What is a Definition?

According to the standard view of definition, all defined terms are mere stipulations, based on a small set of primitive terms. After a brief review of the Hilbert-Frege debate, this paper goes on to challenge the standard view in a number of ways. Examples from graph theory, for example, suggest that some key definitions stem from the way graphs are presented diagramatically and do not fit the standard view. Lakatos's account is also discussed, since he provides further examples that suggest many definitions are much more than mere convenient abbreviations. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

What is a Cognitive Process?

In this commentary to Serrano et al. (2013), I applaud this foundation article for being a breath of fresh air because it addresses the question “What is cognition?” Too often in the cognitive sciences, we leave that question unanswered or worse, unasked. I come not to criticize but to offer a helpful suggestion aimed a pulling together some of the separate strands weaved throughout this article.     

What if Haecceity is not a Property?

In some sense, both ontological and epistemological problems related to individuation have been the focal issues in the philosophy of mathematics ever since Frege. However, such an interest becomes manifest in the rise of structuralism as one of the most promising positions in recent philosophy of mathematics. The most recent controversy between Keränen and Shapiro seems to be the culmination of this phenomenon. Rather than taking sides, in this paper, I propose to critically examine some common assumptions shared by both parties. In particular, I shall focus on their assumptions on (1) haecceity as an individual essence, (2) haecceity as a property, (3) the classification of properties, and thereby (4) the search for the principle of individuation in terms of properties. I shall argue that all these assumptions are mistaken and ungrounded from Scotus’ point of view. Further, I will fathom what consequences would follow, if we reject each of these assumptions.     

What is Sustainable Theory? A Luhmannian Perspective on the Science of Conceptual Systems

Sustainability is an important topic for understanding and developing our society (including business, government, and NGOs). For scholars who want their academic contributions to have an impact, sustainability is important for our conceptual systems (including theories, models, and policies). Because our conceptual systems share similarities with our social systems, we may investigate their characteristics to gain insight into how both may be achieved or at least understood. Theories of the humanities as well as the social/behavioral sciences are changing very rapidly. They are fragile and few seem to have any longevity. At the same time, the theoretical base does not seem to be “advancing.” They are not supporting highly effective results in the real world, so we continue to have seemingly insolvable problems such as crime, war, and poverty. This may be because academia has become inward-focused or, in Luhmann’s terminology, autonomous from the outside world. In seeking to understand how to develop more sustainable theories we found that the concept of sustainability is contested. And, in the process of comparing the sustainability of social systems to the sustainability of theories, we came to realize that neither perspective is viable. Drawing on Luhmann’s insights on the interdependence of theories and society, we came to realize that the two exist in a coevolutionary relationship. Importantly, we present an approach for measuring that evolution and suggest directions for accelerating the coevolutionary advance of society and science.     

Identifying Difference,Engaging Dissent: What is at Stake in Democratizing Knowledge?

Several prominent voices have called for a democratization of science through deliberative processes that include a diverse range of perspectives and values. We bring these scholars into conversation with extant research on democratic deliberation in political theory and the social sciences. In doing so, we identify systematic barriers to the effectiveness of inclusive deliberation in both scientific and political settings. We are particularly interested in what we call misidentified dissent, where deliberations are starkly framed at the outset in terms of dissenting positions without properly distinguishing the kinds of difference and disagreement motivating dissent.     

What has Philosophy to Offer to Chemistry?

The paper asks about the reasons for the neglect of chemistry in modern philosophy of science and investigates in how far this science can be the object of an autonomous philosophical reflection. It is argued that from a culturalistic point of view chemistry indeed offers a field of interesting questions ranging from the reconstruction of its epistemological objects to the elucidation of the semantic functions of terms like "atom" or "molecule". It is further argued that the philosophical reflection upon chemistry has important consequences for the didactic, the history and even the ethics of this science, making thus philosophy to a partner of chemistry in fulfilling its purposes in human society. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Does an Old Art Suffice for New Problems?

In this review I argue that Puech draws on two important currents in modern thought: the criticism of the ontological and social priority of conflict, and the rehabilitation of praxis vis-à-vis theoria. Still, his plea for a non-confrontational art of living leaves important questions unanswered. What is the problem exactly? What does exactly count as (non)confrontational? What is non-confrontation exactly meant to solve? What is the antiposition here? And: how does this new (or rather: old) art of living relate to the political and ethical varieties of Technology Assessment?     

To Explain or to Predict: Which One is Mandatory?

Recently, Luk mentioned that scientific knowledge both explains and predicts. Do these two functions of scientific knowledge have equal significance, or is one of the two functions more important than the other? This commentary explains why prediction may be mandatory but explanation (based intuitively on our everyday experience) may be only desirable and optional.     

Who is Afraid of the Political? A Response to Robert Scharff and Michel Puech

In their respective commentaries to my article “Postphenomenology and the Politics of Sustainable Technology” both Robert Scharff and Michel Puech take issue with my postphenomenological inroad into the politics of technology. In a first step I try to accommodate the suggestions and objections raised by Scharff by making my account of the political more explicit. Consequently, I argue how an antagonistic relational conceptualisation of the political allows me to address head on Puech’s plea to leave politics behind and move towards an ethically informed, post-political approach to sustainability. “But perhaps the question philosophy is confronted with—through the question of the political—might be whether not all reasoning, including a purely theoretical reasoning, can truly only be a political reasoning, resulting in an inevitable, indeed necessary circular structure” (Boehm 2002; author’s translation). In a footnote to my original article ‘Postphenomenology and the Politics of Sustainable Technology’, I wrote that “for the purpose of this paper, it suffices to say that I use the adjective ‘political’ to indicate all aspects of human and non-human agency that are related to ‘shaping the good life’ (Goeminne 2011a).” With hindsight, brought about by the commentaries of Scharff (2011) and Puech (2011), I now see that I could not have been more optimistic. Or should I say naïve? Indeed, although coming from different angles and resulting in very different suggestions, both commentaries precisely target my postphenomenological inroad into the ‘politics’ of technology. In challenging my grounding of the politics of technology in a postphenomenological perspective, Scharff in particular invites me to make my notion of the political more explicit. In what follows, I will therefore first elaborate my take on the political dimension of technology in dialogue with Scharff’s comments and suggestions. Armed with this deepened concept of the political, I will then address Puech’s plea to leave politics behind and move towards an ethically informed, post-political approach to sustainability. Evidently, within the limits of this piece, I can only indicate the broader direction my conceptualisation of the political takes. It suffices perhaps to say that, partly induced by the commentaries of Scharff and Puech, the question of the political has meanwhile taken a much more prominent place in my research as can be seen from a few recent publications [e.g. Goeminne (2012) and Goeminne (forthcoming)]. In saying this, I am also expressing my indebtedness to the commentators for nudging me in this political direction.     

What if We were Already in the In-Between? Further Ventures into the Ontologies of Science and Politics

What follows from the suggestion to pay attention to what is in-between science and politics? Karen François’s paper “In-between science and politics” follows Latour in arguing for the need for political theory to get out of the Platonic cave that it still inhabits. Political theory needs to be brought into the wild through empirical studies of how science and politics in fact intermix. And the Latourian proposition needs to be strengthened by focusing on the embodied knowledges that enable situated objectivities to emerge. Though worthwhile, these arguments are weakened by a superficial treatment of political theory and by a lack of attention to the difficulties involved in combining Latourian actor-network theory with the “strong objectivity” of standpoint theory. Most problematically the paper purports to define as an agenda (exploring the in-between of science and politics) what whole fields of inquiry have already been in full swing exploring for quite a while. The ‘turn to ontology’ in STS and social anthropology and the development of ‘empirical philosophy’ suggests what might be at stake in such explorations.     

“Who” is a “Topical Measuring” Postphenomenologist and How Does One Get That Way?

Gert Goeminne’s paper is primarily concerned with “the politics of sustainable technology,” but for good reasons he does not start with this topic. He knows that technology studies as he conceives it must clear a space for itself in a philosophical atmosphere that discourages its pursuit. He therefore begins with a critique of this objectivistic and technocratically defined atmosphere, before moving on to embrace a postphenomenology of technological multistabilities, and then further to introduce what he calls (in an adaptation of Rudolf Boehm) the “topical measure” of technoscientific life. The problem I raise is not about Goeminne’s aims, with which I mostly agree, but with his presentation of how to achieve them. I argue that if one were actually to follow his advice—that is, start with critique, move on to postphenomenology, and end with “political” evaluation of technoscientific life, the project would be doomed to failure. For in our world, no one Understands this pluralizing vision. According to the understanding we actually live through and speak from, some of postphenomenology’s multiple disclosures already arrive in our experience with significantly greater ontological power than others, and sincerity about topical measure notwithstanding, the very identification of something as an interest or “value,” especially if it allegedly comes from a “layperson,” already condemns it to secondary status.     

The Problem about the English Translation of“优生优育”(youshengyouyu)

蔡敬先生就<科技术语研究>2000年第2期上我写的<关于优生优育英译名的问题>一文提出了名词审定要注意历史和现有工具书的问题,我很同意这个观点.     

死亡?脑死亡?临床死亡?

今年２月４日，约旦国王侯赛因在美国病危回国。次日约旦政府宣布他已处于“脑死亡”（ｂｒａｉｎｄｅａｔｈ）状态，依靠医疗器械维持生命；国外有传媒称他已“临床死亡”（ｃｌｉｎｉｃａｌｄｅａｔｈ）。两天后，约旦政府正式宣布侯赛因于当天上午逝世。读了这些报道，...     

Translationese：翻译体?翻译症?翻译腔?

针对译名混乱一直是学术界普遍关注和长期争论的问题，回顾了西方和国内学者对translationese的研究状况，通过概念对比的方式对translationese的三个通用汉语译名进行了综合分析，并在此基础上就规范translationese的汉语译名提出了看法。     

读心术?

职场是人的江湖,有多少精明能干的高手没有输在刺刀见红的沙场,而是输在了暗流汹涌的内部关系上。我们每个职场人都需要了解心理学规律,掌握职场读心术,知己知彼才能百战百胜。写给所有潜伏在职场的人们为什么脾气越来越焦躁,有时候无故发火;