Rehabilitating theory: refusal of the ‘bottom-up’ construction of scientific phenomena

In this paper I inquire into Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) data/phenomena distinction, which in a similar way to Cartwright’s construal of the model of superconductivity (1995)—although in a different domain—argues for a ‘bottom-up’ construction of phenomena from data without the involvement of theory. I criticise Bogen and Woodward’s account by analysing their melting point of lead example in depth, which is usually cited in the literature to illustrate the data/phenomenon distinction. Yet, the main focus of this paper lies on Matthias Kaiser’s (1995) case study of the plate tectonic revolution, the most extensive case study that has been put forth to support the bottom-up construction of phenomena. On the basis of new historical evidence, which has been overlooked not only by Kaiser but also by the entire historical literature on the plate tectonic revolution, I demonstrate that phenomena are not constructed from the bottom-up but rather, admittedly counter-intuitively, from the top-down.     

They give you the keys and say ‘drive it!’ Managers, referred expertise, and other expertises

On the face of it, the directors of new large scientific projects have an impossible task. They have to make technical decisions about sciences in which they have never made a research contribution—sciences in which they have no contributory expertise. Furthermore, these decisions must be accepted and respected by the scientists who are making research contributions. The problem is discussed in two interviews conducted with two directors of large scientific projects. The paradox is resolved for the managers by their use of interactional and referred expertise. The same analysis might be applicable to management in general. An Appendix, co-authored with Jeff Shrager, compares the notion of referred expertise with contributory expertise.     

Prediction of α‐stable GARCH and ARMA‐GARCH‐M models

The best prediction of generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models with α‐stable innovations, α‐stable power‐GARCH models and autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models with GARCH in mean effects (ARMA‐GARCH‐M) are proposed. We present a sufficient condition for stationarity of α‐stable GARCH models. The prediction methods are easy to implement in practice. The proposed prediction methods are applied for predicting future values of the daily SP500 stock market and wind speed data.     

US Inflation Expectations and Heterogeneous Loss Functions, 1968–2010

Recent literature has suggested that macroeconomic forecasters may have asymmetric loss functions, and that there may be heterogeneity across forecasters in the degree to which they weigh under‐ and over‐predictions. Using an individual‐level analysis that exploits the Survey of Professional Forecasters respondents’ histogram forecasts, we find little evidence of asymmetric loss for the inflation forecasters. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Kant’s dynamical theory of matter in 1755, and its debt to speculative Newtonian experimentalism

This paper explores the scientific sources behind Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755, with a focus on two main Kant’s writings: Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and On Fire. The year 1755 has often been portrayed by Kantian scholars as a turning point in the intellectual career of the young Kant, with his much debated conversion to Newton. Via a careful analysis of some salient themes in the two aforementioned works, and a reconstruction of the scientific sources behind them, this paper shows Kant’s debt to an often overlooked scientific tradition, i.e. speculative Newtonian experimentalism. The paper argues that more than the Principia, it was the speculative experimentalism that goes from Newton’s Opticks to Herman Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae via Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks that played a central role in the elaboration of Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755.     

The influence of Spinoza’s concept of infinity on Cantor’s set theory

Georg Cantor, the founder of set theory, cared much about a philosophical foundation for his theory of infinite numbers. To that end, he studied intensively the works of Baruch de Spinoza. In the paper, we survey the influence of Spinozean thoughts onto Cantor’s; we discuss Spinoza’s philosophy of infinity, as it is contained in his Ethics; and we attempt to draw a parallel between Spinoza’s and Cantor’s ontologies. Our conclusion is that the study of Spinoza provides deepening insights into Cantor’s philosophical theory, whilst Cantor can not be called a ‘Spinozist’ in any stricter sense of that word.     

Ehrenfest’s adiabatic theory and the old quantum theory, 1916–1918

I discuss in detail the contents of the adiabatic hypothesis, formulated by Ehrenfest in 1916. I focus especially on the paper he published in 1916 and 1917 in three different journals. I briefly review its precedents and thoroughly analyze its reception until 1918, including Burgers’s developments and Bohr’s assimilation of them into his own theory. I show that until 1918 the adiabatic hypothesis did not play an important role in the development of quantum theory. An erratum to this article can be found at