考虑产品结构的供应链设计决策模型及其博弈分析

结合供应链运作的特点,从MRP 中的物料单(BOM)入手考虑产品结构建立了以供应链收益最大化为目标的多层供应链整体设计决策经济模型.通过该模型可将企业运作层的参数与供应链战略层的决策变量结合在一起,使供应链核心企业能够更加灵活的对原料与配件进行整体生产指派.最后文章证明了决策模型的解是符合联盟博弈核心概念的,这样根据决策模型得到的生产指派关系方案保证了供应链整体结构的稳定性.     

互联网金融背景下农业产业化的最优运作模式研究

本文研究由农业电商企业和受资金约束的农户所构成的农业供应链.在考虑农产品交付水平的前提下,分别构建了"公司+农户"和"公司租赁"两种运作模式下的决策模型,得到了农业电商企业和农户在这两种模式下的最优策略,并通过对比分析找到了能够实现供应链最优运作模式的"双赢"区间.最后,利用京东"跑步鸡"项目中的市场数据进行数值实验,验证了相关的研究结论.研究表明:只有当农户的抵押物达到一定价值时,"公司+农户"模式才具有可行性;对整个农业供应链来说,"公司租赁"要优于"公司+农户";当农户抵押物的价值较高或较低时,农户将选择"公司租赁"模式;存在关于土地租金的"双赢"区间,使得农业电商企业和农户在该区间内都将选择"公司租赁"模式,同时"双赢"区间将随农户抵押物价值的增加而减小.     

考虑零售商策略性库存的双渠道供应链定价及协调

针对双渠道供应链环境下,零售商将前期采购的部分产品作为策略性库存用于后期销售的情形,建立了制造商为主方的两周期Stackelberg动态博弈模型,分析了零售商持有策略性库存对双渠道供应链成员定价决策的影响。研究结果表明,零售商可以通过持有策略性库存影响制造商的批发价格决策,进而影响传统零售渠道和电子直销渠道之间的零售价格竞争。特别地,当单位库存持有成本较小时,持有策略性库存能够增加零售商利润。同时,为了缓解渠道冲突和双重边际化问题,构造了基于电子渠道直销价格的批发价格折扣和固定转移支付的组合契约。最后,通过数值分析,验证了此种组合契约同时协调零售商策略性库存决策和双渠道供应链成员两周期定价决策的有效性。     

不同主导力量下供应商减排投资的谎报与协调策略

在碳交易政策下的两级低碳供应链中,针对供应商可能利用私有成本信息增加自身利润损害零售商和供应链绩效的问题,探讨供应商投资减排后不同主导力量下供应商的成本信息谎报行为和供应链协调策略。研究发现,供应链主导力量对供应链利润在供应链成员间的分配、供应链的整体绩效和供应商的最优成本谎报策略均有影响。供应商主导型供应链中,供应商不会谎报其成本信息;零售商主导型供应链中,供应商在一定条件下会采取相应的谎报策略以使自身利润最大化,影响减排量、低碳产品零售价格以及零售商和供应链的绩效等。因此,设计一种固定减排量下依赖于批发价格的线性补贴惩罚机制进行协调。在合适的契约参数设置下,此机制在激励供应商反馈真实成本信息的同时能够实现低碳供应链的完美协调,且能将供应链利润在零售商和供应商之间进行自由划分。最后,通过数值分析对结论进行验证并探讨了谎报因子与零售商和供应商利润的关系。     

需求推断差异下供应链成员的运营决策机制

供应链终端随机需求的分布不确定时,制造商和零售商将根据各自掌握信息推断需求分布。若零售商不与制造商分享历史需求数据,制造商将根据零售商的历史订单数据进行需求推断。分析了制造商是否有历史需求数据时的价格决策、零售商相应的订购决策,以及供应链成员之间需求数据分享决策。结论显示：制造商根据零售商订单数据推断的需求过高时,将制定较高的批发价格;零售商的期望利润将比与制造商分享需求数据时少,零售商与制造商共享终端需求数据的可能性较大。进一步分析了激励供应链成员分享需求信息并增加供应链利润的协调机制。     

参照价格效应下的绿色供应链协调机制

在考虑消费者的参照价格效应下,研究绿色供应链的协调机制问题。构建了基于参照价格的分散决策模型、集中决策模型、成本分担契约和收益共享契约,给出了各优化模型下的最优均衡策略,并对其进行了比较分析。研究结果表明：成本分担契约和收益共享契约可以提高供应链系统的利润,却不能达到一体化下的最优利润;收益共享契约优于成本分担契约;随着参照价格效应的增加,产品绿色度、批发价格和零售价格减小,制造商和零售商的利润增加;考虑消费者的参照价格效应可以提高制造商和零售商的利润。     

供应链中制造商与代理商广告合作的博弈

供应链中为了做好产品的销售工作,往往要对产品进行有效的宣传,有一个对制造商与代理商都适宜的广告宣传计划。而在以往的文献中,研究的重点往往基于这样一种关系,制造商处于主导地位,代理商处于从属地位。随着市场的发展,制造商与代理商在广告宣传中的地位发生了变化,代理商可能已经等于甚至超越了制造商在广告宣传中所发挥的作用。本文运用博弈的方法,分别以制造商和代理商为主进行分析,得出不同情况下的最优广告策略。     

FROM MANUFACTURING SCHEDULING TO SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION：THE CONTROL OF COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY

With time-based competition and rapid technology advancements, effective manufacturingscheduling and supply chain coordination are critical to quickly respond to changing marketconditions. These problems, however, are difficult in view of inherent complexity and variousuncertainties involved. Based on a series of results by the authors, decomposition and coordination byusing Lagrangian relaxation is identified in this paper as an effective way to control complexity anduncertainty.A manufacturing scheduling problem is first formulated within the job shop context withuncertain order arrivals, processing times, due dates, and part priorities as a separable optimizationproblem. A solution methodology that combines Lagrangian relaxation, stochastic dynamicprogramming, and heuristics is developed. Method improvements to effectively solve large problemsare also highlighted. To extend manufacturing scheduling within a factory to coordinate autonomicmembers across chains of suppliers, a decentralized supply chai     

Technical Notes ：STUDIES ON THE VALUE OF SECONDARY MARKET TO THE SUPPLY CHAIN

This paper investigates the impact of a secondary market, where retailers can buy and sell excessinventories, on the supply chain. We develop a two-period model with a single manufacturer and tworetailers. At the beginning of the first period the retailers order and receive products from themanufacturer, but at the beginning of the second period, they can trade surplus products betweenthemselves in the secondary market. We investigate the impact of the correlated dependence ofretailers' demand on both the quantity effect and the allocation effect under the secondary market.Lastly,we study potential strategies for the manufacturer to increase sales with the existence of thesecondary market.     

LOGISTICS SCHEDULING： ANALYSIS OFTWO-STAGE PROBLEMS

This paper studies the coordination effects between stages for scheduling problems where decision-making is a two-stage process. Two stages are considered as one system. The system can be a supply chain that links two stages, one stage representing a manufacturer; and the other, a distributor It also can represent a single manufacturer, while each stage represents a different department responsible for a part of operations. A problem that jointly considers both stages in order to achieve ideal overall system performance is defined as a system problem. In practice, at times, it might not be feasible for the two stages to make coordinated decisions due to (i) the lack of channels that allow decision makers at the two stages to cooperate, and/or (ii) the optimal solution to the system problem is too difficult (or costly) to achieve.Two practical approaches are applied to solve a variant of two-stage logistic scheduling problems. The Forward Approach is defined as a solution procedure by which the first sta