从博弈论谈南水北调西线工程的四川对策

南水北调西线工程,从博弈论的角度考虑,属于非零和博弈,各方效益的和大于零,从而具有南北两利的可能.四川的最佳策略,应根据西北的优势策略和中央的决策而选择,应坚持有偿调水,有偿调水可以实现南水北调博弈的纳什均衡.在西线工程中,应将调水藏区的可持续发展和民族区域的稳定作为四川的重点战略选择,借机推动藏区社会经济的跨越式发展.     

有限理性条件下博弈方决策规则获取的粗糙集方法

经典博弈理论是基于完全理性假设成立的,有限理性理论的诞生对经典博弈理论是一个极大的冲击．该理论认为博弈方的决策能力是有限的,博弈方的决策受到各种因素的影响,因而在众多因素中获取决策规则的问题变得相当重要．论文算例给出了影响博弈方决策的因素,应用粗糙集方法,提取博弈对手的决策规则,使博弈方深入了解对手情况后,作出新的决策．     

技术创新中收益分配方案的博弈分析

本文建立了企业技术创新中N—人合作博弃模型,运用Core、Shapley值及定性分析等方法,进行技术创新的收益分配分析,得到了几个结论,并用实例说明了结论的应用。     

Proxy-Users系统收入分配的Stackelberg模型及解的存在性

用对策论的Stackelberg平衡理论研究了Proxy—Users系统中Proxy和Users之间分配收入问题．对Proxy和Users的地位不平等且Proxy不能按到达率提供服务的情况，建立了收入分配的Stackelberg策略模型，得到了一个双层规划模型，并证明了模型的解的存在性．     

目标支付与满意纳什均衡

纳什均衡是一种刺激一反应型的机械的均衡状态，只要博弈结构(环境)给定，纳什均衡就被机械地决定下来。也许参与者对纳什均衡结局并不满意，但也不得不接受。人对纳什均衡结局的无奈，完全抹杀了人的目的性、适应性和创造性。因此，必须将人的目的性内在化，在博弈结构中引入目标支付的概念。本文讨论目标战略博弈及其满意均衡、满意纳什均衡的性质和存在性，并给出目标战略博弈满意纳什均衡的可拓求法的思路。     

Game Analysis of Rational FRS on Market Admittance

The dynamic signaling game-model is employed to study countermeasures of Q, U and C for supply-demand on financial market. As the game result, the mixed equilibrium of Q and U exists naturally without FRS. It is concluded that FRS on market admittance is objective demand of financial market, also the rational management behavior of government FRSI. And in addition to the empirical criteria, the FRS agreements between FRSI and financial-institutions should be considered as one of advanced FRS techniques. These must cover: ①the regulation conformed status investigation with sufficient frequency, ②corresponding punitive measures with sufficient strength. Thus the information can be delivered FRSI have ensured only qualified and regulation-conformed financial-institutions could be allowed to enter. That could safeguard the steadiness of the financial market.     

Overmathematisation in game theory: pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme against the Epistemic Programme

The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme (Interactive Epistemology). The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains this in terms of unjustified degrees of mathematisation in Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme. While this programme’s mathematical models were often inspired by purely mathematical concerns rather than the economic phenomena they were intended to model, the Epistemic Programme’s models were developed with a keen eye to the role beliefs and desires play in strategic interaction between rational economic agents playing games; that is, their interactive epistemology. The Epistemic Programme succeeded in developing mathematical models formalising aspects of strategic interaction that remained implicit in the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme (NERP) owing to an unjustified degree of mathematisation. As a result, the Epistemic Programme is the more successful theory.     

基于实物期权博弈的企业技术创新投资策略的研究

在简要介绍实物期权博弈理论发展和研究成果的基础上,应用实物期权博弈理论研究双寡头竞争者在不完全竞争环境下的企业技术创新项目多阶段投资时机和投资策略的选择问题,项目价值的变化使得竞争者分别可能形成共同投资、领先追随和共同延期三种不同的均衡策略     

浅析外资收购民族产业的利与弊

自改革开放以来,关于外资收购民族产业是否应该放任的争辩一直没有停止。近年来,以制造业为主的许多民族产业被相继收购,更使该问题的争论升温。本文用博弈中常用的Stackelberg模型(企业行为模型)对产业收购影响产量的机制进行分析,得出结论:外资收购民族产业从长远来看是弊大于利。并从保护民族品牌的角度给出相关政策建议。     

计及银行核查作用的授信质押融资演化博弈分析

为研究物流企业和贷款企业授信质押融资时的博弈行为,建立考虑银行核查作用的两企业演化博弈的非线性模型,对其进行了稳定性分析,还借助钟万勰等发展的精细积分方法开展了数值研究,理论分析和数值计算结果吻合较好。研究表明:监管成本、罚款金额等参数都是博弈双方策略选择的影响因素;另外,银行合理调整信用等级,将显著影响博弈双方积极性,达到强化融资监管的目的。