34Mb/s数字电视编码设备中正码速调整的原理和设计

本文扼要介绍了正码速调整的原理,在此基础上,提出了适用于数字电视传输的码速调整技术,并将其定义为非标准码速调整原理以区别于准同步复接中的码速调整原理。     

论胡塞尔对意义的图像论的批驳

胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》中对意义的图像论进行了尖锐的批驳。这也是对逻辑的心理主义批判的继续，他的批驳与他本人和他所处的时代的数学背景有关。他的目的，一方面是为数学和逻辑的客观性作辩护，另一方面是为建立一种纯形式的理想的逻辑体系奠定概念上的和方法论上的基础。     

Modelling and representing: An artefactual approach to model-based representation

The recent discussion on scientific representation has focused on models and their relationship to the real world. It has been assumed that models give us knowledge because they represent their supposed real target systems. However, here agreement among philosophers of science has tended to end as they have presented widely different views on how representation should be understood. I will argue that the traditional representational approach is too limiting as regards the epistemic value of modelling given the focus on the relationship between a single model and its supposed target system, and the neglect of the actual representational means with which scientists construct models. I therefore suggest an alternative account of models as epistemic tools. This amounts to regarding them as concrete artefacts that are built by specific representational means and are constrained by their design in such a way that they facilitate the study of certain scientific questions, and learning from them by means of construction and manipulation.     

Knowing what would happen: The epistemic strategies in Galileo's thought experiments

While philosophers have subjected Galileo's classic thought experiments to critical analysis, they have tended to largely ignored the historical and intellectual context in which they were deployed, and the specific role they played in Galileo's overall vision of science. In this paper I investigate Galileo's use of thought experiments, by focusing on the epistemic and rhetorical strategies that he employed in attempting to answer the question of how one can know what would happen in an imaginary scenario. Here I argue we can find three different answers to this question in Galileo later dialogues, which reflect the changing meanings of ‘experience’ and ‘knowledge’ (scientia) in the early modern period. Once we recognise that Galileo's thought experiments sometimes drew on the power of memory and the explicit appeal to ‘common experience’, while at other times, they took the form of demonstrative arguments intended to have the status of necessary truths; and on still other occasions, they were extrapolations, or probable guesses, drawn from a carefully planned series of controlled experiments, it becomes evident that no single account of the epistemological relationship between thought experiment, experience and experiment can adequately capture the epistemic variety we find Galileo's use of imaginary scenarios. To this extent, we cannot neatly classify Galileo's use of thought experiments as either ‘medieval’ or ‘early modern’, but we should see them as indicative of the complex epistemological transformations of the early seventeenth century.     

当代英美知识论中的内/外在主义之争:历史与现状

知识论研宄在当代呈现出一种崭新样态,关于确证的内／外在主义之争成为主流。从历史上看,内在主义由来已久,最早可溯至笛卡儿,但内／外在主义之争正式始于葛梯尔。从现状上说,内／外在主义之争纷繁复杂,构错胶合,殊难厘清。但其纷争的真正缘由基本也可归结为两个方面：一是对基本概念的误读。二是论证前提的适用不当。     

知识、运气与德性

本文旨在概述一种反运气的德性知识论观点.这一知识论理论综合了反运气条件与德性条件,因此能化解与之相竞争的其它知识论观点所面对的困难,这尤其是针对稳健的德性知识论(robust virtueepistemology)而言的.具体来说,反运气的德性知识论能够解释知识对外部因素的依赖关系,也能够避免知识论意义上的“孪生地球”论证所提出的困难.自从盖梯尔(Gettier 1963)的著名文章挑战了知识作为“得到辩护的真信念”的三元定义以来,知识论学者对于提供知识的分析定义的前景越来越感到怀疑,尤其怀疑这种知识的分析能否有见识且不落入循环定义.我试图表明,应该追求的目标乃是对知识的一种有见识的分析,而不必一定是非循环的分析.尽管避免分析上的循环这一点也很诱人,但也并非所有循环的分析都毫无见识.哲学概念向来有可能交互定义彼此,因此从这些其它概念上我们也可以获得很多启示,而无需必要找到一条突破解释学循环的路径.盖梯尔反例明确提示我们,那种损毁知识的认知运气并不像传统上所理解的那样能由辩护条件来排除.一个人能有知识,就要求其认知成就不是偶然运气的产物.这是所谓反运气的直观.另一个显著的关于知识的直观是,知识要求认知成就以某种有意义的方式从认知能力获得,也就是说,这些成就应归功于相关认知能力的作用.稳健的德性知识论就立足于这种能力直观,更进一步提出认知成就不仅归功于而且就应产生于认知能动性,且满足这一点就同时满足了反运气的直观.然而实际上并非如此.我们可以用知识论意义上的“孪生地球”反例来证明这一点.这一反例的核心在于,两个认知者分别在地球和孪生地球上具有真信念,也同等地归功于认知能动性的发挥,但却仍然在认知运气方面存在差异.按照这一论证,地球与孪生地球上形成的真信念可以表现同等程度的认知能力,却因为受认知运气的不同影响产生不同的知识论地位.反运气的德性知识论化解了这个困难:“S知道p,当且仅当,S的认知成就是安全的,体现了S的相关认知能力,且这一安全的认知成就在相当程度上归功于S的这些认知能力的作用.”首先,它用安全性原则把握知识的反运气条件,主张作为知识的真信念不能轻易为假;其次,它强化了认知成就的安全性要求,同时弱化了能力直观,即不要求认知成就产生于能力,而仅要求其可归功于认知能力,从而在强弱两方面都改造了稳健的德性知识论;最后,即便反运气的德性知识论未必是非循环的知识分析,它也依然有助于理解认知运气、认知能力与知识等概念间的相互关联,从而仍然是有见识的知识论分析.     

Examining tensions in the past and present uses of concepts

Examining tensions between the past and present uses of scientific concepts can help clarify their contributions as tools in experimental practices. This point can be illustrated by considering the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations: despite debates over their respective referential reliabilities remaining unresolved within their interdependent histories, both are used as independently stable concepts in neuroimaging experiments. Building on an account of how these concepts function as tools structured for pursuit of diverging goals in experiments, this paper explores this tension by re-examining the continued reliance of each concept on inverse characterisations inherited from the nominally-discarded ‘mediator-view’ of sensory-like mental phenomena (SLMP). In doing so, I seek to demonstrate how examining unresolved tensions can help highlight that entrenched associations can remain both integral to, and obscured by, the uses of concepts as goal-directed tools within experimental practices.     

Inevitability,contingency, and epistemic humility

This paper offers an epistemological framework for the debate about whether the results of scientific enquiry are inevitable or contingent. I argue in Sections 2 and 3 that inevitabilist stances are doubly guilty of epistemic hubris—a lack of epistemic humility—and that the real question concerns the scope and strength of our contingentism. The latter stages of the paper—Sections 4 and 5—address some epistemological and historiographical worries and sketch some examples of deep contingencies to guide further debate. I conclude by affirming that the concept of epistemic humility can usefully inform critical reflection on the contingency of the sciences and the practice of history of science.     

State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation

The aim of this paper is to survey and discuss some key connections between information and confirmation within a broadly Bayesian framework. We mean to show that treating information and confirmation in a unified fashion is an intuitive and fruitful approach, fostering insights and prospects in the analysis of a variety of related notions such as belief change, partial entailment, entropy, the value of experiments, and more besides. To this end, we recapitulate established theoretical achievements, disclose a number of underlying links, and provide a few novel results.