共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Pierre Uzan 《Foundations of Science》2007,12(2):109-137
All the attempts to find the justification of the privileged evolution of phenomena exclusively in the external world need
to refer to the inescapable fact that we are living in such an asymmetric universe. This leads us to look for the origin of the “arrow of time” in the relationship
between the subject and the world. The anthropic argument shows that the arrow of time is the condition of the possibility
of emergence and maintenance of life in the universe. Moreover, according to Bohr’s, Poincaré’s and Watanabe’s analysis, this
agreement between the earlier-later direction of entropy increase and the past-future direction of life is the very condition
of the possibility for meaningful action, representation and creation. Beyond this relationship of logical necessity between
the meaning process and the arrow of time the question of their possible physical connection is explored. To answer affirmatively
to this question, the meaning process is modelled as an evolving tree-like structure, called “Semantic Time”, where thermodynamic
irreversibility can be shown.
Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river ; it is a tiger which destroys
me, but I am the tiger ; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire. – (Jorge Luis Borges) 相似文献
2.
The process of abstraction and concretisation is a label used for an explicative theory of scientific model-construction. In scientific theorising this process enters
at various levels. We could identify two principal levels of abstraction that are useful to our understanding of theory-application.
The first level is that of selecting a small number of variables and parameters abstracted from the universe of discourse
and used to characterise the general laws of a theory. In classical mechanics, for example, we select position and momentum and establish a relation amongst the two variables, which we call Newton’s 2nd law. The specification of the unspecified
elements of scientific laws, e.g. the force function in Newton’s 2nd law, is what would establish the link between the assertions
of the theory and physical systems. In order to unravel how and with what conceptual resources scientific models are constructed,
how they function and how they relate to theory, we need a view of theory-application that can accommodate our constructions
of representation models. For this we need to expand our understanding of the process of abstraction to also explicate the
process of specifying force functions etc. This is the second principal level at which abstraction enters in our theorising
and in which I focus. In this paper, I attempt to elaborate a general analysis of the process of abstraction and concretisation
involved in scientific- model construction, and argue why it provides an explication of the construction of models of the
nuclear structure. 相似文献
3.
Error is protean, ubiquitous and crucial in scientific process. In this paper it is argued that understanding scientific process
requires what is currently absent: an adaptable, context-sensitive functional role for error in science that naturally harnesses error identification and avoidance to positive, success-driven, science. This
paper develops a new account of scientific process of this sort, error and success driving Self-Directed Anticipative Learning
(SDAL) cycling, using a recent re-analysis of ape-language research as test example. The example shows the limitations of
other accounts of error, in particular Mayo’s (Error and the growth of experimental knowledge, 1996) error-statistical approach,
and SDAL cycling shows how they can be fruitfully contextualised. 相似文献
4.
Gustavo E. Romero 《Foundations of Science》2013,18(2):297-306
I argue that there are no physical singularities in space–time. Singular space–time models do not belong to the ontology of the world, because of a simple reason: they are concepts, defective solutions of Einstein’s field equations. I discuss the actual implication of the so-called singularity theorems. In remarking the confusion and fog that emerge from the reification of singularities I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of the theory of general relativity. 相似文献
5.
Karin Verelst 《Foundations of Science》2008,13(3-4):347-370
In this paper I investigate the relation between physics and metaphysics in Plato’s participation theory. I show that the logic shoring up Plato’s metaphysics in paraconsistent, as had been suggested already by Graham Priest. The transformation of the paradoxical One-and-Many of the pre-Socratics into a paraconsistent Great-and-Small bridges the abyss between archaic rationality and the world of classical logic based ultimately on the principle of contradiction. Indeed, language is an organ of perception, not simply a means of communication. J. Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness 相似文献
6.
Dan Mcarthur 《Foundations of Science》2006,11(4):369-397
In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist
accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated
an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors.
Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature
concerning scientific realism. Arthur Fine and a number of other commentators have argued that the realism debate ought to
be abandoned. The rationale for this argument is that the debate is sterile for it has, it is claimed, no consequence for
actual scientific practice, and therefore does not advance our understanding of science or its practice. Recent “softer” accounts
of social constructivism also hold a similar agnostic stance to the realism question. I provide a survey of these various
agnostic stances and show how they form a general position that I shall refer to as “the anti-philosophical stance”. I then
demonstrate that the anti-philosophical stance fails by identifying difficulties that attend its proposal to ban philosophical
interpretation. I also provide examples of instances where philosophical stances to the realism question affect scientific
practice. 相似文献
7.
8.
John J. Sung 《Foundations of Science》2008,13(2):177-193
Scientific anomalies are observations and facts that contradict current scientific theories and they are instrumental in scientific
theory change. Philosophers of science have approached scientific theory change from different perspectives as Darden (Theory
change in science: Strategies from Mendelian genetics, 1991) observes: Lakatos (In: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and
the growth of knowledge, 1970) approaches it as a progressive “research programmes” consisting of incremental improvements
(“monster barring” in Lakatos, Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery, 1976), Kuhn (The structure of
scientific revolutions, 1996) observes that changes in “paradigms” are instigated by a crisis from some anomaly, and Hanson
(In: Feigl, Maxwell (eds) Current issues in the philosophy of science, 1961) proposes that discovery does not begin with hypothesis
but with some “problematic phenomena requiring explanation”. Even though anomalies are important in all of these approaches
to scientific theory change, there have been only few investigations into the specific role anomalies play in scientific theory
change. Furthermore, much of these approaches focus on the theories themselves and not on how the scientists and their experiments
bring about scientific change (Gooding, Experiment and the making of meaning: Human agency in scientific observation and experiment,
1990). To address these issues, this paper approaches scientific anomaly resolution from a meaning construction point of view.
Conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier and Turner, Cogn Sci 22:133–187, 1996; The way we think: Conceptual blending and
mind’s hidden complexities, 2002) from cognitive linguistics describes how one constructs meaning from various stimuli, such
as text and diagrams, through conceptual integration or blending. The conceptual integration networks that describe the conceptual
integration process characterize cognition that occurs unconsciously during meaning construction. These same networks are
used to describe some of the cognition while resolving an anomaly in molecular genetics called RNA interference (RNAi) in
a case study. The RNAi case study is a cognitive-historical reconstruction (Nersessian, In: Giere (ed) Cognitive models of
science, 1992) that reconstructs how the RNAi anomaly was resolved. This reconstruction traces four relevant molecular genetics
publications in describing the cognition necessary in accounting for how RNAi was resolved through strategies (Darden 1991),
abductive reasoning (Peirce, In: Hartshorne, Weiss (eds) Collected papers, 1958), and experimental reasoning (Gooding 1990).
The results of the case study show that experiments play a crucial role in formulating an explanation of the RNAi anomaly
and the integration networks describe the experiments’ role. Furthermore, these results suggest that RNAi anomaly resolution
is embodied. It is embodied in a sense that cognition described in the cognitive-historical reconstruction is experientially
based.
相似文献
John J. SungEmail: |
9.
重建人和自然界的价值论地位--霍尔姆斯·罗尔斯顿的自然价值范畴 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1
罗尔斯顿对自然价值的论证逻辑经历了从价值观的变化到价值本体化,再到对自然价值客观性的证明等三个环节。自然价值具有价值和事实双重内涵,自然价值论具有伦理学和自然科学双重品性,它存在着价值本体化的思路,其存在论基础是近代哲学的二元论。人与自然界之间伦理关系的基础不是一个客观事实,而是由人确立的,它在本质上是人在实践中为人和自然界确立的一种价值论地位。 相似文献
10.
11.
Jan t Broekaer 《Foundations of Science》1998,3(2):235-258
In the work of the late Belgian philosopher, logician and freethinker Leo Apostel (1924–1995) the concept of ‘world view’
is extensively developed. From the diverse research of Apostel, I gather and examine the constituents of a world view and
their relationships. I propose to understand it as a pluralist and open, rationalised ontology of the ‘world whole’, comprising
knowledge systems, valuative ethical systems and concomitant action guiding systems, to a large extent reflecting insight
in the exact sciences. The prolific and scattered opus of Apostel renders my account of encompassing world views approximate
and incomplete. It merely outlines the intrinsically unfinished project and presents a recent development. This development
mainly involves our approach to the phenomenon of emergence from a quantum theoretical perspective.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
12.
Vadim Batitsky 《Foundations of Science》2000,5(3):299-321
Putnam's ``model-theoretic' argument against metaphysical realism presupposes that an ideal scientific theory is expressible in a first order language. The central aim of this paper is to show that Putnam's ``first orderization' of science, although unchallenged by numerous critics, makes his argument unsound even for adequate theories, never mind an ideal one. To this end, I will argue that quantitative theories, which dominate the natural sciences, can be adequately interpreted and evaluated only with the help of so-called theories of measurement whose epistemological and methodological purpose is to justify systematic assignments of quantitative values to objects in the world. And, in order to fulfill this purpose, theories of measurement must have an essentially higher order logical structure. As a result, Putnam's argument fails because much of science turns out to rest on essentially higher order theoretical assumptions about the world. 相似文献
13.
Edward MacKinnon 《Foundations of Science》2007,12(4):295-323
An epistemological interpretation of quantum mechanics hinges on the claim that the distinctive features of quantum mechanics
can be derived from some distinctive features of an observational basis. Old and new variations of this theme are listed.
The program has a limited success in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The crucial issue is how far it can be extended to
quantum field theory without introducing significant ontological postulates. A C*-formulation covers algebraic quantum field
theory, but not the standard model. Julian Schwinger’s anabatic methodology extended a strict measurement-based formulation
of quantum mechanics through field theory. His extension also excluded the quark hypothesis and the standard model. Quarks
and local gauge invariance are postulates that go beyond the limits of an epistemological interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The ontological significance ascribed to these advances depends on the role accorded ontology.
相似文献
Edward MacKinnonEmail: |
14.
György Darvas 《Foundations of Science》2009,14(4):273-280
Attemts to explain causal paradoxes of Quantum Mechanics (QM) have tried to solve the problems within the framework of Quantum
Electrodynamics (QED). We will show, that this is impossible. The original theory of QED by Dirac (Proc Roy Soc A117:610,
1928) formulated in its preamble four preliminary requirements that the new theory should meet. The first of these requirements
was that the theory must be causal. Causality is not to be derived as a consequence of the theory since it was a precondition
for the formulation of the theory; it has been constructed so that it be causal. Therefore, causal paradoxes logically cannot
be explained within the framework of QED. To transcend this problem we should consider the following points: Dirac himself
stated in his original paper (1928) that his theory was only an approximation. When he returned to improve the theory later
(Proc Roy Soc A209, 1951), he noted that the new theory “involves only the ratio e/m, not e and m separately”. This is a sign that although the electromagnetic effects (whose source is e) are magnitudes stronger than the gravitational effects (whose source is m), the two are coupled. Already in 1919, Einstein noted that “the elementary formations which go to make up the atom” are
influenced by gravitational forces. Although in that form the statement proved not to be exactly correct, the effects of gravitation
on QM phenomena have been established. The conclusion is that we should seek a resolution for the causal paradoxes in the
framework of the General Theory of Relativity (GTR)—in contrast to QED, which involves only the Special Theory of Relativity
(STR). We show that causality is necessarily violated in GTR. This follows from the curvature of the space-time. Although
those effects are very small, one cannot ignore their influence in the case of the so-called “paradox phenomena”. 相似文献
15.
Lois Isenman 《Foundations of Science》2009,14(4):315-329
A companion paper explored the role of intuition in the genesis of an alternative theory for the secretion of pancreatic digestive
enzymes, looking through the lens of three philosophers/historians of science. Gerald Holton, the last scholar, proposed that
scientific imagination is shaped by a number of thematic presuppositions, which function largely below awareness. They come
in pairs of opposites that alternately gain cultural preeminence. The current paper examines three thematic presuppositions
inherent to both the generally accepted model for digestive enzyme secretion and most consciousness-centered views of higher-level
cognition—discreteness, reduction, and simplicity. Since they often build on each other, together they are referred to as
the simplicity worldview. Also considered are the three opposite thematic assumptions inherent to both the alternative model for digestive enzyme
secretion and intuition-friendly views of higher-level cognition—the continuum, holism, and complexity—together referred to
as the complexity worldview. The article highlights the potential importance to scientific knowledge of this currently less favored worldview. 相似文献
16.
Mario Bunge 《Foundations of Science》2017,22(3):455-469
Original research is of course what scientists are expected to do. Therefore the research project is in many ways the unit of science in the making: it is the center of the professional life of the individual scientist and his coworkers. It is also the means towards the culmination of their specific activities: the original publication they hope to contribute to the scientific literature. The scientific project should therefore be of central interest to all the students of science, particularly the philosophers and sociologists of science. We shall focus on the preliminary evaluation of research projects—the specific task of referees—and will emphasize the problem of their scientificity—the chief concern of scientific gatekeepers. In the past such an examination aimed only at protecting the taxpayer from swindlers and incompetent amateurs, such as the inventors of continuous motion artifacts. In recent times a similar issue has resurfaced with regard to some of the most prestigious and most handsomely funded projects, namely work on string theory and many-worlds cosmology. Indeed, some of their faithful have claimed that these theories are so elegant, and so full of high-grade mathematics, that they should be exempted from empirical tests. This claim provoked the spirited rebuttal of the well-known cosmologists Ellis and Silk (Nature 516:321–323, 2014), which the present paper is intended to reinforce. Indeed, we shall try to show why empirical testability is necessary though insufficient for a piece of work to qualify as scientific. Finally, the present paper may also be regarded as an indirect contribution to the current debate over the reliability of quantitative indicators of scientific worth, such as the h-index of scientific productivity (e.g., Wilsdon in Nature 523:129, 2015). But we shall touch only tangentially on the sociological, political, and economics of research teams: our focus will be the acquisition of new scientific knowledge. 相似文献
17.
Standard considerations of philosophy of science are reformulated in psychological terms and arguments, suggesting a fundamental change in life perspective: subjective experiences or introspective data are subject to motivational biases and therefore not admitted as objective empirical facts in science, However, we never experience objects or events of the external world, i.e., so called objective facts, but exclusively subjective percepts or mental events. They are merely assumed to, but may or may not be accurate or distorted mental representations of objects or events of an external world. Accordingly, the latter are theoretical constructs, i.e., constructs of the fictitious but most successful predictive (implicit) theory, called external world, which seems to be constructed from regularities observed in mental events and serves as a reference fiction for, erroneously called empirical, tests of predictions of scientific theories.Relevant Publication: Micko, H.C.: 2001, Psychologie: Von der Geistes – zur Naturwissenschaft – und weiter wohin? Erkenntnistheoretische Erwägungen vor und nach dem Aufkommen des philosophischen Konstruktivismus. Ztschr. f. Psychologie, 209: 54–68. 相似文献
18.
整体论的群落超级有机体范式认为,群落类似于一个生物有机体,是本体存在的最基本的结构功能单位;而还原论的群落个体主义假说认为群落不过是个体生物的随机组合,只有个体生物才具有这种本体论的地位。试图调和的中间路线者的本体论和认识论是整体的,但方法论却是还原的或解释力很弱的。也许只有提出更多具备因果有效性的辅助性假说和桥接原理,中间路线者才能找到还原论与整体论共同的本体论基础。 相似文献
19.
Andrea Cerroni 《Foundations of Science》2000,5(2):209-224
Relativity Theory by Albert Einstein has been so far littleconsidered by cognitive scientists, notwithstanding its undisputedscientific and philosophical moment. Unfortunately, we don't have adiary or notebook as cognitively useful as Faraday's. But physicshistorians and philosophers have done a great job that is relevant bothfor the study of the scientist's reasoning and the philosophy ofscience. I will try here to highlight the fertility of a `triangulation'using cognitive psychology, history of science and philosophy of sciencein starting answering a clearly very complex question:why did Einstein discover Relativity Theory? Here we arenot much concerned with the unending question of precisely whatEinstein discovered, that still remains unanswered, for we have noconsensus over the exact nature of the theory's foundations(Norton 1993). We are mainly interested in starting to answer the`how question', and especially the following sub-question: what(presumably) were his goals and strategies in hissearch? I will base my argument on fundamental publications ofEinstein, aiming at pointing out a theory-specific heuristic, settingboth a goal and a strategy: covariance/invariance.The result has significance in theory formation in science, especiallyin concept and model building. It also raises other questions that gobeyond the aim of this paper: why was he so confident in suchheuristic? Why didn't many other scientists use it? Where did he keep ? such a heuristic? Do we have any other examples ofsimilar heuristic search in other scientific problemsolving? 相似文献
20.
The “DNA is a program” metaphor is still widely used in Molecular Biology and its popularization. There are good historical
reasons for the use of such a metaphor or theoretical model. Yet we argue that both the metaphor and the model are essentially
inadequate also from the point of view of Physics and Computer Science. Relevant work has already been done, in Biology, criticizing the programming paradigm. We will refer to empirical evidence
and theoretical writings in Biology, although our arguments will be mostly based on a comparison with the use of differential
methods (in Molecular Biology: a mutation or alike is observed or induced and its phenotypic consequences are observed) as
applied in Computer Science and in Physics, where this fundamental tool for empirical investigation originated and acquired
a well-justified status. In particular, as we will argue, the programming paradigm is not theoretically sound as a causal(as in Physics) or deductive(as in Programming) framework for relating the genome to the phenotype, in contrast to the physicalist and computational grounds that this paradigm claims
to propose.
相似文献
Giuseppe LongoEmail: URL: http://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo |