审视逻辑相对主义——以关于阿赞德逻辑的争论为例

逻辑相对主义观点是指不同的文化也许根据不同的逻辑规则进行推理。来自人类学关于偏远民族的调查引起了是否存在不同于西方逻辑的其他逻辑的争论。以关于阿赞德逻辑的争论为例进行分析,表明争论的缘起在于用西方形式逻辑的视角讨论特定文化的实践推理。从一种非形式逻辑的视角分析阿赞德推理,则引起争论的疑惑点得以解释与澄清。     

列宁对西方传统真理论的超越

绝对真理和相对真理是真理论的一对重要范畴,西方传统哲学要么恪守真理绝对论,走向绝对主义,要么恪守真理相对论,走向相对主义.列宁运用唯物辩证法,科学阐释了绝对真理的含义,绝对真理与相对真理的关系,以及辩证唯物主义真理论与相对主义真理论的区别,实现了对西方传统真理论的超越.实现这一超越的唯物辩证法,对在建设有中国特色社会主义实践中如何强化马克思主义具有重要的指导意义.     

Scepticism,relativism, and the structure of epistemic frameworks

This paper has four aims: first, to outline the role of the sceptical problem of the criterion in the principal argument for epistemic relativism; second, to establish that methodist and particularist responses to the problem of the criterion do not, by themselves, constitute successful strategies for resisting epistemic relativism; third, to argue that a more fruitful strategy is to attempt to evaluate epistemic frameworks on the basis of the epistemic resources that they have in common; and finally, to make the case that finding this common ground will necessarily involve determining how it is that a framework’s constituent epistemic methods depend on one another for not only their warrant, but for their application.     

人类学文化相对主义观念对科学史研究的影响

文化相对主义观念是人类学的思想精髓,本文首先讨论人类学中的文化相对主义观念以及这一观念的核心立场;继而,重点论述人类学意义上的文化相对主义观念所带来的科学观的变化,以及文化相对主义科学观对科学史研究的影响;最后对围绕相对主义的相关争论进行几点讨论。     

非理性还是不同的合理性--阿赞德人的案例

本文通过对阿赞德人案例的分析，考察了不同学者对阿赞德人行为是否合理的不同看法。作者赞同SSK学者关于合理性及其标准的主张，同意其文化相对主义的立场，并对相对主义自我驳斥的批判进行了反驳。     

蒯因认识论的应然之路与实然之路

为了拯救传统的经验论,蒯因站在自然主义的立场,把认识论自然化,将逻辑实证主义与实用主义相结合,继续发展经验论的事业。但是,有的哲学家对蒯因为自然化认识论设计的路线不以为然,例如,肯定地说,罗蒂认为,蒯因的认识论应该走相对主义的路线;否定地说,里勒认为,蒯因的认识论不应该坚持心理主义的路线。无论哪种评价,都存在着对蒯因自然化认识论要旨的严重误解。     

类典型理论视角下的色彩语码研究——英汉语中"红色"文化含义探析

本文试图通过类典型理论分析红色这一基本颜色词语在英汉语中文化含义的典型特征和变化维度,证实色彩语码研究中文化相对论和自然进化论具有互补性和互动性。     

当代历史视野下的恩格斯的批判人权观

恩格斯在《反杜林论》中以批判人权观的方式表达了自己的人权思想。人权在本质上是人的存在条件，是人之为人的保障，这也是对恩格斯批判人权观的合理的当代解读：我们应从历史与现实相联系的角度出发来对这一解读予以确证，批判人权相对论对恩格斯批判人权现的错误解读，相信对我国当前的人权建设有所裨益。     

Covariance/Invariance: A Cognitive Heuristic in Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation

Relativity Theory by Albert Einstein has been so far littleconsidered by cognitive scientists, notwithstanding its undisputedscientific and philosophical moment. Unfortunately, we don't have adiary or notebook as cognitively useful as Faraday's. But physicshistorians and philosophers have done a great job that is relevant bothfor the study of the scientist's reasoning and the philosophy ofscience. I will try here to highlight the fertility of a `triangulation'using cognitive psychology, history of science and philosophy of sciencein starting answering a clearly very complex question:why did Einstein discover Relativity Theory? Here we arenot much concerned with the unending question of precisely whatEinstein discovered, that still remains unanswered, for we have noconsensus over the exact nature of the theory's foundations(Norton 1993). We are mainly interested in starting to answer the`how question', and especially the following sub-question: what(presumably) were his goals and strategies in hissearch? I will base my argument on fundamental publications ofEinstein, aiming at pointing out a theory-specific heuristic, settingboth a goal and a strategy: covariance/invariance.The result has significance in theory formation in science, especiallyin concept and model building. It also raises other questions that gobeyond the aim of this paper: why was he so confident in suchheuristic? Why didn't many other scientists use it? Where did he keep ? such a heuristic? Do we have any other examples ofsimilar heuristic search in other scientific problemsolving?