Cosmological realism

I discuss the relevance of the current predicament in cosmology to the debate over scientific realism. I argue that the existence of two, empirically successful but ontologically inconsistent cosmological theories presents difficulties for the realist position.     

Can the constructive empiricist be a nominalist? Quasi-truth, commitment and consistency

In this paper, I explore Rosen’s (1994) ‘transcendental’ objection to constructive empiricism—the argument that in order to be a constructive empiricist, one must be ontologically committed to just the sort of abstract, mathematical objects constructive empiricism seems committed to denying. In particular, I assess Bueno’s (1999) ‘partial structures’ response to Rosen, and argue that such a strategy cannot succeed, on the grounds that it cannot provide an adequate metalogic for our scientific discourse. I conclude by arguing that this result provides some interesting consequences in general for anti-realist programmes in the philosophy of science.     

Relativities of fundamentality

S-dualities have been held to have radical implications for our metaphysics of fundamentality. In particular, it has been claimed that they make the fundamentality status of a physical object theory-relative in an important new way. But what physicists have had to say on the issue has not been clear or consistent, and in particular seems to be ambiguous between whether S-dualities demand an anti-realist interpretation of fundamentality talk or merely a revised realism. This paper is an attempt to bring some clarity to the matter. After showing that even antecedently familiar fundamentality claims are true only relative to a raft of metaphysical, physical, and mathematical assumptions, I argue that the relativity of fundamentality inherent in S-duality nevertheless represents something new, and that part of the reason for this is that it has both realist and anti-realist implications for fundamentality talk. I close by discussing the broader significance that S-dualities have for structuralist metaphysics and for fundamentality metaphysics more generally.     

Overlapping ontologies and Indigenous knowledge. From integration to ontological self-determination

Current controversies about knowledge integration reflect conflicting ideas of what it means to “take Indigenous knowledge seriously”. While there is increased interest in integrating Indigenous and Western scientific knowledge in various disciplines such as anthropology and ethnobiology, integration projects are often accused of recognizing Indigenous knowledge only insofar as it is useful for Western scientists. The aim of this article is to use tools from philosophy of science to develop a model of both successful integration and integration failures. On the one hand, I argue that cross-cultural recognition of property clusters leads to an ontological overlap that makes knowledge integration often epistemically productive and socially useful. On the other hand, I argue that knowledge integration is limited by ontological divergence. Adequate models of Indigenous knowledge will therefore have to take integration failures seriously and I argue that integration efforts need to be complemented by a political notion of ontological self-determination.     

Circularity,indispensability, and mathematical explanation in science

In this paper I consider the objection that the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) is circular and hence fails to support mathematical platonism. The objection is that the explanandum in any mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon is itself identified using mathematical concepts. Hence the explanandum is only genuine if the truth of some mathematical theory is already presupposed. I argue that this objection deserves to be taken seriously, that it does sometimes undermine support for EIA, but that there is no reason to think that circularity is an unavoidable feature of mathematical explanation in science.     

Emergence and topological order in classical and quantum systems

There has been growing interest in systems in condensed matter physics as a potential source of examples of both epistemic and ontological emergence. One of these case studies is the fractional quantum Hall state (FQHS). In the FQHS a system of electrons displays a type of holism due to a pattern of long-range quantum entanglement that some argue is emergent. Indeed, in general, quantum entanglement is sometimes cited as the best candidate for one form of ontological emergence. In this paper we argue that there are significant formal and physical parallels between the quantum FQHS and classical polymer systems. Both types of system cannot be explained simply by considering an aggregation of local microphysical properties alone, since important features of each are globally determined by topological features. As such, we argue that if the FQHS is a case of ontological emergence then it is not due to the quantum nature of the system and classical polymer systems are ontologically emergent as well.     

The functional bias of the dual nature of technical artefacts program

In 2006, in a special issue of this journal, several authors explored what they called the dual nature of artefacts. The core idea is simple, but attractive: to make sense of an artefact, one needs to consider both its physical nature—its being a material object—and its intentional nature—its being an entity designed to further human ends and needs. The authors construe the intentional component quite narrowly, though: it just refers to the artefact’s function, its being a means to realize a certain practical end. Although such strong focus on functions is quite natural (and quite common in the analytic literature on artefacts), I argue in this paper that an artefact’s intentional nature is not exhausted by functional considerations. Many non-functional properties of artefacts—such as their marketability and ease of manufacture—testify to the intentions of their users/designers; and I show that if these sorts of considerations are included, one gets much more satisfactory explanations of artefacts, their design, and normativity.     

Eliminative abduction: examples from medicine

Peter Lipton argues that inference to the best explanation (IBE) involves the selection of a hypothesis on the basis of its loveliness. I argue that in optimal cases of IBE we may be able to eliminate all but one of the hypotheses. In such cases we have a form of eliminative induction takes place, which I call ‘Holmesian inference’. I argue that Lipton’s example in which Ignaz Semmelweis identified a cause of puerperal fever better illustrates Holmesian inference than Liptonian IBE. I consider in detail the conditions under which Holmesian inference is possible and conclude by considering the epistemological relations between Holmesian inference and Liptonian IBE.     

The priority of internal symmetries in particle physics

In this paper, I try to decipher the role of internal symmetries in the ontological maze of particle physics. The relationship between internal symmetries and laws of nature is discussed within the framework of “Platonic realism.” The notion of physical “structure” is introduced as representing a deeper ontological layer behind the observable world. I argue that an internal symmetry is a structure encompassing laws of nature. The application of internal symmetry groups to particle physics came about in two revolutionary steps. The first was the introduction of the internal symmetries of hadrons in the early 1960s. These global and approximate symmetries served as means of bypassing the dynamics. I argue that the realist could interpret these symmetries as ontologically prior to the hadrons. The second step was the gauge revolution in the 1970s, where symmetries became local and exact and were integrated with the dynamics. I argue that the symmetries of the second generation are fundamental in the following two respects: (1) According to the so-called “gauge argument,” gauge symmetry dictates the existence of gauge bosons, which determine the nature of the forces. This view, which has been recently criticized by some philosophers, is widely accepted in particle physics at least as a heuristic principle. (2) In view of grand unified theories, the new symmetries can be interpreted as ontologically prior to baryon matter.     

Is biotechnology the new alchemy?

In this article I examine similarities between the science and ethics of biotechnology on the one hand, and those of alchemy on the other, and show that the understanding of nature and naturalness upon which many contemporary ethical responses to biotechnology are predicated is, in fact, significantly similar to the understanding of nature that was the foundation of the practice of alchemy. In doing so I demonstrate that the ethical issues and social responses that are currently arising from advances in the field of biotechnology are interestingly similar to those that arose in reaction to the practice and prevalence of alchemy from its inception in Europe in the mid-twelfth century until at least the early modern period. I argue that a proper conception of the ethical issues and a sensible interpretation of the power and the promise of the science of biotechnology are most likely if we understand such attitudes to nature, and to the ethical issues surrounding technological and scientific developments, in terms of an historical and cultural continuum. That is, we should regard biotechnology as merely the latest in a string of technological and scientific developments rather than, as is often alleged, as something entirely new, requiring its own special ethical response. Finally, I suggest that examining the parallels between the ethical issues generated by alchemy and by biotechnology show us that such issues are best situated and discussed within a framework of virtue ethics, as it allows us to think seriously about the relationship between art and nature and the proper role of humans in relation to their technology.     

From successful measurement to the birth of a law: Disentangling coordination in Ohm's scientific practice

In this paper, I argue for a distinction between two scales of coordination in scientific inquiry, through which I reassess Georg Simon Ohm's work on conductivity and resistance. Firstly, I propose to distinguish between measurement coordination, which refers to the specific problem of how to justify the attribution of values to a quantity by using a certain measurement procedure, and general coordination, which refers to the broader issue of justifying the representation of an empirical regularity by means of abstract mathematical tools. Secondly, I argue that the development of Ohm's measurement practice between the first and the second experimental phase of his work involved the change of the measurement coordination on which he relied to express his empirical results. By showing how Ohm relied on different calibration assumptions and practices across the two phases, I demonstrate that the concurrent change of both Ohm's experimental apparatus and the variable that Ohm measured should be viewed based on the different form of measurement coordination. Finally, I argue that Ohm's assumption that tension is equally distributed in the circuit is best understood as part of the general coordination between Ohm's law and the empirical regularity that it expresses, rather than measurement coordination.     

Against defaultism and towards localism in the contingency/inevitability conversation: Or,why we should shut up about putting-up

Philosophers and historians of science have for some time now debated whether the results of current science are ‘contingent’ or ‘inevitable’. Scholars have noted that inevitabilism often enjoys the status of a presumptive default position. Consequently, contingentists are, from the outset, lumbered with the burden of proof. This is evident in the case of the inevitabilist demand that the contingentist “put up or shut up” (PUSU). This paper adds to the existing case which says that inevitabilism's default-status is unjustified. However, whilst some have suggested that contingentism should replace inevitabilism as the default position, I argue that the contingency/inevitability (C/I) conversation should proceed sans default. This move is motivated largely by my claim that the C/I issue is best conceived as a ‘local’, rather than a global or universal one. The main problem with taking inevitabilism or contingentism as the default is the globalist nature of such a tack. Whilst localism is arguably an emergent reality of the growing C/I literature, its implications have not been fully realised. I suggest that fully and explicitly embracing localism, including the closely related move of doing away with defaults, represents the most promising way forward for the C/I conversation. In addition, I will show how these moves entail that we stop worrying about the inevitabilist PUSU demand, or more bluntly, that we shut up about putting-up.     

Quantum mechanics,time and ontology

Against what is commonly accepted in many contexts, it has been recently suggested that both deterministic and indeterministic quantum theories are not time-reversal invariant, and thus time is handed in a quantum world. In this paper, I analyze these arguments and evaluate possible reactions to them. In the context of deterministic theories, first I show that this conclusion depends on the controversial assumption that the wave-function is a physically real scalar field in configuration space. Then I argue that answers which restore invariance by assuming the wave-function is a ray in Hilbert space fall short. Instead, I propose that one should deny that the wave-function represents physical systems, along the lines proposed by the so-called primitive ontology approach. Moreover, in the context of indeterministic theories, I argue that time-reversal invariance can be restored suitably redefining its meaning.     

On the alleged non-existence of orbitals

I argue that the claim made by Scerri that in many-electron atoms, orbitals do not exist according to quantum mechanics, is incorrect, for it relies on the view that orbitals are entities. Orbitals are states, not entities, and their use in describing many-electron atoms should be seen as an approximation. The writings by Scerri and others on the issue of realism that are based on the claim therefore lead astray. I furthermore disentangle two issues that Scerri discusses in arguing for his claim: that of electron correlation and that of the Pauli principle. Finally, I point out that more generally there is a misconception in chemistry of what quantum states are.     

Diagrams and alien ways of thinking

The recent wave of data on exoplanets lends support to METI ventures (Messaging to Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence), insofar as the more exoplanets we find, the more likely it is that “exominds” await our messages. Yet, despite these astronomical advances, there are presently no well-confirmed tests against which to check the design of interstellar messages. In the meantime, the best we can do is distance ourselves from terracentric assumptions. There is no reason, for example, to assume that all inferential abilities are language-like. With that in mind, I argue that logical reasoning does not have to be couched in symbolic notation. In diagrammatic reasoning, inferences are underwritten, not by rules, but by transformations of self-same qualitative signs. I use the Existential Graphs of C. S. Peirce to show this. Since diagrams are less dependent on convention and might even be generalized to cover non-visual senses, I argue that METI researchers should add some form of diagrammatic representations to their repertoire. Doing so can shed light, not just on alien minds, but on the deepest structures of reasoning itself.     

What is ontic structural realism?

In recent years a doctrine known as ontic structural realism (OSR) has achieved a degree of notoriety, but many people remain confused as to what exactly the doctrine amounts. In this paper three main variants of OSR are defined and discussed: (i) OSR1, which is the view that relations are ontologically primitive but objects and properties are not; (ii) OSR2, which is the view that objects and relations are ontologically primitive but properties are not; (iii) OSR3, which is the view that properties and relations are ontologically primitive but objects are not. Proponents of OSR claim that it is a “naturalistic” metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical views that take objects and/or properties as ontologically primitive are undermined by contemporary physics. In this paper it is argued that OSR1 and OSR2 are themselves undermined by contemporary physics. On the other hand, it is also argued that considerations about the objects of quantum mechanics and general relativity do seem to suggest that we should abandon some of our “common-sense” metaphysical intuitions, and that OSR3 is one of the metaphysical views that is compatible with what these theories seem to tell us about fundamental ontology.     

Function,persistence, and selection: Generalizing the selected-effect account of function adequately

The selected effect account is regarded by many as one of the most attractive accounts of function. This account assumes that the function of a trait is what it has been selected for. Recently, it has been generalized by Justin Garson to include cases in which selection is understood as a simple sorting process, i.e., a selection process between entities that do not reproduce. However, once extended, this generalized selected effect account seems to ascribe functions to entities for which it looks unintuitive to do so. For instance, the hardness of rocks on a beach being differentially eroded by waves would be ascribed the function of resisting erosion. Garson provides one central argument why, despite appearance, one should not ascribe functions in cases of such sorting processes. In this paper, I start by presenting his argument, which hinges on whether a collection of entities form a population. I find it wanting. I argue instead that some selection processes are evolutionarily more or less interesting and that when a selection process is regarded as evolutionarily uninteresting, it will yield an uninteresting form of function rather than a reason for withholding the concept of function altogether.     

Are field quanta real objects? Some remarks on the ontology of quantum field theory

One of the key philosophical questions regarding quantum field theory is whether it should be given a particle or field interpretation. The particle interpretation of QFT is commonly viewed as being undermined by the well-known no-go results, such as the Malament, Reeh-Schlieder and Hegerfeldt theorems. These theorems all focus on the localizability problem within the relativistic framework. In this paper I would like to go back to the basics and ask the simple-minded question of how the notion of quanta appears in the standard procedure of field quantization, starting with the elementary case of the finite numbers of harmonic oscillators, and proceeding to the more realistic scenario of continuous fields with infinitely many degrees of freedom. I will try to argue that the way the standard formalism introduces the talk of field quanta does not justify treating them as particle-like objects with well-defined properties.     

Physically locating the present: A case of reading physics as a contribution to philosophy

By means of an example, special relativity and presentism, I argue for the importance of reading history of physics as a contribution to philosophy, and for the fruitfulness of this approach to doing integrated history and philosophy of science. Within philosophy of physics, presentism is widely regarded as untenable in the light of special relativity. I argue that reading Newton's Principia as a contribution to philosophy reveals a law-constitutive approach to the unity of what there is, from which an alternative approach to presentism within physics emerges. This view respects the methodological and epistemological commitments of philosophy of physics in “taking special relativity seriously”, but proposes an alternative approach to the status of spacetime (as epistemic) and to the ground of what is real (law-constitution). While this approach to presentism does not preserve all of the contemporary presentist desiderata, it offers the possibility that the spatiotemporal extent of an existing thing is less than its entire history as represented in the block universe. I argue that the approach warrants further philosophical investigation.     

Symmetries and the explanation of conservation laws in the light of the inverse problem in Lagrangian mechanics

Many have thought that symmetries of a Lagrangian explain the standard laws of energy, momentum, and angular momentum conservation in a rather straightforward way. In this paper, I argue that the explanation of conservation laws via symmetries of Lagrangians involves complications that have not been adequately noted in the philosophical literature and some of the physics literature on the subject. In fact, such complications show that the principles that are commonly appealed to to drive explanations of conservation laws are not generally correct without caveats. I hope here to give a clearer picture of the relationship between symmetries and conservation laws in Lagrangian mechanics via an examination of the bearing that results in the inverse problem in the calculus of variations have on this topic.