Witnesses of the body: medico-legal cases in seventeenth-century Rome

Studying early modern medico-legal testimonies can enrich our understanding of witnessing, the focus of much research in the history of science. Expert testimonies were well established in the Roman Cannon law, but the sphere of competence of expert witnesses - one of the grounds on which seventeenth-century physicians claimed social and intellectual authority- troubled contemporary jurists. By reconstructing these debates in Counter Reformation Rome, and by placing in them the testimonies given by Poalo Zacchia, one of the founding fathers of legal medicine, this article discusses the epistemological and social issues surrounding the definition of expertise about the body in court. It shows how a high-ranking expert witness would define his competence versus the legal authority on the one hand, lower-status expert witnesses on the other. But it also explores the interactions between specific legal constraints, for example about eye witnessing, and the ways in which different kinds of witnesses would use the body as a source of evidence for testimony. While engaging with medico-legal issues including the ambiguous signs of childbirth and the (in)visibility of pain, the article examines their meanings within Counter Reformation social controversies, including control over sexuality, imposition of discipline and the social status of physicians.     

The professor and the pea: Lives and afterlives of William Bateson’s campaign for the utility of Mendelism

As a defender of the fundamental importance of Mendel’s experiments for understanding heredity, the English biologist William Bateson (1861–1926) did much to publicize the usefulness of Mendelian science for practical breeders. In the course of his campaigning, he not only secured a reputation among breeders as a scientific expert worth listening to but articulated a vision of the ideal relations between pure and applied science in the modern state. Yet historical writing about Bateson has tended to underplay these utilitarian elements of his program, to the extent of portraying him, notably in still-influential work from the 1960s and 1970s, as a type specimen of the scientist who could not care less about application. This paper offers a corrective view of Bateson himself—including the first detailed account of his role as an expert witness in a courtroom dispute over the identity of a commercial pea variety—and an inquiry into the historiographic fate of his efforts in support of Mendelism’s productivity. For all that a Marxian perspective classically brings applied science to the fore, in Bateson’s case, and for a range of reasons, it did the opposite during the Cold War.     

Testimony in seventeenth-century English natural philosophy: legal origins and early development

This essay argues that techniques for assessing testimonial credibility were well established in English legal contexts before they appeared in English natural philosophy. 'Matters of fact' supported by testimony referred to human actions and events before the concept was applied to natural phenomena. The article surveys English legal views about testimony and argues that the criteria for credible testimony in both legal and scientific venues were not limited to those of gentle status. Natural philosophers became concerned with testimony when they shifted their attention from universal statements about nature to particular natural and experimental histories constructed by English naturalists. The shift to a more Baconian approach to natural investigation, itself shaped in part by legal concepts and practice, made it possible for members of the Royal Society to adopt an already familiar and societally approved approach to testimony. However, the essay also suggests how the use of scientific instruments and the desire to avoid the adversarial processes of the law modified legal conditions for fact determination, and made it possible for later generations to associate the concept of fact, supported by credible testimony, with the natural rather than the human sciences.     

Embodied cognition and linguistic comprehension

Traditionally, the language faculty was supposed to be a device that maps linguistic inputs to semantic or conceptual representations. These representations themselves were supposed to be distinct from the representations manipulated by the hearer’s perceptual and motor systems. Recently this view of language has been challenged by advocates of embodied cognition. Drawing on empirical studies of linguistic comprehension, they have proposed that the language faculty reuses the very representations and processes deployed in perceiving and acting. I review some of the evidence and arguments in favor of the embodied view of language comprehension, and argue that none of it is conclusive. Moreover, the embodied view itself blurs two important distinctions: first, the distinction between linguistic comprehension and its typical consequences; and second, the distinction between representational content and vehicles. Given that these distinctions are well-motivated, we have good reason to reject the embodied view of linguistic understanding.     

The detection of fraud and fakery

Fraud is often found in science, especially in what is termed, 'fringe science'. There are several reasons why scientists should be aware of the fact that they, too, can be deceived, both by subjects in experiments and by themselves. The will to believe is strong even among 'hard-headed' academics, and is often the factor that causes them to publish results that do not stand up to subsequent examination and/or attempts to replicate. In some cases, scientists would be well advised to consult with such experts as conjurors, when skilled frauds are in a position to mislead them.     

Language understanding is grounded in experiential simulations: a response to Weiskopf

Several disciplines within the cognitive sciences have advanced the idea that people comprehend the actions of others, including the linguistic meanings they communicate, through embodied simulations where they imaginatively recreate the actions they observe or hear about. This claim has important consequences for theories of mind and meaning, such as that people’s use and interpretation of language emerges as a kind of bodily activity that is an essential part of ordinary cognition. Daniel Weiskopf presents several arguments against the idea that experiential simulations play a major role in immediate language use and meaning. We offer several rebuttals to Weiskopf, in which we critique his interpretation of simulation theory, present additional psycholinguistic evidence supportive of the simulation perspective, and suggest that a more traditional theory of linguistic meaning and processing has little psychological and empirical validity.     

Ion channels in plant signaling

Plant ion channel activities are rapidly modulated in response to several environmental and endogenous stimuli such as light, pathogen attack and phytohormones. Electrophysiological as well as pharmacological studies provide strong evidence that ion channels are essential for the induction of specific cellular responses, implicating their tight linkage to signal transduction cascades. Ion channels propagate signals by modulating the membrane potential or by directly affecting cellular ion composition. In addition, they may also be effectors at the end of signaling cascades, as examplified by ion channels which determine the solute content of stomatal guard cells. Plant channels are themselves subject to regulation by a variety of cellular factors, including calcium, pH and cyclic nucleotides. In addition, they appear to be regulated by (de)-phosphorylation events as well as by direct interactions with cytoskeletal and other cellular proteins. This review summarizes current knowledge on the role of ion chan nels in plant signaling.     

The benefits of acquiring interactional expertise: Why (some) philosophers of science should engage scientific communities

Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for and addressing the need to do work that is socially and scientifically engaged. However, we currently lack well-developed frameworks for thinking about how we should engage other expert communities and what the epistemic benefits are of doing so. In this paper, I draw on Collins and Evans' concept of ‘interactional expertise’ – the ability to speak the language of a discipline in the absence of an ability to practice – to consider the epistemic benefits that can arise when philosophers engage scientific communities. As Collins and Evans argue, becoming an interactional expert requires that one ‘hang out’ with members of the relevant expert community in order to learn crucial tacit knowledge needed to speak the language. Building on this work, I argue that acquiring interactional expertise not only leads to linguistic fluency, but it also confers several ‘socio-epistemic’ benefits such as the opportunity to cultivate trust with scientific communities. These benefits can improve philosophical work and facilitate the broader uptake of philosophers' ideas, enabling philosophers to meet a variety of epistemic goals. As a result, having at least some philosophers of science acquire interactional expertise via engagement will likely enhance the diversity of epistemic capacities for philosophy of science as a whole. For some philosophers of science, moreover, the socio-epistemic benefits identified here may be more important than the ability to speak the language of a discipline, suggesting the need for a broader analysis of interactional expertise, which this paper also advances.     

The evolution of BioBike: Community adaptation of a biocomputing platform

Programming languages are, at the same time, instruments and communicative artifacts that evolve rapidly through use. In this paper I describe an online computing platform called BioBike. BioBike is a trading zone where biologists and programmers collaborate in the development of an extended vocabulary and functionality for computational genomics. In the course of this work they develop interactional expertise with one another’s domains. The extended BioBike vocabulary operates on two planes: as a working programming language, and as a pidgin in the conversation between the biologists and engineers. The flexibility that permits this community to dynamically extend BioBike’s working vocabulary—to form new pidgins—makes BioBike unique among computational tools, which usually are not themselves adapted through the collaborations that they facilitate. Thus BioBike is itself a crucial feature—which it is tempting to refer to as a participant—in the developing interaction.     

Chemistry,microscopy and smell: bloodstains and nineteenth-century legal medicine

This paper analyses the development of three methods for detecting bloodstains during the first half of the nineteenth-century in France. After dealing with the main problems in detecting bloodstains, the paper describes the chemical tests introduced in the mid-1820s. Then the first uses of the microscope in the detection of bloodstains around 1827 are discussed. The most controversial method is then examined, the smell test introduced by Jean-Pierre Barruel in 1829, and the debates which took place in French academies and learned societies during ensuing years are surveyed. Moving to the courtrooms a review is conducted of how the different methods were employed in criminal trials. By reviewing these cases, the main arguments against Barruel's test during the 1830s are explored as well as the changes making possible the return of the microscope to legal medicine around 1840. By reconstructing the history of these three methods, the paper reveals how the senses of smell and vision (colours and microscopic images) were employed in order to produce convincing evidence in both academies and courts. The paper questions two linear master narratives that are organized in terms of progress and decline: the development of forensic science as a result of continued technological progress; and the supposed decline of smell in the history of the senses, particularly in the realm of chemistry and medicine.     

Interactional expertise and embodiment

In this four part exchange, Evan Selinger starts by stating that Collins’s empirical evidence in respect of linguistic socialization and its bearing on artificial intelligence and expertise is valuable; it advances philosophical and sociological understanding of the relationship between knowledge and language. Nevertheless, he argues that Collins mischaracterizes the data under review and thereby misrepresents how knowledge is acquired and understates the extent to which expert knowers are embodied. Selinger reconstructs the case for the importance of the body in the initial acquisition of language and challenges Collins to show how a disembodied entity could become fluent in any language at all.Collins responds by accepting that his approach does not demonstrate quite as much about the irrelevance of the body as he thought it did but that even though he accepts all of Selinger’s claims, ‘the body’ as needed by the philosophical approach set out by Selinger is still a vestigial thing. Collins’s main point, however, is that the philosophical view of the body—the world is divided into embodied agents and unembodied entities—distracts attention from the more interesting empirically researchable question of how the ability to become socialized diminishes, if it does, as the body become more and more minimal. The right research question is not about whether a person can extrapolate from minimal sensory input but how much extrapolation is possible under different circumstances and how it is done.Dreyfus, having seen the whole of the exchange so far, agrees that both have a point but argues that Collins’s approach still misses the well established importance of bodily engagement for full understanding.Collins responds to this by trying to set out more clearly the position associated with the idea of interactional expertise.     

Torus shaped bands at the 2R telomere region and at the region 68 of the salivary gland chromosomes ofDrosophila auraria

Summary The telomere of the 2R arm of the salivary gland chromosomes ofD. auraria exhibits a definite toroidal structure in routine squashed preparations, stained either by propionic orcein-carmine or by fluorescent dyes. There is evidence that a band (or bands) of region 68 (possibly homologous to that ofD. melanogaster) of the 3L chromosome arm also exhibits a toroidal structure. These toroids are associated with heterochromatin, but it is not certain that they are themselves heterochromatic.Acknowledgments. This work was supported by a grant from Volkswagenwerk-Stiftung to C.D.K. The outstanding technical assistance of Ms G. Karamanlidis is acknowledged.     

Alsatian chemists in Paris in the 19th century: a network, a school?

During the nineteenth century French chemistry was marked by an outstanding number of Alsatian chemists whose scientific contributions cannot be ignored. Especially following the Franco-Prussian War, their regional origin was given a particular importance as a means of affirming their singularity on the French scientific scene. However, some questions may be raised: can we distinguish the Alsatians from other French chemists before 1870? Were they a homogeneous group sharing a common origin? The aim of this article therefore, is, to show that by their theoretical options within chemistry, their personal and professional relationships, as well as by their participation in various common initiatives, they organized themselves both formally and informally within the Parisian scientific community. Amongst these forms of organization the research school of Charles Adolphe Wurtz (1817-84) emerges as the nucleus of what we may envisage as a network of Alsatian chemists working in Paris, in the second half of the nineteenth century.     

Multi-model ensembles in climate science: Mathematical structures and expert judgements

Projections of future climate change cannot rely on a single model. It has become common to rely on multiple simulations generated by Multi-Model Ensembles (MMEs), especially to quantify the uncertainty about what would constitute an adequate model structure. But, as Parker points out (2018), one of the remaining philosophically interesting questions is: “How can ensemble studies be designed so that they probe uncertainty in desired ways?” This paper offers two interpretations of what General Circulation Models (GCMs) are and how MMEs made of GCMs should be designed. In the first interpretation, models are combinations of modules and parameterisations; an MME is obtained by “plugging and playing” with interchangeable modules and parameterisations. In the second interpretation, models are aggregations of expert judgements that result from a history of epistemic decisions made by scientists about the choice of representations; an MME is a sampling of expert judgements from modelling teams. We argue that, while the two interpretations involve distinct domains from philosophy of science and social epistemology, they both could be used in a complementary manner in order to explore ways of designing better MMEs.     

A Pluralistic Approach to Interactional Expertise

The concept of interactional expertise – characterized by sociologists Harry Collins and Robert Evans as the ability to speak the language of a discipline without the corresponding ability to practice – can serve as a powerful way of breaking down expert/non-expert dichotomies and providing a role for new voices in specialist communities. However, in spite of the vast uptake of this concept and its potential to fruitfully address many important issues related to scientific expertise, there has been surprisingly little critical analysis of it. We seek to remedy this situation by considering potential benefits of interactional expertise and the ways in which the current conception can – and cannot – realize those benefits. In particular, we argue that interactional expertise hasn't reached its full potential for addressing who ought to be involved in scientific research and decision-making, largely owing to an unnecessarily restrictive way of operationalizing the concept. In its place, we offer a broader, more pluralistic account of interactional expertise – one that is in line with the original spirit of the concept, but also captures the diversity that we see as being an important aspect of interactional experts and the value they can bring to the table.     

Judgement aggregation in scientific collaborations: The case for waiving expertise

The fragmentation of academic disciplines forces individuals to specialise. In doing so, they become experts over their narrow area of research. However, ambitious scientific projects, such as the search for gravitational waves, require them to come together and collaborate across disciplinary borders. How should scientists with expertise in different disciplines treat each others’ expert claims? An intuitive answer is that the collaboration should defer to the opinions of experts. In this paper we show that under certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, this intuitive answer gives rise to an impossibility result when it comes to aggregating the beliefs of experts to deliver the beliefs of a collaboration as a whole. We then argue that when experts’ beliefs come into conflict, they should waive their expert status.     

Heterogeneous Forecast Adjustment

There is ample empirical evidence that expert‐adjusted model forecasts can be improved. One way to potential improvement concerns providing various forms of feedback to the sales forecasters. It is also often recognized that the experts (forecasters) might not constitute a homogeneous group. This paper provides a data‐based methodology to discern latent clusters of forecasters, and applies it to a fully new large database with data on expert‐adjusted forecasts, model forecasts and realizations. For the data at hand, two clusters can clearly be identified. Next, the consequences of having clusters are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

James Franck,the ionization potential of helium,and the experimental discovery of metastable states

In 1920, James Franck together with Fritz Reiche and Paul Knipping found strong experimental evidence that the lowest-lying triplet state in helium is metastable—an atom in this state cannot make a spontaneous transition to the ground state. Even though their evidence was entirely experimental, they tied their results almost inextricably to Alfred Landé’s 1919 model of the helium atom, and in the process, misunderstood the new theoretical selection rules of Adalbert Rubinowicz and Niels Bohr. In an additional complication, experiments of the English physicists Frank Horton and Ann Catherine Davies contradicted Franck’s. Although Franck’s result has held up, the reasons for the discrepancies remain unclear.     

The multiple roles of monocyte subsets in steady state and inflammation

Monocytes participate importantly in immunity. Produced in the bone marrow and released into the blood, they circulate in blood or reside in a spleen reservoir before entering tissue and giving rise to macrophages or dendritic cells. Monocytes are more than transitional cells that adapt to a particular tissue environment indiscriminately. Accumulating evidence now indicates that monocytes are heterogeneous in several species and are themselves predetermined for particular function in the steady state and inflammation. Future therapeutics may harness this heterogeneity to target harmful functions while sparing those that are beneficial. Here, we review recent advances on the ontogeny and function of monocytes and their subsets in humans and mice.