Aristotle Said “Happiness is a State of Activity” — Predicting Mood Through Body Sensing with Smartwatches

We measure and predict states of Activation and Happiness using a body sensing application connected to smartwatches. Through the sensors of commercially available smartwatches we collect individual mood states and correlate them with body sensing data such as acceleration, heart rate, light level data, and location, through the GPS sensor built into the smartphone connected to the smartwatch. We polled users on the smartwatch for seven weeks four times per day asking for their mood state. We found that both Happiness and Activation are negatively correlated with heart beats and with the levels of light. People tend to be happier when they are moving more intensely and are feeling less activated during weekends. We also found that people with a lower Conscientiousness and Neuroticism and higher Agreeableness tend to be happy more frequently. In addition, more Activation can be predicted by lower Openness to experience and higher Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Lastly, we find that tracking people’s geographical coordinates might play an important role in predicting Happiness and Activation. The methodology we propose is a first step towards building an automated mood tracking system, to be used for better teamwork and in combination with social network analysis studies.     

大科学:跌入凡尘奈若何

国际空间站和欧洲核子中心的大型强子对撞机 (LHC)计划目前都面临资金上的窘境 ;……除了对项目 (尤其是耗资巨大的项目 )预算的科学化 ,管理的科学化在其中尤显重要     

Ideals and monisms: recent criticisms of the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge

I offer a reply to criticisms of the Strong Programme presented by Stephen Kemp who develops some new lines of argument that focus on the ‘monism’ of the programme. He says the programme should be rejected for three reasons. First, because it embodies ‘weak idealism’, that is, its supporters effectively sever the link between language and the world. Second, it challenges the reasons that scientists offer in explanation of their own beliefs. Third, it destroys the distinction between successful and unsuccessful instrumental action. Kemp is careful to produce quotations from the supporters of the programme as evidence to support his case. All three points deserve and are given a detailed response and the interpretation of the quoted material plays a significant role in the discussion. My hope is that careful exegesis will offset the numerous misinterpretations that are current in the philosophical literature. Particular attention is paid to what is said about the normative standards involved in the application of empirical concepts. The operation of these standards in the face of the negotiability of all concepts is explored and misapprehensions on the topic are corrected. The work of Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn and Hesse is used to illustrate these themes.     

Pierre Duhem’s virtue epistemology

Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is central to his philosophy of science, given that it is what allows scientists to decide between competing theories. Scientists must use good sense and have intellectual and moral virtues in order to be neutral arbiters of scientific theories, especially when choosing between empirically adequate theories. I discuss the parallels in Duhem’s views to those of virtue epistemologists, who understand justified belief as that arrived at by a cognitive agent with intellectual and moral virtues, showing how consideration of Duhem as a virtue epistemologist offers insights into his views, as well as providing possible answers to some puzzles about virtue epistemology. The extent to which Duhem holds that the intellectual and moral virtues of the scientist determine scientific knowledge has not been generally noticed.