The bounded heavens: defining the limits of astrological practice in the Iberian indices

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the rules for the expurgation of texts of astrology in the Iberian Indices of forbidden books. It addresses the prohibitions put forward in Rule IX of the Index of Trent and the bull Coeli et terrae of Sixtus V, and studies its impact on the rules and their interpretation in the Spanish and Portuguese Indices, in particular, those published in the first decades of the seventeenth century: the Spanish Index librorum prohibitorum et expurgatorum of 1612 and the Portuguese Index auctorum damnatae memoriae of 1624. It shows how these indices offer a more meticulous examination of the prohibitions providing not only more detail regarding the different practices of astrology, but also explicitly accept the doctrine of inclinations of Thomas Aquinas as a central rule to deal with astrological judgments on human behaviour. It also highlights some specific details of the practice of censorship of astrological books by examining case studies of censored Portuguese and Spanish astrological publications. These provide new dimensions and highlight significant differences between the theoretical rules, practical guidelines, and actual restriction of astrological content.     

Putting the Indices into practice: censoring science in early modern Portugal

ABSTRACT

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Inquisition was the institution most invested in the censorship of printed books in the Portuguese empire. Besides publishing the Indices of Forbidden Books, the Holy Office was also responsible for overseeing their implementation and ensuring their efficacy in preventing the importation, reading, and circulation of banned books. Overall, the sixteenth-century Indices condemned 785 authors and 1081 titles, including 52 authors and 85 titles of medicine, natural history, natural philosophy, astronomy, chronology, cosmography, astrology, and divinatory arts. By looking at the largest collection of early modern scientific books in Portugal, I will argue that a closer inspection of marginalia and ownership, and the establishment of a typology of expurgations is essential for the comprehension of the actual practices and the mechanisms of censorship. By examining the material evidence of censorship, in order to reconstruct expurgation practices, this paper reveals the processes and effectiveness of ecclesiastical control in the Portuguese Inquisition and highlights the differences between what inquisitors wrote in the Indices and what others put into practice.     

Rome and Theistic Evolutionism: The Hidden Strategies behind the ‘Dorlodot Affair’, 1920–1926

In 1918, Henry de Dorlodot—priest, theologian, and professor of geology at the University of Louvain (Belgium)—published Le Darwinisme au point de vue de l'Orthodoxie Catholique (translated as Darwinism and Catholic Thought) in which he defended a reconciliation between evolutionary theory and Catholicism with his own particular kind of theistic evolutionism. He subsequently announced a second volume in which he would extend his conclusions to the origin of Man. Traditionalist circles in Rome reacted vehemently. Operating through the Pontifical Biblical Commission, they tried to force Dorlodot to withdraw his book and to publicly disown his ideas by threatening him with an official condemnation, a strategy that had been used against Catholic evolutionists since the late nineteenth century. The archival material on the ‘Dorlodot affair’ shows how this policy ‘worked’ in the early stages of the twentieth century but also how it would eventually reach the end of its logic. The growing popularity of theistic evolutionism among Catholic intellectuals, combined with Dorlodot's refusal to pull back amidst threats, made certain that the traditionalists did not get their way completely, and the affair ended in an uncomfortable status quo. Dorlodot did not receive the official condemnation that had been threatened, nor did he withdraw his theories, although he stopped short on publishing on the subject. With the decline of the traditionalists’ power and authority, the policy of denunciation towards evolutionists made way for a growing tolerance. The ‘Dorlodot affair’—which occurred in a pivotal era in the history of the Church—can be seen as exemplary with regards to the changing attitude of the Roman authorities towards evolutionism in the first half of the twentieth century.     

Re-examining the impact of European astronomy in seventeenth-century China: a study of Xue Fengzuo’s system of thought and his integration of Chinese and Western knowledge

ABSTRACT

During the late Ming and early Qing period, Jesuit missionaries introduced European science into China, and thereby profoundly influenced the later development of Chinese astronomy. Not only did European astronomy become the official system of the Qing dynasty, but the traditional way to ‘attain up above’ by connecting the study of astronomy and Yi learning gradually fell into disuse. However, the astronomers in this period expressed different views on these two processes. As one of the most important early Qing astronomers, Xue Fengzuo’s case presents a distinctive and important example. Firstly, under the influences of both Chinese tradition and European science, Xue Fengzuo rebuilt the way to ‘attain up above’ based on his three-fold ‘calendrical learning’, i.e. calendrical astronomy, astrology and related pragmatic applications, through which he could realize the highest Confucian ideal. Secondly, he integrated Chinese and Western knowledge for all three aspects of his ‘calendrical learning’, instead of ceding the dominant position to Western methods. From Xue Fengzuo’s example, many of the complex effects of the encounter between different cultures and the process of knowledge transfer can be revealed.     

Criticism of trepidation models and advocacy of uniform precession in medieval Latin astronomy

A characteristic hallmark of medieval astronomy is the replacement of Ptolemy’s linear precession with so-called models of trepidation, which were deemed necessary to account for divergences between parameters and data transmitted by Ptolemy and those found by later astronomers. Trepidation is commonly thought to have dominated European astronomy from the twelfth century to the Copernican Revolution, meeting its demise only in the last quarter of the sixteenth century thanks to the observational work of Tycho Brahe. The present article seeks to challenge this picture by surveying the extent to which Latin astronomers of the late Middle Ages expressed criticisms of trepidation models or rejected their validity in favour of linear precession. It argues that a readiness to abandon trepidation was more widespread prior to Brahe than hitherto realized and that it frequently came as the result of empirical considerations. This critical attitude towards trepidation reached an early culmination point with the work of Agostino Ricci (De motu octavae spherae, 1513), who demonstrated the theory’s redundancy with a penetrating analysis of the role of observational error in Ptolemy’s Almagest.     

Henry Dresser and Victorian Ornithology: Birds,Books and Business

The metaphysical commitment to the circle as the essential element in the analysis of celestial motion has long been recognized as the hallmark of classical astronomy. Part I of this paper contains a discussion of how, for Kepler, the circle also functions in geometry to select the basic polygons, in music to select the basic harmonies, and in astrology to select the basic aspects. In Part II, the discussion centres on the question of how the replacement of circular planetary orbits by elliptical orbits in the Astronomia Nova of 1609 affected Kepler's metaphysical commitment to celestial circularity that was made manifest in the derivation of planetary radii in the Mysterium Cosmographicum of 1596. The answer is found in the new and much more accurate derivation of both the planetary radii and their eccentricities in the Harmonice Mundi of 1619. It is the relationship of the diurnal movements of single planets at aphelion and perihelion to specific musical consonances that provides the first step. Then, in the second step, these ratios are ‘tempered’ so that all six planets can provide a heavenly choir. The third and final step employs the ‘mean period’, which is obtained directly from the tempered ratios given by musical theory and diurnal (not annual) motion, in the 3/2 power law to calculate the planetary radii and eccentricities with amazing accuracy. Thus the ellipse is necessary to supply the variation in angular velocities that contain the Creator's archetypal celestial circularity.     

From secondary causes to artificial instruments: Pierre-Sylvain Régis's rethinking of scholastic accounts of causation

Although several of Descartes's disciples established occasionalism as the natural outcome of Cartesianism, Pierre-Sylvain Régis forcefully resisted this conclusion by developing an account of secondary causes in which God does not immediately intervene in the natural world. In order to understand this view, it has been argued that Régis melds Aquinas's concurrentism with the new, mechanist natural philosophy defended in Cartesian physics. In this paper, I contend that such a reading of Régis's position is misleading for our understanding of both his account of secondary causality and the relationship between medieval debates and seventeenth century natural philosophy. I show that Régis's account of secondary causality denies two fundamental features at the core of the account proposed by Aquinas, namely that God acts immediately in nature and that secondary causes are per se causes. I contend that Régis's view more closely resembles a specific account of artificial instrumental causality developed by Duns Scotus. The comparison with Scotus shows that Régis is still dealing with conceptual tools that can be traced back to the scholastic tradition. Yet, Régis implements these tools to establish an account of causation that is fundamentally irreconcilable with scholastic natural philosophy.     

Atomism, Poincaré and Planck

Planck's change in attitude to the question of whether atomic hypotheses were scientifically accessible, is discussed. It is argued contra Holton, that Planck's change in attitude to this question did not signal a methodological shift towards realism. The point of doing this is not just to investigate a significant episode in the history of quantum theory, but also to use the episode as a case study in support of a broader historical thesis. This thesis is that there was a widespread late-nineteenth century methodological tradition which motivated the change in status of certain ontological claims — e.g., that atoms exist — from ‘inaccessible to science’ to ‘scientifically acceptable’ even though those claims were not strictly ‘observable’. This methodological tradition is a hybrid of positivist and realist views. Thus, contrary to one popular view, the fin de siécle triumph of atomism is not to be seen as a triumph for a realist view of science Poincare's views are also used as an illustration.     

Pensions for ‘Cultivators of Science’

The occasional (and belated) concern of the British Government with science in the nineteenth century is a matter of potential interest to historians of science, yet many previous studies have tended to range over a variety of different aspects of the question. There have been too many vague allusions to financial support as ‘money for science’ in general. It is time that particular parts of the problem were unpacked. For example, the award of money (from the 1820s) to pay a few people of independent means for apparatus was quite distinct from the provision (from the 1830s) of an occasional pension. Even then, to speak of ‘pensions’ uncovers unfortunate ambiguities. For too long science in Britain was regarded as no more than a private hobby for the well-to-do. As late as 1856 an official government statement seemed to make this attitude official. The English attitude to pensions differed remarkably from the French, who established a precedent in the reward of savants, sometimes quoted enviously by British men of science. In 1837 Robert Peel virtually admitted that, in awarding pensions to ‘cultivators of science’, he was following the French practice. It may also be useful to emphasise the contrast between the English (often led by Cambridge professors) and the Scots, mostly from Edinburgh, mainly represented here by Whewell and Brewster, respectively. Babbage had a different role in this story from that usually told. A large part in supporting men of science of modest means could have been played by the British Association for the Advancement of Science but it consistently refused to do so, although it supported an elite among its own members.     

Cicero's demarcation of science: A report of shared criteria

The problem of establishing intensional criteria to demarcate science from non-science, and in particular science from pseudoscience, received a great amount of attention in the 20th century philosophy of science. It remains unsolved. This article compares demarcation criteria found in Marcus Tullius Cicero’s rejection of genethliac astrology and other pseudo-divinatory techniques in his De divinatione (44 BCE) with criteria advocated by a broad selection of modern philosophers of science and other specialists in science studies. Remarkable coincidences across two millennia are found on five basic criteria, which hints at a certain historical stability of some of the most fundamental features of a concept of “science” broadly construed.     

‘Nobody could possibly misunderstand what a group is’: a study in early twentieth-century group axiomatics

In the early years of the twentieth century, the so-called ‘postulate analysis’—the study of systems of axioms for mathematical objects for their own sake—was regarded by some as a vital part of the efforts to understand those objects. I consider the place of postulate analysis within early twentieth-century mathematics by focusing on the example of a group: I outline the axiomatic studies to which groups were subjected at this time and consider the changing attitudes towards such investigations.

     

The rationale behind Pierre Duhem's natural classification

The central concern of this paper is the interpretation of Duhem's attitude towards physical theory. Based on his view that the classification of experimental laws yielded by theory progressively approaches a natural classification—a classification reflecting that of underlying realities—Duhem has been construed as a realist of sorts in recent literature. Here I argue that his positive attitude towards the theoretic classification of laws had rather to do with the pragmatic rationality of the physicist. Duhem's idea of natural classification was an intuitive idea in the mind of the physicist that had to be affirmed in order to justify the physicist's pursuit of theory.     

Knowing what would happen: The epistemic strategies in Galileo's thought experiments

While philosophers have subjected Galileo's classic thought experiments to critical analysis, they have tended to largely ignored the historical and intellectual context in which they were deployed, and the specific role they played in Galileo's overall vision of science. In this paper I investigate Galileo's use of thought experiments, by focusing on the epistemic and rhetorical strategies that he employed in attempting to answer the question of how one can know what would happen in an imaginary scenario. Here I argue we can find three different answers to this question in Galileo later dialogues, which reflect the changing meanings of ‘experience’ and ‘knowledge’ (scientia) in the early modern period. Once we recognise that Galileo's thought experiments sometimes drew on the power of memory and the explicit appeal to ‘common experience’, while at other times, they took the form of demonstrative arguments intended to have the status of necessary truths; and on still other occasions, they were extrapolations, or probable guesses, drawn from a carefully planned series of controlled experiments, it becomes evident that no single account of the epistemological relationship between thought experiment, experience and experiment can adequately capture the epistemic variety we find Galileo's use of imaginary scenarios. To this extent, we cannot neatly classify Galileo's use of thought experiments as either ‘medieval’ or ‘early modern’, but we should see them as indicative of the complex epistemological transformations of the early seventeenth century.     

Eric aiton: an appreciation

Summary

A famous debate between John Ray, Joseph Pitton de Tournefort and Augustus Quirinus Rivinus at the end of the seventeenth century has often been referred to as signalling the beginning of a rift between classificatory methods relying on logical division and classificatory methods relying on empirical grouping. Interestingly, a couple of decades later, Linnaeus showed very little excitement in reviewing this debate, and this although he was the first to introduce the terminological distinction of artificial vs. natural methods. In this paper, I will explain Linnaeus's indifference by the fact that earlier debates were revolving around problems of plant diagnosis rather than classification. From Linnaeus's perspective, they were therefore concerned with what he called artificial methods alone – diagnostic tools, that is, which were artificial no matter which characters were taken into account. The natural method Linnaeus proposed, on the other hand, was not about diagnosis, but about relations of equivalence which played a vital, although largely implicit role in the practices of specimen exchange on which naturalists relied to acquire knowledge of the natural world.     

Borelli’s edition of books V–VII of Apollonius’s Conics,and Lemma 12 in Newton’s Principia

To solve the direct problem of central forces when the trajectory is an ellipse and the force is directed to its centre, Newton made use of the famous Lemma 12 (Principia, I, sect. II) that was later recognized equivalent to proposition 31 of book VII of Apollonius’s Conics. In this paper, in which we look for Newton’s possible sources for Lemma 12, we compare Apollonius’s original proof, as edited by Borelli, with those of other authors, including that given by Newton himself. Moreover, after having retraced its editorial history, we evaluate the dissemination of Borelli's edition of books V-VII of Apollonius’s Conics before the printing of the Principia.

     

Deducing Newton’s second law from relativity principles: A forgotten history

In French mechanical treatises of the nineteenth century, Newton’s second law of motion was frequently derived from a relativity principle. The origin of this trend is found in ingenious arguments by Huygens and Laplace, with intermediate contributions by Euler and d’Alembert. The derivations initially relied on Galilean relativity and impulsive forces. After Bélanger’s Cours de mécanique of 1847, they employed continuous forces and a stronger relativity with respect to any commonly impressed motion. The name “principle of relative motions” and the very idea of using this principle as a constructive tool were born in this context. The consequences of Poincaré’s and Einstein’s awareness of this approach are analyzed. Lastly, the legitimacy and significance of a relativity-based derivation of Newton’s second law are briefly discussed in a more philosophical vein.