共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 78 毫秒
1.
2.
3.
In this paper we discuss two approaches to the axiomatization of scientific theories in the context of the so called semantic
approach, according to which (roughly) a theory can be seen as a class of models. The two approaches are associated respectively
to Suppes’ and to da Costa and Chuaqui’s works. We argue that theories can be developed both in a way more akin to the usual
mathematical practice (Suppes), in an informal set theoretical environment, writing the set theoretical predicate in the language
of set theory itself or, more rigorously (da Costa and Chuaqui), by employing formal languages that help us in writing the
postulates to define a class of structures. Both approaches are called internal, for we work within a mathematical framework, here taken to be first-order ZFC. We contrast these approaches with an external one, here discussed briefly. We argue that each one has its strong and weak points, whose discussion is relevant for the
philosophical foundations of science. 相似文献
4.
John J. Sung 《Foundations of Science》2008,13(2):177-193
Scientific anomalies are observations and facts that contradict current scientific theories and they are instrumental in scientific
theory change. Philosophers of science have approached scientific theory change from different perspectives as Darden (Theory
change in science: Strategies from Mendelian genetics, 1991) observes: Lakatos (In: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and
the growth of knowledge, 1970) approaches it as a progressive “research programmes” consisting of incremental improvements
(“monster barring” in Lakatos, Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery, 1976), Kuhn (The structure of
scientific revolutions, 1996) observes that changes in “paradigms” are instigated by a crisis from some anomaly, and Hanson
(In: Feigl, Maxwell (eds) Current issues in the philosophy of science, 1961) proposes that discovery does not begin with hypothesis
but with some “problematic phenomena requiring explanation”. Even though anomalies are important in all of these approaches
to scientific theory change, there have been only few investigations into the specific role anomalies play in scientific theory
change. Furthermore, much of these approaches focus on the theories themselves and not on how the scientists and their experiments
bring about scientific change (Gooding, Experiment and the making of meaning: Human agency in scientific observation and experiment,
1990). To address these issues, this paper approaches scientific anomaly resolution from a meaning construction point of view.
Conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier and Turner, Cogn Sci 22:133–187, 1996; The way we think: Conceptual blending and
mind’s hidden complexities, 2002) from cognitive linguistics describes how one constructs meaning from various stimuli, such
as text and diagrams, through conceptual integration or blending. The conceptual integration networks that describe the conceptual
integration process characterize cognition that occurs unconsciously during meaning construction. These same networks are
used to describe some of the cognition while resolving an anomaly in molecular genetics called RNA interference (RNAi) in
a case study. The RNAi case study is a cognitive-historical reconstruction (Nersessian, In: Giere (ed) Cognitive models of
science, 1992) that reconstructs how the RNAi anomaly was resolved. This reconstruction traces four relevant molecular genetics
publications in describing the cognition necessary in accounting for how RNAi was resolved through strategies (Darden 1991),
abductive reasoning (Peirce, In: Hartshorne, Weiss (eds) Collected papers, 1958), and experimental reasoning (Gooding 1990).
The results of the case study show that experiments play a crucial role in formulating an explanation of the RNAi anomaly
and the integration networks describe the experiments’ role. Furthermore, these results suggest that RNAi anomaly resolution
is embodied. It is embodied in a sense that cognition described in the cognitive-historical reconstruction is experientially
based.
相似文献
John J. SungEmail: |
5.
Sciences are often regarded as providing the best, or, ideally, exact, knowledge of the world, especially in providing laws
of nature. Ilya Prigogine, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for his theory of non-equilibrium chemical processes—this being
also an important attempt to bridge the gap between exact and non-exact sciences [mentioned in the Presentation Speech by
Professor Stig Claesson (nobelprize.org, The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1977)]—has had this ideal in mind when trying to formulate
a new kind of science. Philosophers of science distinguish theory and reality, examining relations between these two. Nancy
Cartwright’s distinction of fundamental and phenomenological laws, Rein Vihalemm’s conception of the peculiarity of the exact
sciences, and Ronald Giere’s account of models in science and science as a set of models are deployed in this article to criticise
the common view of science and analyse Ilya Prigogine’s view in particular. We will conclude that on a more abstract, philosophical
level, Prigogine’s understanding of science doesn’t differ from the common understanding.
相似文献
Piret KuuskEmail: |
6.
7.
Steffen Ducheyne 《Foundations of Science》2006,11(4):419-447
In this paper an analysis of Newton’s argument for universal gravitation is provided. In the past, the complexity of the argument
has not been fully appreciated. Recent authors like George E. Smith and William L. Harper have done a far better job. Nevertheless,
a thorough account of the argument is still lacking. Both authors seem to stress the importance of only one methodological
component. Smith stresses the procedure of approximative deductions backed-up by the laws of motion. Harper stresses “systematic
dependencies” between theoretical parameters and phenomena. I will argue that Newton used a variety of different inferential
strategies: causal parsimony considerations, deductions, demonstrative inductions, abductions and thought-experiments. Each
of these strategies is part of Newton’s famous argument. 相似文献
8.
Error is protean, ubiquitous and crucial in scientific process. In this paper it is argued that understanding scientific process
requires what is currently absent: an adaptable, context-sensitive functional role for error in science that naturally harnesses error identification and avoidance to positive, success-driven, science. This
paper develops a new account of scientific process of this sort, error and success driving Self-Directed Anticipative Learning
(SDAL) cycling, using a recent re-analysis of ape-language research as test example. The example shows the limitations of
other accounts of error, in particular Mayo’s (Error and the growth of experimental knowledge, 1996) error-statistical approach,
and SDAL cycling shows how they can be fruitfully contextualised. 相似文献
9.
Abstraction and Insight: Building Better Conceptual Systems to Support More Effective Social Change 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Steven E. Wallis 《Foundations of Science》2014,19(4):353-362
When creating theory to understand or implement change at the social and/or organizational level, it is generally accepted that part of the theory building process includes a process of abstraction. While the process of abstraction is well understood, it is not so well understood how abstractions “fit” together to enable the creation of better theory. Starting with a few simple ideas, this paper explores one way we work with abstractions. This exploration challenges the traditionally held importance of abstracting concepts from experience. That traditional focus has been one-sided—pushing science toward the discovery of data without the balancing process that occurs with the integration of the data. Without such balance, the sciences have been pushed toward fragmentation. Instead, in the present paper, new emphasis is placed on the relationship between abstract concepts. Specifically, this paper suggests that a better theory is one that is constructed of concepts that exist on a similar level of abstraction. Suggestions are made for quantifying this claim and using the insights to enable scholars and practitioners to create more effective theory. 相似文献
10.
科学发展的多元进化模式是科学哲学关于科学进步问题的成果之一。与其相对应的生物进化论类比则是近年来国际学术界争议的焦点。我们将从当代生物进化论出发,论证科学发展作为增生式的非目的性过程,其生物进化类比是恰当的。 相似文献
11.
Clément Vidal 《Foundations of Science》2010,15(4):375-393
In this philosophical paper, we explore computational and biological analogies to address the fine-tuning problem in cosmology. We first clarify what it means for physical constants or initial conditions to be fine-tuned. We review important distinctions such as the dimensionless and dimensional physical constants, and the classification of constants proposed by Lévy-Leblond. Then we explore how two great analogies, computational and biological, can give new insights into our problem. This paper includes a preliminary study to examine the two analogies. Importantly, analogies are both useful and fundamental cognitive tools, but can also be misused or misinterpreted. The idea that our universe might be modelled as a computational entity is analysed, and we discuss the distinction between physical laws and initial conditions using algorithmic information theory. Smolin introduced the theory of “Cosmological Natural Selection” with a biological analogy in mind. We examine an extension of this analogy involving intelligent life. We discuss if and how this extension could be legitimated. 相似文献
12.
Understanding Pluralism in Climate Modeling 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
W. S. Parker 《Foundations of Science》2006,11(4):349-368
To study Earth’s climate, scientists now use a variety of computer simulation models. These models disagree in some of their
assumptions about the climate system, yet they are used together as complementary resources for investigating future climatic
change. This paper examines and defends this use of incompatible models. I argue that climate model pluralism results both
from uncertainty concerning how to best represent the climate system and from difficulties faced in evaluating the relative
merits of complex models. I describe how incompatible climate models are used together in ‘multi-model ensembles’ and explain
why this practice is reasonable, given scientists’ inability to identify a ‘best’ model for predicting future climate. Finally,
I characterize climate model pluralism as involving both an ontic competitive pluralism and a pragmatic integrative pluralism. 相似文献
13.
14.
15.
16.
This paper sketches a dispositionalist conception of laws and shows how the dispositionalist should respond to certain objections.
The view that properties are essentially dispositional is able to provide an account of laws that avoids the problems that face the two views of laws (the regularity
and the contingent nomic necessitation views) that regard properties as categorical and laws as contingent. I discuss and
reject the objections that (i) this view makes laws necessary whereas they are contingent; (ii) this view cannot account for
certain kinds of laws of nature and their properties. 相似文献
17.
Designing models of complex phenomena is a difficult task in engineering that can be tackled by composing a number of partial
models to produce a global model of the phenomena. We propose to embed the partial models in software agents and to implement
their composition as a cooperative negotiation between the agents. The resulting multiagent system provides a global model
of a phenomenon. We applied this approach in modelling two complex physiological processes: the heart rate regulation and
the glucose-insulin metabolism. Beyond the effectiveness demonstrated in these two applications, the idea of using models
associated to software agents to give reason of complex phenomena is in accordance with current tendencies in epistemology,
where it is evident an increasing use of computational models for scientific explanation and analysis. Therefore, our approach
has not only a practical, but also a theoretical significance: agents embedding models are a technology suitable both to representing
and to investigating reality.
相似文献
Francesco AmigoniEmail: |
18.
In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between
explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second
concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and
that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we claim that the structure of a causal explanation depends on the causal structure of the
relevant fragment of the world and on the interests of the explainer. 相似文献
19.
Bert Mosselmans 《Foundations of Science》2005,10(3):325-345
This paper explores the relationship of time and value in the history of economics, using the contributions of Girard, Achterhuis,
Kula and Mirowski. In the ‘anthropometric stage’ time and value are intertwined: value and time are not abstract concepts,
but they express a concrete process which incorporates the social positions of individuals. In the ‘lineamentric stage’ the
concepts of time and value remain cyclical, but they receive an abstract character. The economy reproduces itself cyclically,
because the origin of value – human labour – reproduces itself in each production period. In the ‘syndetic stage’ the cyclical
conception of the economy is abandoned through the perception of a non-reproductive system. Time and value are detached from
each other, and linear time enters economic theory as an analytical tool. The labour theory of value is replaced by external
denominants of value: utility and external scarcity 相似文献
20.
Jun-Young Oh 《Foundations of Science》2016,21(4):567-578
The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the role of abstraction and idealization in Galileo’s scientific inquiries into the law of free falling motion, and their importance in the history of science. Because there is no consensus on the use of the terms “abstraction” and “idealization” in the literature, it is necessary to distinguish between them at the outset. This paper will argue (1) for the importance of abstraction and idealization in physics and the theories and laws of physics constructed with abduction from observations and (2) that these theoretical laws of physics should be tested with deduction and induction thorough quasi-idealized entities rather than empirical results in the everyday world. Galileo’s work is linked to thought experiments in natural science. Galileo, using thought experiments based on idealization, persuaded others that what had been proven true for a ball on an inclined plane would be equally true for a ball falling through a vacuum. 相似文献