The Third Dogma Revisited

This paper is an attempt to further our understanding of mechanisms conceived of as ontologically separable from laws. What opportunities are there for a mechanistic perspective to be independent of, or even more fundamental than, a law perspective? Advocates of the mechanistic view often play with the possibility of internal and external reliability, or with the paralleling possibilities of enforcing, counteracting, redirecting, etc., the mechanisms’ power to produce To further this discussion I adopt a trope ontology. It is independent of the notion of law, and can easily be adapted to account for such characteristics of mechanisms. The idea of tropes as mechanisms is worked out in some detail. According to the resulting picture, there is still an opportunity to link mechanisms and laws. But while the predominant law view conceives of mechanistic approaches as special kinds of law accounts, this study indicates that the converse may be true. Law accounts are special cases of mechanistic accounts, and they work only in those worlds where the mechanisms are of the right kind     

A Physical Approach to the Construction of Cognition and to Cognitive Evolution

It is shown that the method of operationaldefinition of theoretical terms applied inphysics may well support constructivist ideasin cognitive sciences when extended toobservational terms. This leads to unexpectedresults for the notion of reality, inductionand for the problem why mathematics is sosuccessful in physics.A theory of cognitive operators is proposedwhich are implemented somewhere in our brainand which transform certain states of oursensory apparatus into what we call perceptionsin the same sense as measurement devicestransform the interaction with the object intomeasurement results. Then, perceivedregularities, as well as the laws of nature wewould derive from them can be seen asinvariants of the cognitive operators concernedand are by this human specific constructsrather than ontologically independent elements.(e.g., the law of energy conservation can bederived from the homogeneity of time and bythis depends on our mental time metricgenerator). So, reality in so far it isrepresented by the laws of nature has no longeran independent ontological status. This isopposed to Campbell's `natural selectionepistemology'. From this it is shown that thereholds an incompleteness theorem for physicallaws similar to Gödels incompletenesstheorem for mathematical axioms, i.e., there isno definitive or object `theory of everything'.This constructivist approaches to cognitionwill allow a coherent and consistent model ofboth cognitive and organic evolution. Whereasthe classical view sees the two evolutionrather dichotomously (for ex.: most scientistssee cognitive evolution converging towards adefinitive world picture, whereas organicevolution obviously has no specific focus (the`pride of creation').     

中国“工读学校”概念再思考

中国的工读学校自1955年设立以来在矫正青少年不良行为、预防青少年犯罪方面发挥了重要作用。然而相关法律法规与工读学校的发展现状存在严重不匹配现象,工读学校的法律定位没有完全厘清、相应规范标准模糊不清等,法律制度不尽完善之处已经阻碍了工读学校的良性发展。应尽快完善工读学校相应法律法规,从立法上明确“工读学校”的概念、性质、任务,促进其在法治轨道上持续、良性发展。     

有没有“其它情况均同”定律?

本文论证指出:(1)CP可能包括无限多的条件,因此即使是用科学语言,仍然是不可消去的;(2)我们可以检验CP定律的逆否命题,从而检验CP定律本身;(3)Earman把CP陈述看成展开式微分方程而非定律,与他的MRL定律观不一致,展开式微分方程也应是定律。笔者还提出思想实验表明,Earman对真值条件和应用有效性条件的区分,及其依附性论旨,可能得出自相矛盾的结论。     

The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws

This paper sketches a dispositionalist conception of laws and shows how the dispositionalist should respond to certain objections. The view that properties are essentially dispositional is able to provide an account of laws that avoids the problems that face the two views of laws (the regularity and the contingent nomic necessitation views) that regard properties as categorical and laws as contingent. I discuss and reject the objections that (i) this view makes laws necessary whereas they are contingent; (ii) this view cannot account for certain kinds of laws of nature and their properties.     

Mechanistic Explanations and Models in Molecular Systems Biology

Mechanistic models in molecular systems biology are generally mathematical models of the action of networks of biochemical reactions, involving metabolism, signal transduction, and/or gene expression. They can be either simulated numerically or analyzed analytically. Systems biology integrates quantitative molecular data acquisition with mathematical models to design new experiments, discriminate between alternative mechanisms and explain the molecular basis of cellular properties. At the heart of this approach are mechanistic models of molecular networks. We focus on the articulation and development of mechanistic models, identifying five constraints which guide the articulation of models in molecular systems biology. These constraints are not independent of one another, with the result that modeling becomes an iterative process. We illustrate the use of these constraints in the modeling of the mechanism for bistability in the lac operon.     

定律的形而上学谱系——从休谟式随附谈起

传统科学哲学中规则系统式定律观与普遍必然式定律观,分别代表了定律形而上学观点的最弱与最强的两端,而休谟式随附可以被看作处于这两端之间。这三者构成的定律形而上学谱系,都首先需要承诺对象及其属性的本体论优先性。可是,这时这一谱系的内部区间划分其实并不清楚。于是,对这三种观点尤其是休谟式随附与普遍必然式定律观的哲学分析就是必要的,并且有可能在结合对实际的科学定律案例的分析后获得一种超出了已有形而上学观念的定律观。     

社会突现论对社会因果的研究

社会突现论是基于系统论与心灵哲学等学科而发展起来的关于社会本质与社会现象解释的方法的一种新型整体主义理论。社会突现论认为,社会一方面由个体聚集突现而成,前者具有后者所不具有的特殊属性;另一方面,社会与个体属于不同的层次,前者不能化归为后者。社会突现论视域中的社会因果研究是以个体主义与整体主义之争为背景,对于社会层次是否具有因果效力的研究。社会突现论所关注的社会因果问题是某个社会事件是否能够作为不以个体意志为转移的因素对另一社会事件或社会中的个体产生影响。社会突现论认为,某个社会事件能够作为一个"独立"的因素影响其他的社会事件或社会中的个体。社会因果既与个体密切相关又不可化归为个体的属性。     

A Theory of Scientific Model Construction: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Conceptual Process of Abstraction and Concretisation</Emphasis>

The process of abstraction and concretisation is a label used for an explicative theory of scientific model-construction. In scientific theorising this process enters at various levels. We could identify two principal levels of abstraction that are useful to our understanding of theory-application. The first level is that of selecting a small number of variables and parameters abstracted from the universe of discourse and used to characterise the general laws of a theory. In classical mechanics, for example, we select position and momentum and establish a relation amongst the two variables, which we call Newton’s 2nd law. The specification of the unspecified elements of scientific laws, e.g. the force function in Newton’s 2nd law, is what would establish the link between the assertions of the theory and physical systems. In order to unravel how and with what conceptual resources scientific models are constructed, how they function and how they relate to theory, we need a view of theory-application that can accommodate our constructions of representation models. For this we need to expand our understanding of the process of abstraction to also explicate the process of specifying force functions etc. This is the second principal level at which abstraction enters in our theorising and in which I focus. In this paper, I attempt to elaborate a general analysis of the process of abstraction and concretisation involved in scientific- model construction, and argue why it provides an explication of the construction of models of the nuclear structure.     

再论司南是磁勺吗?——兼答戴念祖先生

自从1948年王振铎提出古文献中的司南是磁勺后，此观点即被普遍接受。笔者从1956年开始对此提出质疑，1985年又提出司南可能既是北斗又是官职之说。最近戴念祖着重引经据典以证明司南确是磁勺，并批驳北斗说。但是他的分析和对文献的理解存在许多问题。文章以对戴文的答复方式进一步阐明司南为磁勺说的质疑和北斗说的根据。     

Understanding Scientific Inquiries of Galileo’s Formulation for the Law of Free Falling Motion

The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the role of abstraction and idealization in Galileo’s scientific inquiries into the law of free falling motion, and their importance in the history of science. Because there is no consensus on the use of the terms “abstraction” and “idealization” in the literature, it is necessary to distinguish between them at the outset. This paper will argue (1) for the importance of abstraction and idealization in physics and the theories and laws of physics constructed with abduction from observations and (2) that these theoretical laws of physics should be tested with deduction and induction thorough quasi-idealized entities rather than empirical results in the everyday world. Galileo’s work is linked to thought experiments in natural science. Galileo, using thought experiments based on idealization, persuaded others that what had been proven true for a ball on an inclined plane would be equally true for a ball falling through a vacuum.     

试析社会科学中的规律观

本文试图为社会科学中存在规律的可能性作一辩护，通过分析反驳社会科学中存在规律的理由，得出结论：按当代科学哲学的新规律观，社会科学中存在的规律本质上与自然科学规律没有不同，并且与社会科学中的规则无法严格区分，因此我建议将规律与规则看作处在同一连续统中，规则处在规律保护带的边缘，社会科学的目标是逐渐地尽可能地改善和精确化那些不同范围内的规则，使之成为在该范围内更具解释力的规律。     

对"李约瑟难题"质疑的再反思

“李约瑟难题”有其合理性。质疑难题的“无科学说”、“伪问题说”和“有毛病说”涉及到历史观、科学观、科学史观和方法论等深层次的问题，如“无科学说”只承认中国古代有技术而不承认有科学，否认中国古代科学的光辉成就，是科学史上的一种西方中心论；“伪问题说”反对科学的连贯性和普遍性，是一种科学特殊论和唯近现代科学论，带有“辉格”的色彩；“有毛病说”反对假设的和逆史实的编史学，是一种狭隘的历史观，不利于历史学的现代化。以上诸说在方法论上有一个共同点，都陷入了形而上学的误区，反对李约瑟创立的中西科学史研究的比较法。“李约瑟难题”是李约瑟中西科学史研究比较法的杰作，对中西科学发展史作了共时性的横向比较和历时性的纵向比较，从而抓住了其中的主要矛盾，具有高度的辩证性，对于揭示中西科学发展的历史规律是很有益的。因此，应以辩证的观点和方法来研究中西科学发展史和理解“李约瑟难题”。     

文化嵌入与集群发展的共演机制研究

作为影响集群发展的重要"软环境",文化嵌入通过影响集群创新系统的结构和行为进而影响集群的竞争优势。从动态视角看,这些关系之间存在着共演,共演可能出现耦合或锁定两种不同结果,共演耦合一般出现在集群发展初期;而共演锁定则更可能在集群发展的后期出现,即最初导致集群发展的文化因素也往往是集群衰亡的原因。共演锁定表明了文化过度嵌入,从内在根源分析,文化的过度嵌入来自于文化功能和性质形成的路径依赖导致的锁定。因此,为了保持集群长期可持续发展,必须实现文化的适度嵌入。     

覆盖律解释与意向性解释

在社会科学的解释模型中，意向性解释诉诸人的信念、期望等目的性因素；覆盖律解释旨在寻找规律。本文通过辨析这两种不同主张的根源，试图说明意向性解释与覆盖律解释的不同源于对社会科学本质的不同理解，以逻辑经验主义的科学观为平台使得覆盖律解释的努力失败，弥合意向性解释和覆盖律解释的分歧的可能性来自于突破逻辑经验主义的局限，重新看待社会科学的本质。     

数与力:牛顿科学纲领的基本内核探微

牛顿科学劳作背后的形上理念及其方法论架构乃科学史中的元问题之一,也是以往学界乏有论及的盲区。本文注重一种回到事情本身的理路,从牛顿的具体文本出发,撷取出微分定律的工具理性、力之概念的别样意蕴和运动机制的自然本态等三大理论质点,以图彰显牛顿科学纲领的别样意蕴,并澄清以往学界对牛顿的某些误解与误读之处。     

谱录类文献的科学文化意蕴

中国古代谱录类书中,载有极珍贵的科技思想文献。要注重搜集其中设计思想的精华、工艺技巧的精华、制作加工手段的精华;考订是整理工作的重点,可从思想精髓的提取,揭示技术上蕴涵的科学思想,从数据分析中得到规律等诸方面进行研究。当今,要做好几被忽视的谱录工作,应特别注意提取文献中的科技含量和考究文献中的文化品位。     

自然观:生态女性主义与生态马克思主义之比较研究

在自然观上，生态女性主义与生态马克思主义都反对机械论自然观，都主张未来社会人与自然能和谐相处，都超越了一般的环境主义立场。两种自然观的理论基础、理论分析方法不同，其理论贡献以及在实践中所产生的影响也有所差别。     

Points of View: A Conceptual Space Approach

Points of view are a central phenomenon in human cognition. Although the concept of point of view is ambiguous, there exist common elements in different notions. A point of view is a certain way to look at things around us. In conceptual points of view, things are looked at or interpreted through conceptual lenses. Conceptual points of view are important for epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. In this article, a new method to formalize conceptual points of view is introduced. It is based on the conceptual space approach, where concepts are regions of multi-dimensional quality spaces. Points of view, as defined in this article, consist of a selection of relevant dimensions, referred to here as determinables, and of a certain supposition, referred to here as a theory, about the subject content. After considering some early efforts to formalize points of view, the notion of conceptual space is defined and explored. One concept of point of view is defined and developed in the framework of conceptual space, and a new logic for points of view is also outlined. The problem of mind–body correlation is discussed as an example of the application of the notion of points of view. To conclude, the meaning and applications of the new concepts and tools developed in the article are discussed.