Forms of Causal Explanation

In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we claim that the structure of a causal explanation depends on the causal structure of the relevant fragment of the world and on the interests of the explainer.     

论个体性状的完全因果解释

尼安德的"传递论证"中有两个不合理之处:第一,把个体性状出现的遗传学原因扩展为个体性状出现的所有原因,从而把完全因果解释理解成了对个体性状的历史解释;第二,要求对个体性状的解释包括对"原因的原因"的无休止上溯,从而把完全因果解释理解成了终极解释。索伯尔在回应尼安德时只是强调了遗传机制与选择机制属于两种不同的因果路径,没有指出尼安德对科学解释的错误理解,这就不能完全排除选择机制对个体性状的解释作用。     

从Simpson悖论看群体生物学中统计解释和因果解释之争

在理论的群体生物学中,有三种模型都是通过性状适合度(trait fitness)的分布来解释和预见种群结构变化的量和方向。双因子和单因子模型都将性状适合度看成是一种因果属性,而丹尼斯.沃尔什(Denis Walsh)等则指出它们仅仅是一种统计学的属性。笔者通过分析沃尔什的有力论证,尝试表明如果将性状适合度看成是一种因果属性的话,将导致Simpson悖论,因而是不融贯的。所以,关于种群结构变化的统计学解释要优于因果解释。     

范·弗拉森反最佳说明推理的无动于衷论证

最佳说明推理的有效性是当前科学哲学研究备受关注的话题.范·弗拉森反驳这种推理的有效性.他通过质询正确的好说明是否在那堆被考虑的可能说明中,表明如果遗漏正确说明,在考虑它时"无动于衷",那就无法认为一堆可能说明中最佳的那个说明是正确的.范·弗拉森对这种推理的理解实际上并不充分.结合他的相关表述,就能看到他的无动于衷论证存...     

Quantum Particles as Conceptual Entities: A Possible Explanatory Framework for Quantum Theory

We put forward a possible new interpretation and explanatory framework for quantum theory. The basic hypothesis underlying this new framework is that quantum particles are conceptual entities. More concretely, we propose that quantum particles interact with ordinary matter, nuclei, atoms, molecules, macroscopic material entities, measuring apparatuses,  in a similar way to how human concepts interact with memory structures, human minds or artificial memories. We analyze the most characteristic aspects of quantum theory, i.e. entanglement and non-locality, interference and superposition, identity and individuality in the light of this new interpretation, and we put forward a specific explanation and understanding of these aspects. The basic hypothesis of our framework gives rise in a natural way to a Heisenberg uncertainty principle which introduces an understanding of the general situation of ‘the one and the many’ in quantum physics. A specific view on macro and micro different from the common one follows from the basic hypothesis and leads to an analysis of Schrödinger’s Cat paradox and the measurement problem different from the existing ones. We reflect about the influence of this new quantum interpretation and explanatory framework on the global nature and evolutionary aspects of the world and human worldviews, and point out potential explanations for specific situations, such as the generation problem in particle physics, the confinement of quarks and the existence of dark matter.     

覆盖律解释与意向性解释

在社会科学的解释模型中，意向性解释诉诸人的信念、期望等目的性因素；覆盖律解释旨在寻找规律。本文通过辨析这两种不同主张的根源，试图说明意向性解释与覆盖律解释的不同源于对社会科学本质的不同理解，以逻辑经验主义的科学观为平台使得覆盖律解释的努力失败，弥合意向性解释和覆盖律解释的分歧的可能性来自于突破逻辑经验主义的局限，重新看待社会科学的本质。     

On Gene’s Action and Reciprocal Causation

Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by wholly physical properties, e.g., geometrical structures of molecular aggregates (cells). In response, we argue that contrary to his expectations one cannot infer reductionist assumptions even from detailed biological explanations that invoke the molecular level, as interlevel causal reciprocity is essential to these explanations. Recent very detailed explanations that concern the structure and function of chromatin—the intricacies of supposedly basic molecular level—demonstrate this. They show that what seem to be basic physical parameters extend into a more general biological context, thus rendering elusive the concepts of the basic level and causal hierarchy postulated by the reductionists. In fact, relevant phenomena are defined across levels by entangled, extended parameters. Nor can the biological context be explained away by basic physical parameters defining molecular level shaped by evolution as a physical process. Reductionists claim otherwise only because they overlook the evolutionary significance of initial conditions best defined in terms of extended biological parameters. Perhaps the reductionist assumptions (as well as assumptions that postulate any particular levels as causally fundamental) cannot be inferred from biological explanations because biology aims at manipulating organisms rather than producing explanations that meet the coherence requirements of general ontological models. Or possibly the assumptions of an ontology not based on the concept of causal powers stratified across levels can be inferred from biological explanations. The incoherence of downward causation is inevitable, given reductionist assumptions, but an ontological alternative might avoid this. We outline desiderata for the treatment of levels and properties that realize interlevel causation in such an ontology.     

预测心智进路中的社会认知观

近年来,一种以"预测加工"为核心的社会认知观备受学术界的关注.其基本主张为:社会认知过程就是两个大脑之间持续进行双向预测,实现错误预测最小化并最终达致某种动态耦合的过程.一方面,这种新兴的预测理论在脑与神经科学层面澄清了关于社会感知的机制问题;但另一方面,它还不能构成对社会认知的完备解释,因为社会认知作为一个异常复杂的...     

自主体-因果力:“自由意志危机”的一种化解

李贝特的"迟半秒"实验以及魏格纳的副现象论直接威胁了自由意志的本体论地位,引起了"自由意志危机",但国内外许多著名学者通过新的解读认为这些并不能证明自由意志不存在,其中蒂莫西.奥康纳的自主体—因果力理论则是独树一帜的。他关注的是行动的整个因果链及其解释,从本体论的角度讨论了自主体的原因作用和理由的解释相关性,认为自主体具有基于突现属性的自主体—因果力,是行动产生的原因。但该力具有概率性的结构化倾向,理由则从因果上构造了自主体—因果力并为该力发挥选择作用限定了范围。该理论对因果关系的形而上学问题、心灵的动力学问题以及行动哲学中的行动解释问题有所启示,不失为解决自由意志危机的一种系统而有深度的方案。     

The situation of causality

Causality in the abstract is a grand theme. We take it up when we want to penetrate to the bottom of things to understand general laws that govern the working at the world of the deepest and most detailed level.In this essay, I argue for a more situated understanding of causality. To counter our desire for ever greater generality, I suggest that causal relations, even those that hold only on average, require context. To counter our desire for ever greater detail, I suggest that causal relations may exist only at a certain level of granularity.     

论因果性

因果联系之所以存在,是因为世间存在着有可能经历变化的持久事物,而且人们拥有关于持久事物本性的知识。如果一个持久事物经历了一种变化,人们就能够借助他们关于该事物本性的知识确认它经历了这一变化,从而能够为该事物为什么经历这一变化提供因果解释。因果联系可以分为自然与理性两类,二者间的一个重要区别在于,前者可以为合理预测提供根据,但后者不能。     

The Science of Conceptual Systems: A Progress Report

In this paper I provide a brief history of the emerging science of conceptual systems, explain some methodologies, their sources of data, and the understandings that they have generated. I also provide suggestions for extending the science-based research in a variety of directions. Essentially, I am opening a conversation that asks how this line of research might be extended to gain new insights—and eventually develop more useful and generally accepted methods for creating and evaluating theory. This effort will support our ability to generate theory that is more effective in practical application as well as accelerating the development of theory to support advances in other sciences.     

从拉瓦锡化学革命案例看萨伽德的整合认知-社会解释纲要

就科学知识的发展问题主要有逻辑解释、认知解释和社会解释之分.萨伽德在考虑逻辑因素的情况下,对认知解释和社会解释进行了有机的结合,提出了解释科学知识发展的整合认知-社会解释纲要(integrated cognitive-social schema).本文先对整合认知-社会解释纲要进行了描述,然后单独从认知因素和社会因素介绍萨伽德对化学革命案例的解释,最后对整合认知-社会解释纲要及其在化学革命案例上的运用进行了论述.     

Model-Based and Manipulative Abduction in Science

What I call theoretical abduction (sentential and model-based)certainly illustrates much of what is important in abductive reasoning, especially the objective of selecting and creating a set of hypotheses that are able to dispense good (preferred) explanations of data, but fails to account for many cases of explanation occurring in science or in everyday reasoning when the exploitation of the environment is crucial. The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to capture the role of action in many interesting situations: action provides otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and performing a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses. Many external things, usually inert from the epistemological point of view, can be transformed into what I callepistemic mediators, which are illustrated in the last part of the paper, together with an analysis of the related notions of ``perceptual and inceptual rehearsal' and of ``external representation'.     

库恩范式论在心理学中的反响与应用

库恩的范式论对心理学产生了极大的影响。许多心理学家应用范式论的观点解释心理学的发展。心理学家之所以对库恩的范式论感兴趣，是因为范式论在很大程度上是以心理学原理为基础的。在心理学家库恩热的背后，是对范式论的肤浅了解。     

科学说明为何离不开理解 ——从对科学说明模型的分析展开

结合着关于科学说明的一系列重要模型，分析考查了科学说明如何离不开理解：科学理解在科学说明的前提、过程以及结果中都起着重要的作用。     

A Theory of Scientific Model Construction: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Conceptual Process of Abstraction and Concretisation</Emphasis>

The process of abstraction and concretisation is a label used for an explicative theory of scientific model-construction. In scientific theorising this process enters at various levels. We could identify two principal levels of abstraction that are useful to our understanding of theory-application. The first level is that of selecting a small number of variables and parameters abstracted from the universe of discourse and used to characterise the general laws of a theory. In classical mechanics, for example, we select position and momentum and establish a relation amongst the two variables, which we call Newton’s 2nd law. The specification of the unspecified elements of scientific laws, e.g. the force function in Newton’s 2nd law, is what would establish the link between the assertions of the theory and physical systems. In order to unravel how and with what conceptual resources scientific models are constructed, how they function and how they relate to theory, we need a view of theory-application that can accommodate our constructions of representation models. For this we need to expand our understanding of the process of abstraction to also explicate the process of specifying force functions etc. This is the second principal level at which abstraction enters in our theorising and in which I focus. In this paper, I attempt to elaborate a general analysis of the process of abstraction and concretisation involved in scientific- model construction, and argue why it provides an explication of the construction of models of the nuclear structure.     

Salmon and Van Fraassen on the Existence of Unobservable Entities: A Matter of Interpretation of Probability

A careful analysis of Salmon’s Theoretical Realism and van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism shows that both share a common origin: the requirement of literal construal of theories inherited by the Standard View. However, despite this common starting point, Salmon and van Fraassen strongly disagree on the existence of unobservable entities. I argue that their different ontological commitment towards the existence of unobservables traces back to their different views on the interpretation of probability via different conceptions of induction. In fact, inferences to statements claiming the existence of unobservable entities are inferences to probabilistic statements, whence the crucial importance of the interpretation of probability.     

读心的模拟说进路

本文从几个方面考察了日常生活中的读心能力实现的主要进路之一模拟说,交待了模拟说作为理论说的对立方出现的背景,复制策略、最小努力原则和离线机制三种模拟形式,几组支持模拟说的有力的实验证据,以及模拟说在遭到质疑时的各种辩护,说明了读心过程和读物过程存在巨大差异,模拟说对于读心研究而言的确存在诸多理论说所不可比拟的解释优势,但读心始终是一个不可将理论因素完全排除在外的过程,它容纳模拟与理论甚至更多进路的结合。