discussing the topic was to emphasize the strict limits to human knowledge.