Inconsistent idealizations and inferentialism about scientific representation

Inferentialists about scientific representation hold that an apparatus's representing a target system consists in the apparatus allowing “surrogative inferences” about the target. I argue that a serious problem for inferentialism arises from the fact that many scientific theories and models contain internal inconsistencies. Inferentialism, left unamended, implies that inconsistent scientific models have unlimited representational power, since an inconsistency permits any conclusion to be inferred. I consider a number of ways that inferentialists can respond to this challenge before suggesting my own solution. I develop an analogy to exploitable glitches in a game. Even though inconsistent representational apparatuses may in some sense allow for contradictions to be generated within them, doing so violates the intended function of the apparatus's parts and hence violates representational “gameplay”.     

A structural interpretation of measurement and some related epistemological issues

Measurement is widely applied because its results are assumed to be more reliable than opinions and guesses, but this reliability is sometimes justified in a stereotyped way. After a critical analysis of such stereotypes, a structural characterization of measurement is proposed, as partly empirical and partly theoretical process, by showing that it is in fact the structure of the process that guarantees the reliability of its results. On this basis the role and the structure of background knowledge in measurement and the justification of the conditions of object-relatedness (“objectivity”) and subject-independence (“intersubjectivity”) of measurement are specifically discussed.     

Accountability and values in radically collaborative research

This paper discusses a crisis of accountability that arises when scientific collaborations are massively epistemically distributed. We argue that social models of epistemic collaboration, which are social analogs to what Patrick Suppes called a “model of the experiment,” must play a role in creating accountability in these contexts. We also argue that these social models must accommodate the fact that the various agents in a collaborative project often have ineliminable, messy, and conflicting interests and values; any story about accountability in a massively distributed collaboration must therefore involve models of such interests and values and their methodological and epistemic effects.     

普通物理双语教学模型探索

本文阐明了对普通物理实施双语教学的重要性。对普通物理双语教学过程中各个环节进行了探索和实践,期望进一步推进我院双语教学的步伐和改善双语教学模式。     

浅谈如何办好企业内部刊物——以《电力职工教育培训》为例

介绍了《电力职工教育培训》杂志的历史和面临的严峻发展形势,提出了破解《电力职工教育培训》发展瓶颈的有效举措。     

浅谈危机管理

企业在生产经营中面临着多种危机,并且无论哪种危机发生,都有可能给企业带来致命的打击。对于企业来说,危机管理迫在眉睫,它不再是仅仅局限于处理突发性事件,而注重挖掘企业管理的深层次原因日渐成为企业管理必不可少的组成部分。     

关于映射的两个导出映射

设f：A→B是映射,任意C∈2^A,令f1（C）=f（C）,任意D∈2^B,令f2（D）=f^-1（D）,则称f1,f2是f的导出映射．研究了单射、满射、双射（及其逆）、映射的积的导出映射,并得到了相应的结果．     

基于PSRT的大连豆粕期货价格的混沌判据

通过相空间重构技术,对大连豆粕期货价格增长率的时间序列分别进行相空间重构,应用Wolf方法得出最大的Lyapunov指数,从而给出系统混沌存在的证据;利用关联函数求出关联维度和Kolmogorov熵,从而给出对系统的混沌程度的估计和对大连豆粕期货价格进行有效性预测的时间尺度.     

Local reduction in physics

A conventional wisdom about the progress of physics holds that successive theories wholly encompass the domains of their predecessors through a process that is often called “reduction.” While certain influential accounts of inter-theory reduction in physics take reduction to require a single “global” derivation of one theory׳s laws from those of another, I show that global reductions are not available in all cases where the conventional wisdom requires reduction to hold. However, I argue that a weaker “local” form of reduction, which defines reduction between theories in terms of a more fundamental notion of reduction between models of a single fixed system, is available in such cases and moreover suffices to uphold the conventional wisdom. To illustrate the sort of fixed-system, inter-model reduction that grounds inter-theoretic reduction on this picture, I specialize to a particular class of cases in which both models are dynamical systems. I show that reduction in these cases is underwritten by a mathematical relationship that follows a certain liberalized construal of Nagel/Schaffner reduction, and support this claim with several examples. Moreover, I show that this broadly Nagelian analysis of inter-model reduction encompasses several cases that are sometimes cited as instances of the “physicist׳s” limit-based notion of reduction.