Scientists’ attitudes on science and values: Case studies and survey methods in philosophy of science

This article examines the relevance of survey data of scientists’ attitudes about science and values to case studies in philosophy of science. We describe two methodological challenges confronting such case studies: 1) small samples, and 2) potential for bias in selection, emphasis, and interpretation. Examples are given to illustrate that these challenges can arise for case studies in the science and values literature. We propose that these challenges can be mitigated through an approach in which case studies and survey methods are viewed as complementary, and use data from the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative to illustrate this claim.     

The origins of Schwinger׳s Euclidean Green׳s functions

This paper places Julian Schwinger׳s development of the Euclidean Green׳s function formalism for quantum field theory in historical context. It traces the techniques employed in the formalism back to Schwinger׳s work on waveguides during World War II, and his subsequent formulation of the Minkowski space Green׳s function formalism for quantum field theory in 1951. Particular attention is dedicated to understanding Schwinger׳s physical motivation for pursuing the Euclidean extension of this formalism in 1958.     

Conventionalism about what? Where Duhem and Poincaré part ways

This paper examines whether, and in what contexts, Duhem's and Poincaré's views can be regarded as conventionalist or structural realist. After analysing the three different contexts in which conventionalism is attributed to them—in the context of the aim of science, the underdetermination problem and the epistemological status of certain principles—I show that neither Duhem's nor Poincaré's arguments can be regarded as conventionalist. I argue that Duhem and Poincaré offer different solutions to the problem of theory choice, differ in their stances towards scientific knowledge and the status of scientific principles, making their epistemological claims substantially different.     

Multiplicity in Everett׳s interpretation of quantum mechanics

Everett׳s interpretation of quantum mechanics was proposed to avoid problems inherent in the prevailing interpretational frame. It assumes that quantum mechanics can be applied to any system and that the state vector always evolves unitarily. It then claims that whenever an observable is measured, all possible results of the measurement exist. This notion of multiplicity has been understood in different ways by proponents of Everett׳s theory. In fact the spectrum of opinions on various ontological questions raised by Everett׳s approach is rather large, as we attempt to document in this critical review. We conclude that much remains to be done to clarify and specify Everett׳s approach.     

Narrative and evidence. How can case studies from the history of science support claims in the philosophy of science?

A common method for warranting the historical adequacy of philosophical claims is that of relying on historical case studies. This paper addresses the question as to what evidential support historical case studies can provide to philosophical claims and doctrines. It argues that in order to assess the evidential functions of historical case studies, we first need to understand the methodology involved in producing them. To this end, an account of historical reconstruction that emphasizes the narrative character of historical accounts and the theory-laden character of historical facts is introduced. The main conclusion of this paper is that historical case studies are able to provide philosophical claims with some evidential support, but that, due to theory-ladenness, their evidential import is restricted.     

From positivism to conventionalism: Comte,Renouvier, and Poincaré

Considered in its historical context, conventionalism is quite different from the way in which it has been caricatured in more recent philosophy of science, that is, as a conservative philosophy that allows the preservation of theories through arbitrary ad hoc stratagems. It is instead a liberal outgrowth of Comtean positivism, which broke with the Reidian interpretation of the Newtonian tradition in France and defended a role for hypotheses in the sciences. It also has roots in the social contract political philosophy of Renouvier, who explicitly drew the analogy between conventions in political life and the conventional acceptance of hypotheses in the sciences, and conceived a philosophy that permits scientists to set aside foundational worries and explore new ideas. Although Poincaré and Renouvier may have hesitated to accept certain then recent developments in mathematics and the sciences such as non-Euclidean geometries, this conservatism cannot necessarily be attributed to their conventionalism. It may instead reflect the engineering background they shared with Comte, which emphasizes practical applications. Although Renouvier and Poincaré may have seen no practical use for these new ideas, unlike Comte they did not prohibit others from pursuing them, reflecting conventionalism's more liberal attitude toward recent developments in the sciences.     

On the “negative utility” of Ernst Cassirer׳s philosophy of physics: An application to the EPR argument

This paper tries to reconstruct Ernst Cassirer's potential reception of the EPR argument, as exposed by Einstein in his letter to Cassirer of March 1937. It is shown that, in conformity with his transcendental epistemology taking the conditions of accessibility as constitutive of the quantum object, Cassirer would probably have rejected the argument. Indeed, Cassirer would probably not have subscribed to its separability/local causality presupposition (which goes against his interpretation of the quantum formalism as a self-sufficient condition constitutive of the quantum object, without any reliance on spatial intuition), nor to its completeness requirement (as his partial endorsement of Bohr's complementarity, and his rejection of the Kantian "idea of complete determination", illustrate). By rejecting both of its premises, Cassirer's philosophy of physics thus enables to escape the EPR dilemma, and exhibits what, in Kantian terms, might be called a "negative utility" with respect to physical science. A further investigation of the anti-reductionist utility of Cassirer's systematic philosophy with respect to physics and other "symbolic forms" is finally suggested.     

Into the ‘regions of physical and metaphysical chaos’: Maxwell’s scientific metaphysics and natural philosophy of action (agency,determinacy and necessity from theology,moral philosophy and history to mathematics,theory and experiment)

Maxwell’s writings exhibit an enduring preoccupation with the role of metaphysics in the advancement of science, especially the progress of physics. I examine the question of the distinction and the proper relation between physics and metaphysics and the way in which the question relies on key notions that bring together much of Maxwell’s natural philosophy, theoretical and experimental. Previous discussions of his attention to metaphysics have been confined to specific issues and polemics such as conceptions of matter and the problem of free will. I suggest a unifying pattern based on a generalized philosophical perspective and varying expressions, although never a systematic or articulated philosophical doctrine, but at least a theme of action and active powers, natural and human, intellectual and material, with sources and grounds in theology, moral philosophy and historical argument. While science was developing in the direction of professional specialization and alongside the rise of materialism, Maxwell held on to conservative intellectual outlook, but one that included a rich scientific life and held science as part of a rich intellectual, cultural and material life. His philosophical outlook integrated his science with and captured the new Victorian culture of construction and work, political, economic, artistic and engineering.     

“Exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science

This essay utilizes the concept “exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science. The essay traces the emergence of the historiographical concept “exploratory experimentation” in the late 1990s. The reconstruction of the early discussions about exploratory experimentation shows that the introduction of the concept had unintended consequences: Initially designed to debunk philosophical ideas about theory testing, the concept “exploratory experimentation” quickly exposed the poverty of our conceptual tools for the analysis of experimental practice. Looking back at a number of detailed analyses of experimental research, we can now appreciate that the concept of exploratory experimentation is too vague and too elusive to fill the desideratum whose existence it revealed.     

“The soul of the fact”—Poincaré and proof

Henri Poincaré acquired a reputation in his lifetime for being difficult to read. It was said that he missed out important steps in his arguments, assumed the truth of claims that would be difficult if not impossible to prove, and in short that he lacked rigour. In the years after his death this view coalesced into an exaggerated claim that his work was simply too vague, and has become a cliché. This paper argues that Poincaré was far from indifferent to rigour, and that what characterises his work is an attempt to convey a particular sense of what it is to understand a topic. Throughout his working life Poincaré was concerned to promote the understanding of many domains of mathematics and physics. This is as apparent in his views about geometry, his conventionalism, and his theory of knowledge, as it is in his work on electricity and optics, on number theory, and function theory. It is one of the ways Poincaré discharged his responsibilities as a scientist, and that it accounts not only for a surprising degree of unity in his work but also gives it its distinctive character—at once profound and elusive.     

History of science and science combined: solving a historical problem in optics—the case of Galileo and his telescope

Archive for History of Exact Sciences - The claim that Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) transformed the spyglass into an astronomical instrument has never been disputed and is considered a...     

Atomism and ‘subtlety’ in Francis Bacon's philosophy

Francis Bacon's reflections on atomism have generally been misunderstood because they have never been systematically studied in relation to the speculative chemical philosophy which he developed in the interval between about 1592 and his death in 1626. This philosophy, in many respects unknown to historians until quite recently, was the only body of positive science which Bacon ever accepted. The speculative philosophy was, on the whole, chemical and non-mechanical, and consequently not consistent with atomist doctrines. In fact, Bacon never at any time accepted the principal atomist tenets. It is therefore necessary to explain why he was interested in atomism at all. Of the several reasons for his interest one (hitherto unrecognised) is especially important—namely, his belief that the speculative and atomic philosophies had affinities. In particular, he believed that of all the ancient philosophies atomism alone approached the ideals associated with the key notion of ‘subtlety’—ideals represented in their highest form (as he imagined) in the speculative philosophy.     

On the relation between the probabilistic characterization of the common cause and Bell׳s notion of local causality

In this paper the relation between the standard probabilistic characterization of the common cause (used for the derivation of the Bell inequalities) and Bell׳s notion of local causality will be investigated in the isotone net framework borrowed from algebraic quantum field theory. The logical role of two components in Bell׳s definition will be scrutinized; namely that the common cause is localized in the intersection of the past of the correlated events; and that it provides a complete specification of the ‘beables’ of this intersection.     

Mach׳s principle as action-at-a-distance in GR: The causality question

A part of the revival of interest in Mach׳s principle since the early 1960s has involved work by physicists aimed at calculating various sorts of frame-dragging effects by matter shells surrounding an interior region, and arguing that under certain conditions or in certain limits (ideally, ones that can be viewed as plausibly similar to conditions in our cosmos) the frame dragging becomes “complete” (e.g. Lynden-Bell, Katz, & Bičák, 1995) . Such results can bolster the argument for the satisfaction of Mach׳s principle by certain classes of models of GR. Interestingly, the frame-dragging “effect” of (say) a rotational movement of cosmic matter around a central point is argued by these physicists to be instantaneous—not an effect propagating at the speed of light. Not all physicists regard this as unproblematic. But rather than exploring whether there is something unphysical about such instantaneous “action at a distance”, or a violation of the precepts of Special Relativity, I am interested in exploring whether these physicists׳ calculations should be thought of as showing local inertia (resistance to acceleration) to be an effect, with distant matter distributions being the cause. I will try to apply some leading philosophical accounts of causation to the physical models of frame dragging, to see whether they imply that the frame dragging is superluminal causation. I will then offer reflections on the difficulties of applying causal talk in physical theories.     

Grasping the spirit in nature: Anschauung in Ørsted's epistemology of science and beauty

The intersection between art, poetry, philosophy and science was the leitmotif which guided the lives and careers of romantic natural philosophers including that of the Danish natural philosopher, H. C. Ørsted. A simple model of Ørsted’s career would be one in which it was framed by two periods of philosophical speculation: the youth’s curious and idealistic interest in new attractive thoughts and the experienced man’s mature reflections at the end of his life. We suggest that a closer look at the epistemological aspects of his works on the theory of beauty reveals a connection between this late work and his early philosophical work including experimental philosophy, but also with the work in teaching and textbook writing, that lies in between. The latter includes Ørsted’s view on the application of mathematics in natural philosophy as well as his failed attempt at a genetic presentation of elementary geometry.     

On “the application of science to science itself:” chemistry,instruments, and the scientific labor process

The “Instrumental Revolution” in chemistry refers to a transitional period in the mid-20th century during which sophisticated instrumentation based on physical principles was introduced to solve chemical problems. Historical and philosophical reflection on whether the revolution was a scientific one has been dominated by general models of scientific revolution, in particular, those proposed by Thomas Kuhn, I. B. Cohen and Ian Hacking. In this article I propose that the Industrial Revolution is a useful model for understanding the transformation wrought by the increasingly important role of machines in chemical research. Drawing on Marx's analysis of that event, I argue that that the Instrumental Revolution bears a striking resemblance to the industrial one. I offer grounds for thinking that the resemblance is not fortuitous, but rather reflects a general pattern of development involving the mechanization of the labor process. It is suggested that the cognitive consequences of radical changes in the means of production, as exemplified in the Instrumental Revolution, warrant the consideration of whether the latter is an instance of a kind of revolution in science rather than a singular episode.