On What Ontology is and Not-is

In this paper I investigate the relation between physics and metaphysics in Plato’s participation theory. I show that the logic shoring up Plato’s metaphysics in paraconsistent, as had been suggested already by Graham Priest. The transformation of the paradoxical One-and-Many of the pre-Socratics into a paraconsistent Great-and-Small bridges the abyss between archaic rationality and the world of classical logic based ultimately on the principle of contradiction. Indeed, language is an organ of perception, not simply a means of communication. J. Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness      

对量化问题的哲学实验研究

在量化问题上,传统逻辑和现代逻辑的对当方阵大相径庭,且各有局限。哲学实验结果显示:(1)自然语言中A、I命题都允许主项为实体性存在、观念性存在,不接受自相矛盾的主项;(2)各语境下自然语言的A、I命题在主项存在方面高度相似,表明A命题预设了主项存在;(3)不同语境下对A、I命题的否定接受了不同的预设,表明了否定包含预设、且预设具有层次性。基于实验结果的"分层量化"方案,把A命题的主项存在预设形式化为公式的一部分;把不同语境下否定的预设形式化为独立的前提,据此分层建立了否定时预设个体存在(■x)、预设主项存在(■xSx)、预设主项为全域(■xSx)的对当方阵,三者具有内在一致性。新方案似可较为系统地消解量化问题的困境。     

自然选择是万能的吗?——进化论中的适应主义及其生物学哲学争论

自然选择是达尔文进化论学说的重要概念。达尔文之后,关于自然选择的作用,形成了两种互相对立的学说:适应主义和反适应主义。适应主义者认为,自然选择是万能的,生物的进化都是通过自然选择而获得适应性进化的结果;反适应者主义者则认为,自然选择的作用不是万能的,生物还可以通过其他途径进化。鉴于适应主义的广泛影响及其在理解进化生物学中的重要作用,本文拟澄清适应主义的含义及其形式,阐明适应主义与反适应主义在生物学和哲学两个层面的争论,并指出适应主义思想的局限性及多元主义视角的价值。     

Non-Monotonic Set Theory as a Pragmatic Foundation of Mathematics

In this paper I propose a new approach to the foundation of mathematics: non-monotonic set theory. I present two completely different methods to develop set theories based on adaptive logics. For both theories there is a finitistic non-triviality proof and both theories contain (a subtle version of) the comprehension axiom schema. The first theory contains only a maximal selection of instances of the comprehension schema that do not lead to inconsistencies. The second allows for all the instances, also the inconsistent ones, but restricts the conclusions one can draw from them in order to avoid triviality. The theories have enough expressive power to form a justification/explication for most of the established results of classical mathematics. They are therefore not limited by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This remarkable result is possible because of the non-recursive character of the final proofs of theorems of non-monotonic theories. I shall argue that, precisely because of the computational complexity of these final proofs, we cannot claim that non-monotonic theories are ideal foundations for mathematics. Nevertheless, thanks to their strength, first order language and the recursive dynamic (defeasible) proofs of theorems of the theory, the non-monotonic theories form (what I call) interesting pragmatic foundations.     

Of Humans & Cyborgs, Caterpillars & Butterflies

In response to Peter–Paul Verbeek’s and Paul Levinson’s reviews of my article ‘In Between Us,’ I comment on four criticisms. Firstly, my approach of ‘mediation as such’ does not endorse the view of mediation as secondary to mediata (i.e., entities), but does not exclude it either. Secondly, my concepts of “transparency of use” and of “context” are to be seen as philosophical ‘tools’ and not as mutually exclusive states. Thirdly, I agree with Levinson that technologies do indeed remediate, and mostly not for the worse. However, fourthly, at the same time we should always be on guard for their nefarious effects.     

Pro-Latour

In this comment I want to clarify five topics. The first topic concerns the importance of looking back at the very principles of the foundations of Western society. The second comment argues for the original position of Latour within the field of (social) constructivism. In the third comment, I argue that Haraway adds to the science-politics discussion by elaborating her philosophy beyond dichotomy. In the fourth comment, I argue that the terms ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ are central philosophical concepts which should be retained. Finally I will make the connection between ‘what’ is represented and ‘how’ to represent it.     

The Intentionality of Formal Systems

One of the most interesting and entertaining philosophical discussions of the last few decades is the discussion between Daniel Dennett and John Searle on the existence of intrinsic intentionality. Dennett denies the existence of phenomena with intrinsic intentionality. Searle, however, is convinced that some mental phenomena exhibit intrinsic intentionality. According to me, this discussion has been obscured by some serious misunderstandings with regard to the concept ‘intrinsic intentionality’. For instance, most philosophers fail to realize that it is possible that the intentionality of a phenomenon is partly intrinsic and partly observer relative. Moreover, many philosophers are mixing up the concepts ‘original intentionality’ and ‘intrinsic intentionality’. In fact, there is, in the philosophical literature, no strict and unambiguous definition of the concept ‘intrinsic intentionality’. In this article, I will try to remedy this. I will also try to give strict and unambiguous definitions of the concepts ‘observer relative intentionality’, ‘original intentionality’, and ‘derived intentionality’. These definitions will be used for an examination of the intentionality of formal mathematical systems. In conclusion, I will make a comparison between the (intrinsic) intentionality of formal mathematical systems on the one hand, and the (intrinsic) intentionality of human beings on the other hand.     

Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis

This paper studies the Lockean thesis from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic. The Lockean thesis states that belief can be defined as ‘sufficiently high degree of belief’. Its main problem is that it gives rise to a notion of belief which is not closed under conjunction. This problem is typical for classical epistemic logic: it is single-agent and static. I argue that from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic, the Lockean thesis fares much better. I briefly mention that it can successfully be extended from single-agent to multi-agent settings. More importantly, I show that accepting the Lockean thesis (and a more sophisticated version for conditional beliefs) leads to a significant and unexpected unification in the dynamic behavior of (conditional) belief and high (conditional) probability with respect to public announcements. This constitutes a methodological argument in favor of the Lockean thesis. Furthermore, if one accepts Baltag’s Erlangen program for epistemology, this technical observation has even stronger philosophical implications: because belief and high probability display the same dynamic behavior, it is plausible that they are indeed one and the same epistemic notion.     

Displacing Epistemology: Being in the Midst of Technoscientific Practice

Interest the Erklären?CVerstehen debate is usually interpreted as primarily epistemological. By raising the possibility that there are fundamentally different methods for fundamentally different types of science, the debate puts into play all the standard issues??that is, issues concerning scientific explanation and justification, the unity and diversity of scientific disciplines, the reality of their subject matter, the accessibility of various subject matters to research, and so on. In this paper, however, I do not focus on any of these specific issues. I start instead from the fact that the very existence of the debate itself is an issue; in fact, it poses a philosophical problem that almost everyone but the hardest line logical empiricists has come to realize cannot be resolved epistemologically. In my view, however, that it cannot be resolved ontologically, either. I think the problem is at bottom hermeneutical, and its resolution requires that we focus first, not on the objects of science or the methods of studying them, but on the character of the philosophical orientation assumed by those who would try to resolve it. In this paper, I explain why I think this is so by analyzing (1) Dilthey??s contribution to the original debate, (2) Husserl??s reaction to Dilthey, and (3) Heidegger??s critical evaluation of both. This line of philosophical development??this movement of self-understanding from critiques of objectivism to hermeneutical phenomenology??is of course already a central feature of much work in continental philosophy of science. In my conclusion, however, I argue for the less well-established??even if apparently approved??idea that it ought to be a central feature of technoscience studies as well.     

Mediating Mars: Perceptual Experience and Scientific Imaging Technologies

The philosophical tradition of phenomenology, with its focus on human bodily perception, can be used to explore the ways scientific instrumentation shapes a user’s experience. Building on Don Ihde’s account of technological embodiment, I develop a framework of concepts for articulating the experience of image interpretation in science. These concepts can be of practical value to the analysis of scientific debates over image interpretation for the ways they draw out the relationships between the image-making processes and the rival scientific explanations of image content. As a guiding example, I explore a contemporary debate over images of the surface of Mars which reveal a landmass that resembles river delta formations on Earth, and which thus has important implications for the history of Martian climate and water flow. The phenomenological framework I develop can be used to help evaluate the different interpretations on offer for these images, and to analyze the roles in this discussion played by spacecraft equipped with cameras and laser and thermal imaging devices.     

Dwelling In-Between Walls: The Architectural Surround

The title of this paper might evoke claustrophobic associations. In other words, architecture in a very immediate sense can affect our behavior and feelings. In more mediated ways, architecture is also capable of influencing humans and putting their environment into perspective. Consider, for example, how a penthouse apartment can literally elevate people??s emotions and unfold a new perspective on city life, which some people are willing to pay millions of dollars to attain. In this paper I will explore how architecture frames human experience from a philosophical point of view. My aim is to offer key elements of a new typology of architecture. For that purpose I am going to reflect and expand on key insights into technology of one of the funding fathers of contemporary philosophy of technology, Don Ihde. Through a life time, Ihde has been probing and investigating the relation between humans and their world as it is mediated through technology. In doing so he has concentrated on examining and understanding the role of scientific instruments. This paper is dedicated to showing how Ihde??s significant postphenomenological concepts not only can be translated to another domain and serve a better understanding of architecture, but also how his work can help us to relate to architecture in multiple constructive ways. The succeeding experimental translations of Ihde??s understanding of technology to architecture are also meant as a guide to design more adequate and fascinating built environments. I will begin with a broad overview of Ihde??s postphenomenological project; subsequently I shall endeavor to translate this work onto architecture through a number of case-studies, some of which are detailed and others less so.     

自然语言中的感官隐喻认知系统

感官隐喻认知系统在汉语自然语言中普遍存在,能够从一定程度上反映汉民族的认知规律。跨概念域的映射是其实质,体验性心智是其哲学基础,感觉统合是其神经心理学基础,中国古代心学思想是其哲学渊源。     

“Who” is a “Topical Measuring” Postphenomenologist and How Does One Get That Way?

Gert Goeminne’s paper is primarily concerned with “the politics of sustainable technology,” but for good reasons he does not start with this topic. He knows that technology studies as he conceives it must clear a space for itself in a philosophical atmosphere that discourages its pursuit. He therefore begins with a critique of this objectivistic and technocratically defined atmosphere, before moving on to embrace a postphenomenology of technological multistabilities, and then further to introduce what he calls (in an adaptation of Rudolf Boehm) the “topical measure” of technoscientific life. The problem I raise is not about Goeminne’s aims, with which I mostly agree, but with his presentation of how to achieve them. I argue that if one were actually to follow his advice—that is, start with critique, move on to postphenomenology, and end with “political” evaluation of technoscientific life, the project would be doomed to failure. For in our world, no one Understands this pluralizing vision. According to the understanding we actually live through and speak from, some of postphenomenology’s multiple disclosures already arrive in our experience with significantly greater ontological power than others, and sincerity about topical measure notwithstanding, the very identification of something as an interest or “value,” especially if it allegedly comes from a “layperson,” already condemns it to secondary status.     

自然与自由:康德因果性问题中的科学与哲学意蕴

在西方哲学史上,康德第一次将哲学与科学区分开来。自然与自由是康德因果性问题的两种模式,是理解康德关于哲学与科学关系的关键。通过休谟因果性问题的解决,康德直接论证了自然因果性的普遍必然性。通过纯粹理性的第三个二律背反的解决,康德间接论证了自由因果性的可能性。其中,自然因果性为科学奠定基础,自由因果性为哲学提供根据。康德因果性问题包含着深刻的科学和哲学意蕴。     

The Perspective of the Instruments: Mediating Collectivity

Numerous studies in the fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and philosophy of technology have repeatedly stressed that scientific practices are collective practices that crucially depend on the presence of scientific technologies. Postphenomenology is one of the movements that aims to draw philosophical conclusions from these observations through an analysis of human–technology interactions in scientific practice. Two other attempts that try to integrate these insights into philosophy of science are Ronald Giere’s Scientific Perspectivism (2006) and Davis Baird’s Thing Knowledge (2004). In this paper, these two approaches will be critically discussed from the perspective of postphenomenology. We will argue that Giere and Baird problematically assume that scientific instruments (a) have a determined function, and (b) that all human members of a scientific collective have immediate access to this function. However, these assumptions also allow them to offer a clear answer to the question how scientists can collectively relate to scientific phenomena. Such an answer is not yet (explicitly) formulated within the postphenomenological perspective. By adding a postphenomenological touch to the semiotic approach in Actor-Network Theory, we offer an account of how different individual human–technology relations are integrated into larger scientific collectives. We do so by showing that scientific instruments not only help constitute scientific phenomena, but also the intersubjectivity within such collectives.     

Mario Bunge on Gravitational Waves and the Reality of Spacetime

I discuss the recent claims made by Mario Bunge on the philosophical implications of the discovery of gravitational waves. I think that Bunge is right when he points out that the detection implies the materiality of spacetime, but I reject his identification of spacetime with the gravitational field. I show that Bunge’s analysis of the spacetime inside a hollow sphere is defective, but this in no way affects his main claim.     

Virtual Invaders

Since both responses interrogate different aspects of my article “The screen as an in-between” (Vanderbeeken 2011), I will address them separately. Vanhoutte rightly questions the affinities of my theses with Luddism, Orwell and Baudrillard’s theoretical terrorism. My reply discusses why these reactionary positions are currently out of joint. Hoens rightly questions my interpretation of the notion ‘passion for the real’ and whether the examples discussed delineate the specificity of new media. My reply discusses how I take this notion as a starting point for an analysis that complements rather then criticises Badiou and ?i?ek and how the apparent resemblance between old and new media in fact entails significant differences.     

专名的意向性分析和语境——评塞尔的专名理论

随着塞尔意向性理论的发展,塞尔对专名的研究由前期的"簇摹状词"理论转到"簇意向内容"理论,其研究方向也由语言哲学转向心灵哲学。塞尔认为专名的含义就是意向内容,指称是由一根意向内容的,因果历史链条决定的。本文指出,由于塞尔忽略语境因素,且意向内容本质上是心理的因而是私人性的,这使专名的意义在其理论中失去公共性。本文对塞尔、克里普克和陈晓平三人的因果历史理论作了比较和评价,进而指出,在语境中两种因果历史链条相结合的必要性。     

The Abductive Loop: Tracking Irrational Sets

We argue from the Church-Turing thesis (Kleene Mathematical logic. New York: Wiley 1967) that a program can be considered as equivalent to a formal language similar to predicate calculus where predicates can be taken as functions. We can relate such a calculus to Wittgenstein’s first major work, the Tractatus, and use the Tractatus and its theses as a model of the formal classical definition of a computer program. However, Wittgenstein found flaws in his initial great work and he explored these flaws in a new thesis described in his second great work; the Philosophical Investigations. The question we address is “can computer science make the same leap?” We are proposing, because of the flaws identified by Wittgenstein, that computers will never have the possibility of natural communication with people unless they become active participants of human society. The essential difference between formal models used in computing and human communication is that formal models are based upon rational sets whereas people are not so restricted. We introduce irrational sets as a concept that requires the use of an abductive inference system. However, formal models are still considered central to our means of using hypotheses through deduction to make predictions about the world. These formal models are required to continually be updated in response to peoples’ changes in their way of seeing the world. We propose that one mechanism used to keep track of these changes is the Peircian abductive loop.