Infrared metaphysics: the elusive ontology of radiation. Part 1

Hardly any ontological result of modern science is more firmly established than the fact that infrared radiation differs from light only in wavelength; this is part of the modern conception of the continuous spectrum of electromagnetic radiation reaching from radio waves to gamma radiation. Yet, like many such evident truths, the light-infrared unity was an extremely difficult thing to establish. We examine the competing arguments in favour of the unified and pluralistic theories of radiation, as put forward in the first half of the nineteenth century by three of the most important early pioneers of the study of radiation: Herschel, Melloni and Draper. In this part of the paper, we conclude that there were no compelling reasons of observational adequacy to prefer the unified theory to the pluralistic theory. (Whether there were other conclusive reasons for that preference is the question addressed in Part 2 of the paper.)     

Distinctively mathematical explanation and the problem of directionality: A quasi-erotetic solution

The increasing preponderance of opinion that some natural phenomena can be explained mathematically has inspired a search for a viable account of distinctively mathematical explanation. Among the desiderata for an adequate account is that it should solve the problem of directionality —the reversals of distinctively mathematical explanations should not count as members among the explanatory fold but any solution must also avoid the exclusion of genuine explanations. In what follows, I introduce and defend what I refer to as a quasi-erotetic solution which provides a remedy to the problem in the form of an additional necessary condition on explanation.     

Science,politics and regulation: The trust-based approach to the demarcation problem

Drawing on literature on values in science and a case-study of UK cancer policy, this paper argues for a novel account of the demarcation project in terms of trustworthiness. The first part of the paper addresses the relationship between science, politics and demarcation. In 2010, the UK government decided to pay more for cancer drugs than for drugs for other diseases; in 2016, this Cancer Drugs Fund was reformed so as to lower the evidential standards for approving cancer drugs, rather than paying more for them. Are these two ways of treating cancer as “special” importantly different? This paper argues that, if we the argument from inductive risk seriously, they seem equivalent. This result provides further reason to doubt the notion of demarcating science from non-science. However, the second part of the paper complicates this story, arguing that considerations of epistemic trust might give us reasons to prefer epistemic communities centred around “broadly acceptable” standards, and which are “sociologically well-ordered”, regardless of inductive risk concerns. After developing these claims through the cancer case-study, the final section suggests how these concerns might motivate novel versions of the demarcation project.     

Newtonianism in early Enlightenment Germany, c. 1720 to 1750: metaphysics and the critique of dogmatic philosophy

The acceptance of Newton’s ideas and Newtonianism in the early German Enlightenment is usually described as hesitant and slow. Two reasons help to explain this phenomenon. One is that those who might have adopted Newtonian arguments were critics of Wolffianism. These critics, however, drew on indigenous currents of thought, pre-dating the reception of Newton in Germany and independent of Newtonian science. The other reason is that the controversies between Wolffians and their critics focused on metaphysics. Newton’s reputation, however, was that of a mathematician, and one point, on which Wolffians and their opponents agreed, was that mathematics was of no use in the solution of metaphysical questions. The appeal to Newton as an authority in metaphysics, it was argued, was the fault of Newton’s over-zealous disciples in Britain, who tried to transform him from a mathematician into the author of a general philosophical system. It is often argued that the Berlin Academy after 1743 included a Newtonian group, but even there the reception of Newtonianism was selective. Philosophers such as Leonhard Euler were also reluctant to be labelled ‘Newtonians’, because this implied a dogmatic belief in Newton’s ideas. Only after the mid-eighteenth century is ‘Newtonianism’ increasingly accepted in the sense of a philosophical system.     

Suitability of urethane anesthesia for physiopharmacological investigations in various systems. Part 2: Cardiovascular system

Summary Urethane produces a level of surgical anesthesia characterized by preservation of a number of cardiovascular reflexes. When the proper route of administration is used, and the use of unnecessarily high doses is avoided, urethane anesthesia appears to be suitable for a number of investigations at cardiovascular level. However in certain types of studies involving pharmacological stimulation of peripheral adrenoceptors urethane affects markedly the magnitude of the response under study.     

Suitability of urethane anesthesia for physiopharmacological investigations. Part 3: Other systems and conclusions

Summary The suitability of urethane anesthesia for physiopharmacological experiments in various systems is briefly reviewed. Urethane anesthesia appears to be suitable for various types of studies on respiratory function and on reflex activation of motility of the urinary bladder and some sections of the intestinal tract. However, urethane produces a variety of potentially disturbing side-effects at endocrine and renal level.     

The Left Vienna Circle, Part 2. The Left Vienna Circle, disciplinary history, and feminist philosophy of science

This paper analyzes the claim that the Left Vienna Circle (LVC) offers a theoretical and historical precedent for a politically engaged philosophy of science today. I describe the model for a political philosophy of science advanced by LVC historians. They offer this model as a moderate, properly philosophical approach to political philosophy of science that is rooted in the analytic tradition. This disciplinary-historical framing leads to weaknesses in LVC scholars’ conception of the history of the LVC and its contemporary relevance. In this light, I examine the claim that there are productive enrichments to be gained from the engagement of feminist philosophy of science with the LVC, finding this claim ill-formulated. The case of LVC historiography and feminist philosophy of science presents a revealing study in the uses and ethics of disciplinary history, showing how feminist and other perspectives are misconceived and marginalized by forms of disciplinary self-narrativizing.     

Putting pragmatism to work in the Cold War: Science, technology, and politics in the writings of James B. Conant

This paper examines James Conant’s pragmatic theory of science—a theory that has been neglected by most commentators on the history of 20^th-century philosophy of science—and it argues that this theory occupied an important place in Conant’s strategic thinking about the Cold War. Conant drew upon his wartime science policy work, the history of science, and Quine’s epistemological holism to argue that there is no strict distinction between science and technology, that there is no such thing as “the scientific method,” and that theories are better interpreted as policies rather than creeds. An important consequence that he drew from these arguments is that science is both a thoroughly value-laden, and an intrinsically social, enterprise. These results led him to develop novel proposals for reorganizing scientific and technological research—proposals that he believed could help to win the Cold War. Interestingly, the Cold War had a different impact upon Conant’s thinking than it did upon many other theorists of science in postwar America. Instead of leading him to “the icy slopes of logic,” it led him to develop a socially- and politically-engaged theory that was explicitly in the service of the American Cold War effort.     

Fluid and protein clearance in the rat endometrium. Part I: Ultrastructural proof of the absence of an intrinsic lymphatic system from the rat endometrium

Summary An integrated histological and ultrastructural study of the endometrial microcirculation in rats reveals that lymphatic capillaries are absent from the superficial uterine mucosa. Blood capillaries are fenestrated, and their basement membrane may be poorly developed.Supported by a grant from the Nationaal Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-Fonds voor Geneeskundig Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Belgium).     

Fluid and protein clearance in the rat endometrium. Part II: Ultrastructural evidence for the presence of alternative,non-lymphatic clearance mechanisms in the rat endometrium

Summary In the rat endometrium, resident macrophages and exudate phagocytes ensure proteolysis by means of phagocytosis, macro-and micropinocytosis. Using exogenous tracer particles no ultrastructural evidence could be obtained for the occurrence of endometrial prelymphatics. It is suggested that the free tissue fluid may be drained via the fenestrated (probably venous) blood capillaries.Supported by a grant from the Nationaal Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-Fonds voor Geneeskundig Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Belgium).     

The rhetorical strategy of William Paley’s Natural theology (1802): Part 2, William Paley’s Natural theology and the challenge of atheism

The first part of this two-part article suggested that William Paley’s Natural theology (1802) should be viewed as the culmination of a complex psychological strategy for inculcating religious and moral sentiments. Having focused in Part 1 on Paley’s rhetoric, we now turn our attention to the philosophical part of the programme. This article attempts to settle the vexed question of how far Paley responded to the devastating critique of the teleological argument contained in Hume’s posthumously published Dialogues concerning natural religion (1779). It also identifies tensions that arose in Natural theology between the rhetorical and intellectual sides of the stratagem. In response to Erasmus Darwin’s evolutionary theories, Paley asserted that the divinely designed architecture of nature had remained unchanged since the creation. But the more he emphasized the preordained nature of providence, its effectuation through mechanical dispositions, the less room there appeared to be for particular interventions. Section 2 concentrates on Paley’s efforts to reconcile this model of a law-governed, mechanical universe, with the belief in a personal God who was active in worldly affairs. It therefore challenges the view, long unquestioned in the historical literature, that Paley’s Deity was merely a watchmaker, who had remained idle since the Creation.