The estimative functions of physical theory

Attention is drawn to two closely related functions served by scientific theory (called here ‘mensurative’ and ‘reconstructive estimation’) which are of fundamental importance in physical science but as yet little discussed in philosophy. As indicated by their names, they constitute the theoretical basis of physical measurements.After analysing some historically important examples and sketching the historical development of these ideas, this paper examines the similarities and differences between the estimate functions of theory and such well-known functions as prediction and explanation. The pervasiveness of the estimative functions even when theory is but poorly developed is noted; and some of the problems raised by the physical equivalence of the measuring instrument to the object measured are discussed. The relations of estimation to ‘reductive logic’ are also considered.We then apply this understanding of estimative functioning to distinguishing experimental errors from those genuine anomalies which result in discovery. It is also shown that there can be no facts established nor any verification of predictions except on the basis of valid estimates derived, in turn, from antecedently accepted theories.     

Generalized measures of association for ranked data with an application to prediction accuracy

A common practice in cross validation research in the behavioral sciences is to employ either the product moment correlation or a simple tabulation of first-choice “hits” for measuring the accuracy with which various preference models predict subjects’ responses to a holdout sample of choice objects. We propose a nonparametric approach for summarizing the accuracy of predicted rankings across a set of holdout-sample options. The methods that we develop contain a novel way to deal with ties and an approach to the different weighting of rank positions.     

Can the constructive empiricist be a nominalist? Quasi-truth, commitment and consistency

In this paper, I explore Rosen’s (1994) ‘transcendental’ objection to constructive empiricism—the argument that in order to be a constructive empiricist, one must be ontologically committed to just the sort of abstract, mathematical objects constructive empiricism seems committed to denying. In particular, I assess Bueno’s (1999) ‘partial structures’ response to Rosen, and argue that such a strategy cannot succeed, on the grounds that it cannot provide an adequate metalogic for our scientific discourse. I conclude by arguing that this result provides some interesting consequences in general for anti-realist programmes in the philosophy of science.     

服务主道型数字图书馆及网上参考谘询服务 :宏观检视(英文)

阐述数字图书馆之定义、优点及面世的历史背景 ,指出读者使用数字图书馆时所遇到的困难及建立服务主道型数字图书馆的重要性 .网上参考谘询服务是实施服务主道型数字图书馆的一种工具 ,能让读者觉得图书馆服务无处不在及无远弗界 .本文将检视此项服务的发展、优点及实施时之问题 .为要说明运用详情 ,亦会枚举一些实例以供参考 .特别引述的例子则是由台湾逢甲大学图书馆及美国夏威夷大学图书馆协同规划的中华经济圈经贸与工商法律国际合作资料搜集计划项目 .最后 ,提出此项服务在未来发展时应要注意的数项要点     

A new look at Heron's “Steam Engine”

Communicated by C. A. Wilson