Ideals and monisms: recent criticisms of the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge

I offer a reply to criticisms of the Strong Programme presented by Stephen Kemp who develops some new lines of argument that focus on the ‘monism’ of the programme. He says the programme should be rejected for three reasons. First, because it embodies ‘weak idealism’, that is, its supporters effectively sever the link between language and the world. Second, it challenges the reasons that scientists offer in explanation of their own beliefs. Third, it destroys the distinction between successful and unsuccessful instrumental action. Kemp is careful to produce quotations from the supporters of the programme as evidence to support his case. All three points deserve and are given a detailed response and the interpretation of the quoted material plays a significant role in the discussion. My hope is that careful exegesis will offset the numerous misinterpretations that are current in the philosophical literature. Particular attention is paid to what is said about the normative standards involved in the application of empirical concepts. The operation of these standards in the face of the negotiability of all concepts is explored and misapprehensions on the topic are corrected. The work of Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn and Hesse is used to illustrate these themes.     

The serini reaction

Zusammenfassung Der Mechanismus der Serini-Reaktion wird kurz erörtert und ein 17, 20-Oxyd als Zwischenprodukt vorgeschlagen. Das stereochemische Ergebnis der Reaktion soll von zwei Faktoren abhängig sein, und zwar: 1. von der Geometrie des « transition state » und 2. von der Konfiguration des Oxydrings. Ausgehend von diesen Überlegungen, kann vorausgesagt werden, daßReichsteins Substanz 0-Diacetat durch die Serini-Reaktion in ein 17-Iso-20-keton und nicht in ein 17-Normal-20-keton umgewandelt werden soll. Tatsächlich ist das 17-Isoallopregnanol-(3)-on-20 als einziges Produkt experimentell aufgefunden worden.     

Pierre Duhem’s virtue epistemology

Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is central to his philosophy of science, given that it is what allows scientists to decide between competing theories. Scientists must use good sense and have intellectual and moral virtues in order to be neutral arbiters of scientific theories, especially when choosing between empirically adequate theories. I discuss the parallels in Duhem’s views to those of virtue epistemologists, who understand justified belief as that arrived at by a cognitive agent with intellectual and moral virtues, showing how consideration of Duhem as a virtue epistemologist offers insights into his views, as well as providing possible answers to some puzzles about virtue epistemology. The extent to which Duhem holds that the intellectual and moral virtues of the scientist determine scientific knowledge has not been generally noticed.     

On the limitations of comparing mean square forecast errors

Linear models are invariant under non-singular, scale-preserving linear transformations, whereas mean square forecast errors (MSFEs) are not. Different rankings may result across models or methods from choosing alternative yet isomorphic representations of a process. One approach can dominate others for comparisons in levels, yet lose to another for differences, to a second for cointegrating vectors and to a third for combinations of variables. The potential for switches in ranking is related to criticisms of the inadequacy of MSFE against encompassing criteria, which are invariant under linear transforms and entail MSFE dominance. An invariant evaluation criterion which avoids misleading outcomes is examined in a Monte Carlo study of forecasting methods.