Human behaviour: Egalitarian motive and altruistic punishment

Altruistic punishment is a behaviour in which individuals punish others at a cost to themselves in order to provide a public good. Fehr and G?chter present experimental evidence in humans indicating that negative emotions towards non-cooperators motivate punishment, which, in turn, provokes a high degree of cooperation. Using Fehr and G?chter's original data, we provide an alternative analysis of their experiment that suggests that egalitarian motives are more important than motives for punishing non-cooperative behaviour. This finding is consistent with evidence that humans may have an evolutionary incentive to punish the highest earners in order to promote equality, rather than cooperation.     

Winners don't punish

A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.     

Altruistic punishment in humans.

Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.     

Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem

Models of large-scale human cooperation take two forms. 'Indirect reciprocity' occurs when individuals help others in order to uphold a reputation and so be included in future cooperation. In 'collective action', individuals engage in costly behaviour that benefits the group as a whole. Although the evolution of indirect reciprocity is theoretically plausible, there is no consensus about how collective action evolves. Evidence suggests that punishing free riders can maintain cooperation, but why individuals should engage in costly punishment is unclear. Solutions to this 'second-order free rider problem' include meta-punishment, mutation, conformism, signalling and group-selection. The threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory. Here, we show that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem because punishers can withhold help from free riders without damaging their reputations. However, we also show that such a strategy cannot invade a population in which indirect reciprocity is not linked to collective action, thus leaving unexplained how collective action arises.     

Evolution of novel cooperative swarming in the bacterium Myxococcus xanthus

Cooperation among individuals is necessary for evolutionary transitions to higher levels of biological organization. In such transitions, groups of individuals at one level (such as single cells) cooperate to form selective units at a higher level (such as multicellular organisms). Though the evolution of cooperation is difficult to observe directly in higher eukaryotes, microorganisms do offer such an opportunity. Here we report the evolution of novel cooperative behaviour in experimental lineages of the bacterium Myxococcus xanthus. Wild-type strains of M. xanthus exhibit socially dependent swarming across soft surfaces by a mechanism known as 'S-motility' that requires the presence of extracellular type IV pili. In lineages of M. xanthus unable to make pili, a new mechanistic basis for cooperative swarming evolved. Evolved swarming is mediated, at least in part, by enhanced production of an extracellular fibril matrix that binds cells-and their evolutionary interests-together. Though costly to individuals, fibril production greatly enhanced population expansion in groups of interconnected cells. These results show that fundamental transitions to primitive cooperation can readily occur in bacteria.     

研发竞争条件下产学研合作行为的演化博弈仿真分析

引入研发竞争因素,构建了产学研合作演化博弈模型,分析了企业方和学研方的决策交互行为、系统均衡状态和演化路径,进而通过模型分析和数值仿真探究了不同影响因素的变化对产学研合作均衡状态的影响.实验结果表明:合理公平的成本分担和收益分配机制都有利于系统向双方都合作的方向演化;外部研发竞争因素对产学研合作的均衡结果和合作的可能性都会产生重要影响.最后,根据实验结果提出促进产学研合作的政策建议.     

一个人的童年和他的政治——从“自我”角度对周作人附逆悲剧的解读

由于自幼体弱多病,周作人在成长过程中得到了亲人的过度关爱,这影响于他的“自我”就是生命意识的凸显和弱者的自我认同的合一。这决定了周作人现实行为的出发点首先是自我保护,而与外界的自觉的呼应和配合则取决于他与社会的具体关系：只有在一个理解轨道和他的内心相通的环境中,周作人的自我的生命力才会被激发起来,其人格走向才是外向、张扬和成长的;如若不然,便是自我封闭,在对外界的决绝拒斥中退回到童年自我的封闭狭隘中去。周作人的“自我”的独特性在其附逆的人生悲剧中也得到了体现。     

Young不等式在Lp空间中的应用

给出Young不等式的一些证明方法及Young逆不等式的几个证明方法.给出了它们在证明Lp空间中的相关不等式时的应用,直接利用Young逆不等式简化了H(o)lder逆不等式的证明.     

论高校教师非工资收入增长的原因

随着我国市场经济的发展和分配制度改革的深入,高校教师收入日趋多元化和市场化,校外兼职、讲学、科研、培训、咨询等非工资收入增长迅速,部分教师的非工资收入已远远超过国家工资收入,其不平等程度也高于国家工资收入。从经济、社会、教师职业特点、国家工资制度等方面对引起高校教师非工资收入增长的原因进行剖析。     

考虑负荷聚合商的源荷双侧合作协同运行策略

为应对可再生能源出力间歇性对电能供需实时平衡带来的挑战,利用供给侧与需求侧相互配合的运营模式,进而提出考虑负荷聚合商参与的源荷合作博弈优化模型。首先,构建考虑负荷聚合商的源荷合作运行基本框架,以解决源侧可再生能源出力波动性带来的电能供需供应难题。其次,计及源侧发电成本、弃风成本,荷侧需求响应成本,构建源荷双侧支付函数模型;并以源荷合作运行总成本最低为目标函数,以保证各参与主体的运行经济性。再次,基于Shapley值分配法,提出合作运行联盟内源荷双侧的成本分配策略,从而保证合作运行联盟的稳定性。最后利用算例仿真验证所提源荷合作运行策略的可行性与有效性。结果表明：所提策略可减小负荷峰谷差、减少火电机组出力、提高可再生能源消纳量、降低源荷双侧运行成本,对系统的经济环境效益具有积极作用。     

基于班轮公司合作的海运空箱调运优化模型

为了降低空箱调运成本,建立基于班轮公司合作的海运箱空箱调运优化模型.以班轮公司之间的共享调运资源为基础,综合考虑租箱成本、运输费用、调运方向约束、各节点间的可达性以及最大空箱调运能力的限制等因素,在保证重箱正常运输的前提下,通过调运资源共享并配合合理租箱,以达到所有参与合作调运的班轮公司空箱需求得到满足的综合获取总成本最小.同时,通过算例,给出了班轮公司海运空箱合作调运的优化方案,从而验证了该模型的有效性.     

The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment

Human cooperation in social dilemmas challenges researchers from various disciplines. Here we combine advances in experimental economics and evolutionary biology that separately have shown that costly punishment and reputation formation, respectively, induce cooperation in social dilemmas. The mechanisms of punishment and reputation, however, substantially differ in their means for 'disciplining' non-cooperators. Direct punishment incurs salient costs for both the punisher and the punished, whereas reputation mechanisms discipline by withholding action, immediately saving costs for the 'punisher'. Consequently, costly punishment may become extinct in environments in which effective reputation building--for example, through indirect reciprocity--provides a cheaper and powerful way to sustain cooperation. Unexpectedly, as we show here, punishment is maintained when a combination with reputation building is available, however, at a low level. Costly punishment acts are markedly reduced although not simply substituted by appreciating reputation. Indeed, the remaining punishment acts are concentrated on free-riders, who are most severely punished in the combination. When given a choice, subjects even prefer a combination of reputation building with costly punishment. The interaction between punishment and reputation building boosts cooperative efficiency. Because punishment and reputation building are omnipresent interacting forces in human societies, costly punishing should appear less destructive without losing its deterring force.     

公益诉讼及其“外部性”的经济学简析

公益诉讼对公众利益的保护具有巨大的预防和救济价值。目前，我国立法的有关规定导致公益诉讼的原告方所负担的诉讼成本过高，而诉讼收益却过低，这种成本与产出之间的巨大差异如果不能得到有效改变，势必会给我国公益诉讼的正常发展带来极大不利。解决途径可借鉴经济学有关“外部性”内化的方法，一方面降低诉讼成本，另一方面提高诉讼收益，从制度上保障公益诉讼正常发展和运作。     

Cooperation and competition in pathogenic bacteria

Explaining altruistic cooperation is one of the greatest challenges for evolutionary biology. One solution to this problem is if costly cooperative behaviours are directed towards relatives. This idea of kin selection has been hugely influential and applied widely from microorganisms to vertebrates. However, a problem arises if there is local competition for resources, because this leads to competition between relatives, reducing selection for cooperation. Here we use an experimental evolution approach to test the effect of the scale of competition, and how it interacts with relatedness. The cooperative trait that we examine is the production of siderophores, iron-scavenging agents, in the pathogenic bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. As expected, our results show that higher levels of cooperative siderophore production evolve in the higher relatedness treatments. However, our results also show that more local competition selects for lower levels of siderophore production and that there is a significant interaction between relatedness and the scale of competition, with relatedness having less effect when the scale of competition is more local. More generally, the scale of competition is likely to be of particular importance for the evolution of cooperation in microorganisms, and also the virulence of pathogenic microorganisms, because cooperative traits such as siderophore production have an important role in determining virulence.     

甄别、审查和消费信贷研究

基于目标规划及博弈论等原理，对贷款申请者的事前甄别和事后审查进行建模分析以降低银行不能收回贷款的风险．结果表明，当贷款规模相对审查成本偏小时(如消费信贷)，贷款人为了收回没有偿还的贷款而采取成本高昂的审查行动可能存在一定的困难，因此审查的决策必须是事后最优的；通过事前对贷款申请人进行甄别，贷款人能够降低借款人不能还款的概率，并且也能降低借款人能偿还借款但选择不偿还借款的概率．在一个竞争性的环境中，甄别成本可通过较高的贷款利率被转移到借款人．     

推进山西省电子政务发展之我见

阐述了在山西省电子政务推进过程中应该坚持的讲战略、重实效、促协同的3个主要原则,据此提出了当前推进电子政务发展的若干建议。     

欠发达地区校企合作提升学生就业能力探索——以井冈山大学机电工程学院为例

针对欠发达地区高校毕业生就业难的问题,分析了校企合作促进毕业生就业的必要性和存在的问题,并以井冈山大学机电工程学院为例,提出了合理的校企合作运行机制,找到了应用型本科生＂校内实训提水平,校外实训促就业＂的特色就业道路,取得了较好的效果。     

复杂条件下保险费随机收取的双险种风险模型

讨论了资金利率和通货膨胀率带干扰下的保险费随机收取的双险种风险模型,用鞅方法得到破产概率的一般公式及lundberg不等式,给出了当理赔额与收取的保险费均服从指数分布时的的破产概率的具体表达式.     

技术创新合作网络与经济网络演化特征及协同关系研究

加快技术创新合作,促进城市经济互动,有利于缩减区域差距,最终实现协调发展.本研究基于社会网络分析和引力模型的方法,分析中国30个省会城市技术创新合作网络与经济网络的时空演进特征,研究发现:省会城市间的直接技术创新合作不断增强且呈现多中心化趋势,合作突破地理局限且东西部差异较为明显;城市经济网络密度有所增强但整体偏低,核心区域与边缘区域的经济联系发展不均衡,各城市在经济网络中位置变化不明显.二次指派问题(Quadratic Assignment Problem,QAP)分析表明技术创新合作网络与经济网络存在正相关关系,格兰杰检验进一步证明二者互为因果关系,但技术创新合作网络对经济网络的影响更为显著.     

安徽省部分城市敬老院体育发展现状及对策分析

通过对安徽省部分城市敬老院调查,研究城市敬老院体育发展状况,并提出对策.运用文献资料法、问卷调查法、数理统计法研究安徽省城市敬老院体育发展状况.结果表明安徽省城市敬老院老人参加体育活动动机多样,但以增进健康、抵抗疾病、改善情绪和消磨时间为主.安徽省城市敬老院老人参加文体活动形式多元化,但老年女性参加体育活动的比例高于老年男性.不知道如何锻炼和没有合适的场地和设施是阻碍安徽省敬老院老人参加体育活动的主要原因.因此应加强健康教育,提高敬老院老人体育锻炼健身意识,增加敬老院社会体育指导员数量,加大敬老院体育活动场地和适合老年人健身活动的器材设施.