工程招投标中围标合谋行为分析

本文从理论上分析了工程招投标中投标人之间合谋行为“围标”的形成原因。在此基础上,进行经济条件假设,建立博弈模型,分析了影响围标合谋的主要因素和行为产生条件,进而有针对地提出控制招投标过程中投标人不规范行为的对策建议。     

高等教育质量保障制度变迁中的博弈均衡探析

我国高等教育质量保障制度正在经历从以政府主导的外部控制向以高校自控为主、内外结合的演进过程.文章从博弈论中的基本概念"参与人"出发,对现行高等教育质量保障制度中的四大利益主体博弈进行分析,探讨主体博弈规则缺失及其原因,通过制度创新实现利益主体的博弈均衡.     

用博弈论分析摩托罗拉网络服务的策略

基于豪泰林的地点差异化模型的分析研究,以摩托罗拉网络服务为例,分析了摩托罗拉作为跨国大公司在面对市场中采用低价策略的国内小电信网络服务公司的竞争时,采取差异化策略推出一系列的新型移动网络服务产品,从而获得竞争优势的内在因素和实施方法.从而进一步表明:为避免价格竞争,获取市场份额和利润,差异化是竞争战略的重要手段;作为国际性大企业,类似摩托罗拉公司,有能力、有条件实施差异化,提供差异化服务,并最终在绩效上有了良好的表现;差异化和消费者的赶路成本、偏好紧密相关,产品差异化要满足不同用户不同地点的不同需求.     

Analysis of Conditional Value-at-Risk for Newsvendor with Holding and Backorder Cost under Market Search

We consider a distribution system with one supplier and two retailers. For the two retailers, they face different demand and are both risk averse. We study a single period model which the supplier has ample goods and the retailers order goods separately. Market search is measured as the fraction of customers who unsatisfied with their ＂local＂ retailer due to stock-out, and search for the goods at the other retailer before leaving the system. We investigate how the retailers game for order quantity in a Conditional Value-at-Risk framework and study how risk averse degree, market search level, holding cost and backorder cost influence the optimal order strategies. Furthermore, we use uniform distribution to illustrate these results and obtain Nash equilibrium of order strategies.     

我国供应商与外国零售商交易冲突的博弈分析

在厘清外国零售商与我国供应商交易冲突的内容和特点的基础上,运用完全信息博弈法,通过构建外国零售商和国内供应商的两级供应链存在性博弈模型,分析我国供应商在与外国零售商交易冲突中所处的被动地位。从数理和应用两个角度研究对策后指出:我国供应商可利用主导价格的主动合作型策略,变零供独立决策为集中决策的集中决策型策略以及建立长期的合作关系的市场交易策略,以摆脱劣势。     

无限集合的有限子集理论的等价转化

利用Ehrenfeucht博奕 ,证明了任一无限集合的有限子集理论与自然数集合的有限子集理论是初等等价的     

Application of the Option Game Theory to the Real Estate Enterprise Investment Decision

One of the remarkable characteristics of the current development of China's national economy is the increase of uncertainties, which makes the traditional method more and more unsuitable for the current economic development in the real estate investment process. Based on the option game theory, the investment decision making of real estate is analyzed here, the investment optimization mathematic model established, and Nash Equilibrium discussed. Through case studies, we analyze the application of game option in the real estate, which is put under symmetrical duopoly. The conclusions will contribute to both the theory on and practice of the present investment in the real estate enterprise.     

A differential game model for a developing and a developed country

A differential game (DG) model for a developing and a developed country is considered. Each player makes decisions about how much resource to be used to restrict the opponent's development so as to maximize his weighted sum of current consumption and final output. Current consumption is assumed to be preferred to final output for both players. The developing country is assumed to have a higher economic growth rate and a higher preference to final output, whereas the developed country is assumed to have a higher initial income and a higher efficiency in restricting his opponent. This problem is investigated under three kinds of information structures, i.e., a zerosum, a nonzero-sum, and a Stackelberg game. Open-loop equilibrium solutions are obtained for all the three cases. Economic implications of the result are provided. The research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 70771118 and 70371030 and the Scientific Research Foundation for the Returned Overseas Chinese Scholars, State Education Ministry under Grant No. 2006.331.     

福建省青少年游泳运动员比赛表现的影响因素探析

采用文献资料法、问卷调查法、数理统计法,对影响福建省青少年游泳运动员比赛表现的影响因素进行研究。经过对34个因素进行因子分析,得出影响运动员比赛表现的影响因素的9个主因子。对9大因子进行分析得知,运动员比赛表现是个人技战术水平、心理能力、客观环境、人为因素、赛前准备、教练信任、对手作用、最佳体验与自我评价等多方面因素影响的结果,为我国游泳运动员训练和赛前控制比赛状态提供理论参考。     

治理假冒伪劣产品泛滥的经济博弈分析

根据经济博弈论中不完美信息动态博弈理论，建立了双价产品交易的博弈模型，在对模型分析的基础上，从如何提高伪装成本上讨论了治理假冒伪劣产品泛滥的若干对策。