首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 781 毫秒
1.
In recent years a doctrine known as ontic structural realism (OSR) has achieved a degree of notoriety, but many people remain confused as to what exactly the doctrine amounts. In this paper three main variants of OSR are defined and discussed: (i) OSR1, which is the view that relations are ontologically primitive but objects and properties are not; (ii) OSR2, which is the view that objects and relations are ontologically primitive but properties are not; (iii) OSR3, which is the view that properties and relations are ontologically primitive but objects are not. Proponents of OSR claim that it is a “naturalistic” metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical views that take objects and/or properties as ontologically primitive are undermined by contemporary physics. In this paper it is argued that OSR1 and OSR2 are themselves undermined by contemporary physics. On the other hand, it is also argued that considerations about the objects of quantum mechanics and general relativity do seem to suggest that we should abandon some of our “common-sense” metaphysical intuitions, and that OSR3 is one of the metaphysical views that is compatible with what these theories seem to tell us about fundamental ontology.  相似文献   

2.
In this paper I investigate whether the phenomenon of quantum decoherence, the vanishing of interference and detectable entanglement on quantum systems in virtue of interactions with the environment, can be understood as the manifestation of a disposition. I will highlight the advantages of this approach as a realist interpretation of the quantum formalism, and demonstrate how such an approach can benefit from advances in the metaphysics of dispositions. I will also confront some commonalities with and differences to the many worlds interpretation, and address the difficulties induced by quantum non-locality. I conclude that there are ways to deal with these issues and that the proposal hence is an avenue worth pursuing.  相似文献   

3.
The view that the fundamental kind properties are intrinsic properties enjoys reflexive endorsement by most metaphysicians of science. But ontic structural realists deny that there are any fundamental intrinsic properties at all. Given that structuralists distrust intuition as a guide to truth, and given that we currently lack a fundamental physical theory that we could consult instead to order settle the issue, it might seem as if there is simply nowhere for this debate to go at present. However, I will argue that there exists an as-yet untapped resource for arguing for ontic structuralism – namely, the way that fundamentality is conceptualized in our most fundamental physical frameworks. By arguing that physical objects must be subject to the ‘Goldilock's principle’ if they are to count as fundamental at all, I argue that we can no longer view the majority of properties defining them as intrinsic. As such, ontic structural realism can be regarded as the most promising metaphysics for fundamental physics, and that this is so even though we do not yet claim to know precisely what that fundamental physics is.  相似文献   

4.
A recent debate in the metaphysics of physics focuses on the invariance and intrinsicality of four-dimensional shapes in the Special Theory of Relativity. Davidson (2014) argues that four-dimensional shapes cannot be intrinsic properties of persisting objects because they have to be relativized to reference frames. Balashov (2014a) criticizes such an argument in that it mistakes four-dimensional shapes with their three-dimensional projections on the axes of those frames. This paper adds to that debate. Rather than criticizing an argument against the relativistic invariance of four-dimensional shapes, as Balashov did, it offers a direct argument in favor of such an invariance.  相似文献   

5.
Intrinsic topologically ordered (ITO) condensed matter systems are claimed to exhibit two types of non-locality. The first is associated with topological properties and the second is associated with a particular type of quantum entanglement. These characteristics are supposed to allow ITO systems to encode information in the form of quantum entangled states in a topologically non-local way that protects it against local errors. This essay first clarifies the sense in which these two notions of non-locality are distinct, and then considers the extent to which they are exhibited by ITO systems. I will argue that while the claim that ITO systems exhibit topological non-locality is unproblematic, the claim that they also exhibit quantum entanglement non-locality is less clear, and this is due in part to ambiguities associated with the notion of quantum entanglement. Moreover, any argument that claims some form of "long-range" entanglement is necessary to explain topological properties is incomplete if it fails to provide a convincing reason why mechanistic explanations should be favored over structural explanations of topological phenomena.  相似文献   

6.
There has been growing interest in systems in condensed matter physics as a potential source of examples of both epistemic and ontological emergence. One of these case studies is the fractional quantum Hall state (FQHS). In the FQHS a system of electrons displays a type of holism due to a pattern of long-range quantum entanglement that some argue is emergent. Indeed, in general, quantum entanglement is sometimes cited as the best candidate for one form of ontological emergence. In this paper we argue that there are significant formal and physical parallels between the quantum FQHS and classical polymer systems. Both types of system cannot be explained simply by considering an aggregation of local microphysical properties alone, since important features of each are globally determined by topological features. As such, we argue that if the FQHS is a case of ontological emergence then it is not due to the quantum nature of the system and classical polymer systems are ontologically emergent as well.  相似文献   

7.
8.
This paper relates both to the metaphysics of probability and to the physics of time asymmetry. Using the formalism of decoherent histories, it investigates whether intuitions about intrinsic time directedness that are often associated with probability can be justified in the context of no-collapse approaches to quantum mechanics. The standard (two-vector) approach to time symmetry in the decoherent histories literature is criticised, and an alternative approach is proposed, based on two decoherence conditions (‘forwards’ and ‘backwards’) within the one-vector formalism. In turn, considerations of forwards and backwards decoherence and of decoherence and recoherence suggest that a time-directed interpretation of probabilities, if adopted, should be both contingent and perspectival.  相似文献   

9.
S-dualities have been held to have radical implications for our metaphysics of fundamentality. In particular, it has been claimed that they make the fundamentality status of a physical object theory-relative in an important new way. But what physicists have had to say on the issue has not been clear or consistent, and in particular seems to be ambiguous between whether S-dualities demand an anti-realist interpretation of fundamentality talk or merely a revised realism. This paper is an attempt to bring some clarity to the matter. After showing that even antecedently familiar fundamentality claims are true only relative to a raft of metaphysical, physical, and mathematical assumptions, I argue that the relativity of fundamentality inherent in S-duality nevertheless represents something new, and that part of the reason for this is that it has both realist and anti-realist implications for fundamentality talk. I close by discussing the broader significance that S-dualities have for structuralist metaphysics and for fundamentality metaphysics more generally.  相似文献   

10.
Scientific realism is fundamentally a view about unobservable things, events, processes, and so on, but things can be unobservable either because they are tiny or because they are past. The familiar abductive arguments for scientific realism lend more justification to scientific realism about the tiny than to realism about the past. This paper examines both the “basic” abductive arguments for realism advanced by philosophers such as Ian Hacking and Michael Devitt, as well as Richard Boyd’s version of the inference to the best explanation of the success of science, and shows that these arguments provide less support to historical than to experimental realism. This is because unobservably tiny things can function both as unifiers of the phenomena and as tools for the production of new phenomena, whereas things in the past can only serve as unifiers of the phenomena. The upshot is that realists must not suppose that by presenting arguments for experimental realism they have thereby defended realism in general.  相似文献   

11.
This paper criticizes the traditional philosophical account of the quantization of gauge theories and offers an alternative. On the received view, gauge theories resist quantization because they feature distinct mathematical representatives of the same physical state of affairs. This resistance is overcome by a sequence of ad hoc modifications, justified in part by reference to semiclassical electrodynamics. Among other things, these modifications introduce ”ghosts”: particles with unphysical properties which do not appear in asymptotic states and which are said to be purely a notational convenience. I argue that this sequence of modifications is unjustified and inadequate, making it a poor basis for the interpretation of ghosts. I then argue that gauge theories can be quantized by the same method as any other theory. On this account, ghosts are not purely notation: they are coordinates on the classical configuration space of the theory—specifically, on its gauge structure. This interpretation does not fall prey to the standard philosophical arguments against the significance of ghosts, due to Weingard. Weingard’s argumentative strategy, properly applied, in fact tells in favor of ghosts’ physical significance.  相似文献   

12.
The aim of this paper is to discuss Maimon's criticism of Kant's doctrine of mathematical cognition. In particular, we will focus on the consequences of this criticism for the problem of the possibility of metaphysics as a science. Maimon criticizes Kant's explanation of the synthetic a priori character of mathematics and develops a philosophical interpretation of differential calculus according to which mathematics and metaphysics become deeply interwoven. Maimon establishes a parallelism between two relationships: on the one hand, the mathematical relationship between the integral and the differential and on the other, the metaphysical relationship between the sensible and the supersensible. Such a parallelism will be the clue to the Maimonian solution to the Kantian problem of the possibility of metaphysics as a science.  相似文献   

13.
This paper aims to illuminate Christian Wolff’s view of mathematical reasoning, and its use in metaphysics, by comparing his and Leibniz’s responses to Newton’s work. Both Wolff and Leibniz object that Newton’s metaphysics is based on ideas of sense and imagination that are suitable only for mathematics. Yet Wolff expresses more regard (than Leibniz) for Newton’s scientific achievement. Wolff’s approval of the use of imaginative ideas in Newtonian mathematical science seems to commit him to an inconsistent triad. For he rejects their use in metaphysics, and also holds that every scientific discipline must follow mathematics’ method. A facile resolution would be to suppose Wolff identifies the method of mathematics with the order in which propositions are deduced, or with “analysis” that reveals the structure of concepts. This would be to assimilate Wolff’s view to Leibniz’s (on which all mathematical propositions are ultimately derived from definitions, and definitions are justified by conceptual analysis). On this construal, mathematical reasoning involves only the understanding. But Wolff conceives mathematics’ method more broadly, to include processes of concept-formation which involve perception and imagination. Thus my way of resolving the tension is to find roles for perception and imagination in the formation of metaphysical concepts.  相似文献   

14.
I argue for an interpretation of the connection between Descartes’ early mathematics and metaphysics that centers on the standard of geometrical intelligibility that characterizes Descartes’ mathematical work during the period 1619 to 1637. This approach remains sensitive to the innovations of Descartes’ system of geometry and, I claim, sheds important light on the relationship between his landmark Geometry (1637) and his first metaphysics of nature, which is presented in Le monde (1633). In particular, I argue that the same standard of clear and distinct motions for construction that allows Descartes to distinguish ‘geometric’ from ‘imaginary’ curves in the domain of mathematics is adopted in Le monde as Descartes details God’s construction of nature. I also show how, on this interpretation, the metaphysics of Le monde can fruitfully be brought to bear on Descartes’ attempted solution to the Pappus problem, which he presents in Book I of the Geometry. My general goal is to show that attention to the standard of intelligibility Descartes invokes in these different areas of inquiry grants us a richer view of the connection between his early mathematics and philosophy than an approach that assumes a common method is what binds his work in these domains together.  相似文献   

15.
In this paper we describe some first steps for bringing the framework of branching space-times (BST) to bear on quantum information theory. Our main application is quantum error correction. It is shown that BST offers a new perspective on quantum error correction: as a supplement to the orthodox slogan, “fight entanglement with entanglement”, we offer the new slogan, “fight indeterminism with indeterminism”.  相似文献   

16.
Recent philosophy has paid increasing attention to the nature of the relationship between the philosophy of science and metaphysics. In The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Steven French offers many insights into this relationship (primarily) in the context of fundamental physics, and claims that a specific, structuralist conception of the ontology of the world exemplifies an optimal understanding of it. In this paper I contend that his messages regarding how best to think about the relationship are mixed, and in tension with one another. The tension is resolvable but at a cost: a weakening of the argument for French's structuralist ontology. I elaborate this claim in a specific case: his assertion of the superiority of a structuralist account of de re modality in terms of realism about laws and symmetries (conceived ontologically) over an account in terms of realism about dispositional properties. I suggest that these two accounts stem from different stances regarding how to theorize about scientific ontology, each of which is motivated by important aspects of physics.  相似文献   

17.
Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by `holism'. For this purpose I propose an epistemological criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if it is impossible in principle to infer the global properties, as assigned in the theory, by local resources available to an agent. I propose that these resources include at least all local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well-known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. The criterion for holism proposed here involves a shift in emphasis from ontology to epistemology. I apply this epistemological criterion to classical physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a phase and configuration space respectively, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.  相似文献   

18.
This paper reviews the relations between the methods of seasonal adjustment used by official statistical agencies and the ‘model-based’ methods that postulate explicit stochastic models for the unobserved components of a time series and apply optimal signal extraction theory to obtain a seasonally adjusted series. The Kalman filter implementation of the model-based methods is described and some recent results on its properties are reviewed. The model-based methods employ homogeneous or time-invariant models that assume in particular that the autocovariance structure does not vary with the season. Relaxing this leads to the class of models known as periodic models, and an example of a seasonally heterosceclastic unobserved-components ARIMA (SHUCARIMA) model is presented. The calculation of the standard error of a seasonally adjusted series via the Kalman filter is extended to this periodic model and illustrated for a monthly rainfall series.  相似文献   

19.
Many astronomers seem to believe that we have discovered that Pluto is not a planet. I contest this assessment. Recent discoveries of trans-Neptunian Pluto-sized objects do not militate for Pluto's expulsion from the planets unless we have prior reason for not simply counting these newly-discovered objects among the planets. I argue that this classificatory controversy — which I compare to the controversy about the classification of the platypus — illustrates how our classificatory practices are laden with normative commitments of a distinctive kind. I conclude with a discussion of the relevance of such “norm-ladenness” to other controversies in the metaphysics of classification, such as the monism/pluralism debate.  相似文献   

20.
There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of science regarding how best to interpret the relationship between neuroscience and psychology. It has traditionally been argued that either the two domains will evolve and change over time until they converge on a single unified account of human behaviour, or else that they will continue to work in isolation given that they identify properties and states that exist autonomously from one another (due to the multiple-realizability of psychological states). In this paper, I argue that progress in psychology and neuroscience is contingent on the fact that both of these positions are false. Contra the convergence position, I argue that the theories of psychology and the theories of neuroscience are scientifically valuable as representational tools precisely because they cannot be integrated into a single account. However, contra the autonomy position, I propose that the theories of psychology and neuroscience are deeply dependent on one another for further refinement and improvement. In this respect, there is an irreconcilable codependence between psychology and neuroscience that is necessary for both domains to improve and progress. The two domains are forever linked while simultaneously being unable to integrate.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号