A game theoretical study of cooperative advertising with multiple retailers in a distribution channel

Extant studies of cooperative advertising mainly consider a single-manufacturer-single-retailer channel structure.This can provide limited insights,because a manufacturer,in real practices,usually deals with multiple retailers simultaneously.In order to examine the impact of the retailer’s multiplicity on channel members’ decisions and on total channel efficiencies,this paper develops a multiple-retailer model.In this model,the manufacturer and the retailers play a Stackelberg game to make the optimal advertising decisions.Based on the quantitative results,it is observed that:1) When there are multiple symmetric retailers,as the number of retailers scales up,the manufacturer’s national advertising investment contributes increasingly to add to channel members’ profits in equilibrium,but the total channel efficiency deteriorates quickly and converges down to a certain value;2) When there are multiple asymmetric retailers,the distribution channel suffers from the manufacturer’s uniform participation strategy due to the retailer’s free-riding,and benefits with the manufacturer’s retailer-specific participation strategy.This study derives equilibrium solutions in closed form for all games considered and measures explicitly the gains/losses of channel efficiencies under different game settings.     

AN AGENT—BASED SIMULATION ON MARKET CONSIDERING KNOWLEDGE TRANSITION AND SOCIAL IMPACT

In this paper, an agent-based simulation about knowledge transition associated with social impact in market is introduced. In the simulation, the genetic algorithm is used to generate the next generation products and a dynamic social impact model is used to simulate how customers are influenced by other customers. The simulation and its results not only show some features and patterns of knowledge transition, but also explore and display some phenomena of business cultures. On the basis of the innovation model of knowledge-based economy, the transition between technical knowledge and products knowledge is discussed, and a fuzzy linear quantification model which can be used to simulate the transition is introduced.     

Manufacturers' Channel Competition with Retailer Demand-Enhancing Service

Manufacturers’channel competition with service is examined in this paper.Specifically,the authors consider channel competition within a supply chain comprising two manufacturers and one single retailer where each manufacturer can choose to sell its products either directly to the end market(online channel,say)or through the potential retail channel,based on the profit maximization criterion,which is influenced by exogenous market conditions,such as the degree of competition,etc.Furthermore,the retailer provides additional demand-enhancing service to promote the manufacturer’s products distributed via it.If only one of the manufacturers sells products through the retailer,its products will be promoted by the additional retail service,which poaches demand of products of the manufacturer who adopts direct online channel.Products of both manufacturers are supported by the retailer’s promotional service when both distribute their product through the common retailer.Finally,some managerial implications are derived from numerical analyses of our model,which explain the phenomena in practice and conclude the paper.     

In-house or Outsourcing R&D?Manufacturer Technology Strategy in the Presence of Market Follower Encroachment

Facing the threat of market follower encroachment,this paper constructs game theoretical models based on different channel structures and market structures,investigates following manufacturer's encroachment strategy and technology strategies,and discusses the impact of following manufacturer's strategy on quality decisions.The results show that encroachment always improves consumer surplus by slashing prices when leading manufacturer adopts in-house R&D(IRD);otherwise,it results in lower consumer surplus with mild competition if leading manufacturer is at a technological disadvantage.Furthermore,the technology strategies of following manufacturer are related to their R&D capabilities.The superior one is outsourcing R&D(ORD)for the manufacturers when their R&D capability is weak,otherwise,IRD is optimal.In a word,the leading manufacturer always prefers IRD under certain conditions,while the following manufacturer always prefers ORD.In addition,encroachment restrains quality innovative motivation under fixed or quality-sensitive R&D costs,but can improve quality level when consumers have a higher reference dependency for quality;meanwhile,the following manufacturer adopting ORD is always beneficial to quality improvement.     

Strategic Response to a Powerful Downstream Retailer:Difference-Setting Wholesale Pricing Contract and Partial Forward Integration

We study a supply chain consisted of a supplier and both retailers,and the supplier sells a single product through a dominant retailer and a weak retailer.The aggressive bargaining behavior of the dominant retailer brings the supplier much concern and two feasible strategies are presented to respond to that:difference-setting wholesale pricing contract and integration with the weak retailer.We investigate the decisions of supply chain members under each solution and find that,compared to the traditional form,the supplier always benefits from announcing the difference-setting wholesale pricing contract for it not only raises the marginal wholesale profits of both channels but also reduces the market share of the dominant retailer,thus potentially weakening its channel power.In addition,we show that combining with the weak retailer is not a wise choice for suppliers when the dominant retailer with relatively little bargaining power enjoys a large market share.Finally,by comparing the equilibria of these two solutions,we find that the optimal choice for suppliers depends not only on the difference in market share but also on the dominant retailer's bargaining power in the negotiation.     

Optimal Dual-Channel Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Items under Different Attenuation Coefficients of Demands

This paper discusses optimal dual-channel dynamic pricing of a retailer who sells perishable products in a finite horizon.The type of product which is equipped with different attenuation coefficients of demands on different sales channels is considered.Novel demand functions for the two channels are proposed according to attenuation coefficients of demands,and then a decision model is constructed,which can be handled stage-by-stage.It is shown that the sales price and the sales quantity of the channel which possesses more market shares are both higher than the ones of the other channel at each sales stage.More importantly,by analyzing the reasonability of the obtained solution,a necessary and sufficient condition is proposed to guarantee that both of the two channels will not stop selling through the entire period.We also propose an approach by the elimination method to deal with cases in which some channel stops selling.Further,we demonstrate that the channel which possesses more market shares is the optimal option when only one channel runs.Finally,numerical examples are presented to investigate the change of sales prices of the two channels under different market potential demands.     

B2B MARKET FORMATION AND WELFARE IMPLICATION IN A BUYER'S MARKET

The emergence of B2B electronic markets has greatly changed the relative bargaining power of buyers and sellers.We study the equilibrium market structure in a buyer＇s market.We find that buyer-controlled B2B markets and neutral B2B markets have different equilibrium structures,and the emergence of B2B markets will increase social welfare,but its effect on buyers and sellers will be different：B2B markets increase the consumer surplus of the end market,but their effects on buyer and seller profits are moderated by the relative bargaining power of buyers and sellers.The profits of the side with much weaker bargaining power will decrease due to the introduction of B2B markets.     

ON MANAGERIAL DECISION PROBLEM OF THE AUCTION SITES

This paper studies one managerial decision problem of the auction sites： how to combine penalties with commissions？ It is shown that when there exists secondary auction market, the auction whose penalty is a linear function of the seller＇s commission will be more efficient than the auction with only commissions but no penalties. It has also been proven that using this strategy can maximize the expected revenue for the seller, the auction site and their total expected revenues.     

A RISK-AVERSE NEWSVENDOR MODEL WITH LIMITED CAPACITY AND OUTSOURCING UNDER THE CVAR CRITERION

For seasonal products,the retailers usually launch various marketing efforts,like advertising and promotion,to promote them in a selling season.While facing large demand from the customers,one should take the capacity constraint and outsourcing into consideration.Considering the shorten life cycles of most products,in this paper we adopt the traditional newsvendor model to investigate the optimal marketing effort along with optimal order quantity.We address the risk aversion issue and characterize the influence of the sellers’ risk propensity with CVaR criterion,and we develop an effective algorithm to obtain the optimal strategy.The impact of sellers’ risk propensity on the performance of the system is illustrated via numerical examples.The innovation of this paper is threefold.First,the optimal joint strategy of the marketing effort and order quantity is investigated and an efficient algorithm to find the optimal strategy is developed.Second,the capacity constraint option and an outsourcing strategy are studied jointly for excess products.Finally,the risk propensity of the seller and its influence are investigated by using the CVaR criterion,through which we obtain some new managerial insights.     

Manufacturing and services: From mass production to mass customization

Manufacturing and services constitute two of the five sectors of every country’s economy;depending on the maturity of the economy,they are-in terms of employment-typically the two largest sectors.The outputs or products of an economy can also be divided into goods products(due to manufacturing,construction,agriculture and mining) and services products.To date,the goods and services products have,for the most part,been mass produced;it is the premise of this paper that recent technological advances-including flexible manufacturing,cloud computing,nanotechnology and smart sensing-can better enable the transformation from mass production to mass customization.We regard mass customization as the simultaneous and real time management of supply and demand chains,based on a taxonomy that can be defined in terms of its underpinning component and management foci.From a components perspective,we first consider the value chain of supplier,manufacturer,assembler,retailer,and customer,and then develop a consistent set of definitions for supply and demand chains based on the location of the customer order penetration point.From a management perspective,we classify the methods that are employed in the management of these chains,based on whether supply and/or demand are flexible or fixed.Interestingly,our management taxonomy highlights a very critical research area at which both supply and demand are flexible,thus manageable.Simultaneous management of supply and demand chains sets the stage for mass customization which is concerned with meeting the needs of an individualized customer market.Simultaneous and real time management of supply and demand chains set the stage for real time mass customization(e.g.,wherein a tailor first laser scans an individual’s upper torso and then delivers a uniquely fitted jacket within a reasonable period,while the individual is waiting).The benefits of real time mass customization cannot be over-stated as goods and services become indistinguishable and are co-produced-as "servgoods"-in real time,resulting in an overwhelming economic advantage.     

零售商开通二手市场对供应链成员收益的影响

以大学校园中的旧书市场为研究背景,基于耐用品二手市场的存在与不存在两种情况,研究了耐用品二手市场的存在对供应链成员决策的影响.通过构建包含单一制造商和单一零售商的两周期供应链模型,得出两种情况下供应链成员的最优决策值,并且通过比较两种情况下制造商和零售商的最大利润值,得出二手市场存在的必要条件.结果表明,当旧产品的回收成本较小时,零售商开通二手市场对其自身及制造商都有利;当旧产品的回收成本较大时,零售商开通二手市场对自身有利而对制造商不利.最后,通过数值仿真,分析了消费者对旧产品的接受度及旧产品的回收率对供应链成员决策的影响.     

WARRANTY STRATEGY IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WHEN TWO RETAILER'S EXTENDED WARRANTIES BUNDLED WITH THE PRODUCTS

We in this paper examine warranty strategy in a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and two competing retailers.The manufacturer produces two substitute products and markets them through the two retailers to a group of consumers,respectively.For each type of products,the manufacturer's base warranty and a retailer's extended warranty are bundled with the product.We use game theoretic models to explore the interactions between the two types of warranties and the competition between the retailers.For this purpose,two scenarios are considered:no retailer and both the two retailers providing the extended warranties,respectively.In each scenario,the manufacturer's base warranties are assumed to be offered.Our results show that when the retailers offer their extended warranties,the manufacturer has no incentive to offer the base warranties;otherwise,the manufacturer has to provide the base warranties.The competition between retailers in terms of the product substitutability has no impact on warranty decisions,but affects all players' profits in the supply chain.The manufacturer can provide a longer warranty length and higher customer welfare to a customer than the retailers do,if it is more efficient than the retailers in warranty cost-efficiency,and vice versa.     

基于回收价格与销售数量的再制造闭环供应链渠道选择模型

针对现有刻画闭环供应链回收数量函数的不足,构建了与销售数量和回收价格均相关的回收数量函数.分析了三种情形下(两个零售商参与回收,一个零售商参与回收和制造商回收)供应链中成员的最优决策问题.研究表明：新品与再制品的成本差越大,制造商越倾向于选择两个零售商进行回收;然而,当新品与再制品的成本差较小时,选择一个零售商回收或制造商自行回收,会受到市场规模大小,吸引系数和游移系数的影响;并说明了消费者环保意识的提高对制造商、消费者和社会环境都是有利的,为制造商选择回收渠道提供了决策依据.     

不同市场竞争环境下生产成本信息分享决策

考虑由一个制造商和两个竞争性的异质零售商组成的二级供应链,在外生批发价格的情形下,研究制造商在不同市场竞争环境下的生产成本信息分享策略:均分享、仅分享一个零售商和均不分享.研究发现,在零售商的成本估计值均大于真实生产成本的情形下,当市场竞争不激烈时,制造商的最优策略为均分享,否则,为均不分享.当存在零售商的成本估计值小于真实生产成本的情形下,制造商的信息分享策略与市场竞争程度和退货成本有关.随着退货成本的增加,当市场竞争程度非常激烈时,制造商越不愿意分享生产成本信息,否则,制造商越愿意分享生产成本信息.成本信息分享在市场竞争激烈或非常激烈的环境下能改进所有供应链成员的利润.     

电子产品闭环供应链回收渠道选择研究

基于电子产品的短生命周期和价格依赖随机需求的特性,分别建立了零售商竞争环境下,制造商回收和零售商回收的闭环供应链模型,对比分析了这两种回收模式下的最优零售价和制造商利润,给出了制造商的最优回收渠道选择决策,并对模型进行了扩展分析.研究结果表明:当回收率为外生变量时,无论回收量为零售商订货量还是销售量的一定比例,且无论销售期末未售出产品残值为零与否,制造商都将选择零售商进行回收,两零售商之间的竞争程度并不影响制造商对于回收渠道的选择;当回收率为内生变量时,只有当系统参数变化使得零售商回收其全部订货量时,零售商回收才优于制造商回收.     

竞争情况下零售商的产品组合决策研究

本文研究了市场竞争情况下两个零售商横向差异产品组合决策,基于multinominal logit(MNL)模型刻画消费者选择行为并建立基本模型,得到市场相互独立时的最优产品组合.将市场竞争情况下的产品组合决策细分为四种情形并研究了零售商进入市场顺序的影响,对比了市场相互独立与竞争情况下的结果.结果表明:市场竞争时的产品多样化程度不低于市场相互独立的情况;部分产品存在两个零售商的利润空间是零售商选择重复产品必要条件;市场相互独立时的最优解外的产品有利可图是产品多样化程度高于市场相互独立情况的必要条件;零售商进入市场存在先后顺序时,信息不对称不影响均衡结果.     

基于一个博弈论方法的简单供应链合作广告模型

在合作广告文献中,重点研究一个制造商是领导者而零售商是追随者之间的关系.最近对市场结构的考察已显示出零售势力从制造商向零售商的转移.由于这种新市场现象的出现,文章意欲考察一个制造商和一个零售商在品牌投资、地方广告支出和广告费用共享规则上进行交易时纵向合作广告的效率.本文的探讨基于两个非合作性博弈模型.     

供应链上相关信息的共享激励及共享价值分配

研究由一个制造商与N个零售商构成的供应链系统上,零售商之间的不确定需求信息相关,制造商能够和部分零售商共享不确定需求信息,从而影响系统成员的决策,以及由信息共享所产生价值的分配.研究发现,首先,不确定性需求函数分布过程与订单过程存在必然的联系;其次,通过与零售商共享信息,制造商能够降低订单不确定性波动的大小,从而缓解系统上的牛鞭效应;并且,降低的幅度与需求相关性系数、参与共享零售商的个数、不确定性需求函数分布过程相关;最后,采用合作博弈中的夏普利值方式分配信息共享价值时,制造商和零售商都有激励增加共享信息的零售商个数.     

竞争市场中的库存共享实施策略

零售商间的竞争使市场中的库存共享和转运实施变的困难,这造成极大的资源浪费.为实现竞争厂商间的库存转运共享,本文设计了一类由生产商主导的库存转运机制,进而分析转运系统的协调策略.假设市场需求随机且存在顾客转移,考虑两销售周期,针对由单生产商、两零售商组成的供应链系统.首先建立Stackelberg-Nash均衡博弈策略模型刻画供应链分销系统;其次设计生产商主导的竞争零售商主动转运机制;运用博弈分析方法分别给出分散式无转运、分散式转运及集中式转运系统的最优生产、订货、补货及转运等均衡策略;设计了一类由调货价合同、批发价合同、加盟费合同组成的组合协调机制,以实现分散式分销系统的协调及效率改进.研究及分析表明:生产商主导的协助转运机制能实现竞争零售商间的主动库存转运和共享;合理批发价、调货价、加盟费等设置下的组合协调合同能够实现供应链转运分销系统的完美协调.研究为企业科学开展库存决策提供了依据.     

Information transmission in launching a new private label product

With the buyer's market strengthening, retailers have begun to lead in product development by introducing their own private label products. The success of such a new product launch relies on transmission of demand information along a supply chain, yet this new phenomenon has been little researched. This paper attempts to address such an issue by modeling vertical information transmission in a supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer. The retailer would like to introduce a new private label product and knows the demand of the product to be either high or low, while the manufacturer only knows the prior distribution of the demand type. This study attempts to find whether a wholesale-price contract or a two-part tariff contract can facilitate the manufacturer to identify the demand type. The results show that the two-part tariff contract is always effective in realizing information transmission as long as the retailer's reserve profit remains within a reasonable range.