Taking times out: Tense logic as a theory of time

Ulrich Meyer’s book The Nature of Time uses tense logic to argue for a ‘modal’ view of time, which replaces substantial times (as in Newton’s Absolute Time) with ‘ersatz times’ constructed using conceptually basic tense operators. He also argues against Bertrand Russell’s relationist theory, in which times are classes of events, and against the idea that relativity compels the integration of time and space (called by Meyer the Inseparability Argument). I find fault with each of these negative arguments, as well as with Meyer’s purported reconstruction of empty spacetime from tense operators and substantial spatial points. I suggest that Meyer’s positive project is best conceived as an elimination of time in the mode of Julian Barbour's The End of Time.     

The case of the composite Higgs: The model as a “Rosetta stone” in contemporary high-energy physics

This paper analyses the practice of model-building “beyond the Standard Model” in contemporary high-energy physics and argues that its epistemic function can be grasped by regarding models as mediating between the phenomenology of the Standard Model and a number of “theoretical cores” of hybrid character, in which mathematical structures are combined with verbal narratives (“stories”) and analogies referring back to empirical results in other fields (“empirical references”). Borrowing a metaphor from a physics research paper, model-building is likened to the search for a Rosetta stone, whose significance does not lie in its immediate content, but rather in the chance it offers to glimpse at and manipulate the components of hybrid theoretical constructs. I shall argue that the rise of hybrid theoretical constructs was prompted by the increasing use of nonrigorous mathematical heuristics in high-energy physics. Support for my theses will be offered in form of a historical–philosophical analysis of the emergence and development of the theoretical core centring on the notion that the Higgs boson is a composite particle. I will follow the heterogeneous elements which would eventually come to form this core from their individual emergence in the 1960s and 1970s, through their collective life as a theoretical core from 1979 until the present day.     

Mach׳s principle as action-at-a-distance in GR: The causality question

A part of the revival of interest in Mach׳s principle since the early 1960s has involved work by physicists aimed at calculating various sorts of frame-dragging effects by matter shells surrounding an interior region, and arguing that under certain conditions or in certain limits (ideally, ones that can be viewed as plausibly similar to conditions in our cosmos) the frame dragging becomes “complete” (e.g. Lynden-Bell, Katz, & Bičák, 1995) . Such results can bolster the argument for the satisfaction of Mach׳s principle by certain classes of models of GR. Interestingly, the frame-dragging “effect” of (say) a rotational movement of cosmic matter around a central point is argued by these physicists to be instantaneous—not an effect propagating at the speed of light. Not all physicists regard this as unproblematic. But rather than exploring whether there is something unphysical about such instantaneous “action at a distance”, or a violation of the precepts of Special Relativity, I am interested in exploring whether these physicists׳ calculations should be thought of as showing local inertia (resistance to acceleration) to be an effect, with distant matter distributions being the cause. I will try to apply some leading philosophical accounts of causation to the physical models of frame dragging, to see whether they imply that the frame dragging is superluminal causation. I will then offer reflections on the difficulties of applying causal talk in physical theories.     

The directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations

In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples. This inadequacy is remediable in each case by appeal to ontic facts that account for why the explanation is acceptable in one direction and unacceptable in the other direction. The mathematics involved in these examples cannot play this crucial normative role. While Lange's examples fail to demonstrate the existence of distinctively mathematical explanations, they help to emphasize that many superficially natural scientific explanations rely for their explanatory force on relations of stronger-than-natural necessity. These are not opposing kinds of scientific explanations; they are different aspects of scientific explanation.     

Edge cases in animal research law: Constituting the regulatory borderlands of the UK's Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act

This paper explores how the boundaries of the UK's Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act (A(SP)A) are constituted, as illustrative of the rising importance of legal procedures around animal research and how these are continuously being challenged and questioned. Drawing on empirical work in animal research communities, we consider how it is decided whether activities are undertaken for an “experimental or other scientific purpose”. We do this by focusing on “edge cases”, where debates occur about whether to include an activity within A(SP)A's remit. We demonstrate that the boundaries of animal research regulation in the UK are products of past and present decisions, dependencies, and social relationships. Boundaries are therefore not clear-cut and fixed, but rather flexible and changing borderlands. We particularly highlight the roles of: historical precedent; the management of risk, workload, and cost; institutional and professional identities; and research design in constituting A(SP)A's edges. In doing so, we demonstrate the importance of paying attention to how, in practice, animal law requires a careful balance between adhering to legal paragraphs and allowing for discretion. This in turn has real-world implications for what and how science is done, who does it, and how animals are used in its service.     

How to put a black box in a showcase: History of science museums and recent heritage

Coping with recent heritage is troublesome for history of science museums, since modern scientific artefacts often suffer from a lack of esthetic and artistic qualities and expressiveness. The traditional object-oriented approach, in which museums collect and present objects as individual showpieces is inadequate to bring recent heritage to life. This paper argues that recent artefacts should be regarded as “key pieces.” In this approach the object derives its meaning not from its intrinsic qualities but from its place in an important historical event or development. The “key pieces” approach involves a more organic way of collecting and displaying, focussing less on the individual object and more on the context in which it functioned and its place in the storyline. Finally, I argue that the “key pieces” approach should not be limited to recent heritage. Using this method as a general guiding principle could be a way for history of science museums to appeal to today’s audiences.     

Reichenbach on causality in 1923: Scientific inference,coordination, and confirmation

In The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (1920b), Reichenbach developed an original account of cognition as coordination of formal structures to empirical ones. One of the most salient features of this account is that it is explicitly not a top-down type of coordination, and in fact it is crucially “directed” by the empirical side. Reichenbach called this feature “the mutuality of coordination” but, in that work, did not elaborate sufficiently on how this is supposed to work. In a paper that he wrote less than two years afterwards (but that he published only in 1932), “The Principle of Causality and the Possibility of its Empirical Confirmation” (1923/1932), he described what seems to be a model for this idea, now within an analysis of causality that results in an account of scientific inference. Recent reassessments of his early proposal do not seem to capture the extent of Reichenbach's original worries. The present paper analyses Reichenbach's early account and suggests a new way to look at his early work. According to it, we perform measurements, individuate parameters, collect and analyse data, by using a “constructive” approach, such as the one with which we formulate and test hypotheses, which paradigmatically requires some simplicity assumptions. Reichenbach's attempt to account for all these aspects in 1923 was obviously limited and naive in many ways, but it shows that, in his view, there were multiple ways in which the idea of “constitution” is embodied in scientific practice.     

Adaptation and its analogues: Biological categories for biosemantics

“Teleosemantic” or “biosemantic” theories form a strong naturalistic programme in the philosophy of mind and language. They seek to explain the nature of mind and language by recourse to a natural history of “proper functions” as selected-for effects of language- and thought-producing mechanisms. However, they remain vague with respect to the nature of the proposed analogy between selected-for effects on the biological level and phenomena that are not strictly biological, such as reproducible linguistic and cultural forms. This essay critically explores various interpretations of this analogy. It suggests that these interpretations can be explicated by contrasting adaptationist with pluralist readings of the evolutionary concept of adaptation. Among the possible interpretations of the relations between biological adaptations and their analogues in language and culture, the two most relevant are a linear, hierarchical, signalling-based model that takes its cues from the evolution of co-operation and joint intentionality and a mutualistic, pluralist model that takes its cues from mimesis and symbolism in the evolution of human communication. Arguing for the merits of the mutualistic model, the present analysis indicates a path towards an evolutionary pluralist version of biosemantics that will align with theories of cognition as being environmentally “scaffolded”. Language and other cultural forms are partly independent reproducible structures that acquire proper functions of their own while being integrated with organism-based cognitive traits in co-evolutionary fashion.     

Why the “stimulus-error” did not go away

Psychologists in the early years of the discipline were much concerned with the stimulus-error. Roughly, this is the problem encountered in introspective experiments when subjects are liable to frame their perceptual reports in terms of what they know of the stimulus, instead of just drawing on their perceptual experiences as they are supposedly felt. “Introspectionist” psychologist E. B. Titchener and his student E. G. Boring both argued in the early 20th century that the stimulus-error is a serious methodological pit-fall. While many of the theoretical suppositions motivating Titchener and Boring have been unfashionable since the rise of behaviourism, the stimulus-error brings our attention to one matter of perennial importance to psychophysics and the psychology of perception. This is the fact that subjects are liable to give different kinds of perceptual reports in response to the same stimulus. I discuss attempts to control for variable reports in recent experimental work on colour and lightness constancy, and the disputes that have arisen over which kinds of reports are legitimate. Some contemporary psychologists do warn us against a stimulus-error, even though they do not use this terminology. I argue that concern over the stimulus-error is diagnostic of psychologists' deep theoretical commitments, such as their conception of sensation, or their demarcation of perception from cognition. I conclude by discussing the relevance of this debate to current philosophy of perception.     

Rehabilitating the regulative use of reason: Kant on empirical and chemical laws

In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant asserts that laws of nature “carry with them an expression of necessity” (A159/B198). There is, however, widespread interpretive disagreement regarding the nature and source of the necessity of empirical laws of natural sciences in Kant's system. It is especially unclear how chemistry—a science without a clear, straightforward connection to the a priori principles of the understanding—could contain such genuine, empirical laws. Existing accounts of the necessity of causal laws unfortunately fail to illuminate the possibility of non-physical laws. In this paper, I develop an alternative, ‘ideational’ account of natural laws, according to which ideas of reason necessitate the laws of some non-physical sciences. Chemical laws, for instance, are grounded on ideas of the elements, and the chemist aims to reduce her phenomena to these elements via experimentation. Although such ideas are beyond the possibility of experience, their postulation is necessary for the achievement of reason's theoretical ends: the unification and explanation of the cognitions of science.     

The problem of grounding natural modality in Kant's account of empirical laws of nature

One of the central problems of Kant's account of the empirical laws of nature is: What grounds their necessity? In this article I discuss the three most important lines of interpretation and suggest a novel version of one of them. While the first interpretation takes the transcendental principles as the only sources of the empirical laws' necessity, the second interpretation takes the systematicity of the laws to guarantee their necessity. It is shown that both views involve serious problems. The third interpretation, the “causal powers interpretation”, locates the source of the laws' necessity in the properties of natural objects. Although the second and third interpretations seem incompatible, I analyse why Kant held both views and I argue that they can be reconciled, because the metaphysical grounding project of the laws' necessity is accounted for by Kant's causal powers account, while his best system account explains our epistemic access to the empirical laws. If, however, causal powers are supposed to fulfil the grounding function for the laws' natural modality, then I suggest that a novel reading of the causal powers interpretation should be formulated along the lines of a genuine dispositionalist conception of the laws of nature.     

On the narrative form of simulations

Understanding complex physical systems through the use of simulations often takes on a narrative character. That is, scientists using simulations seek an understanding of processes occurring in time by generating them from a dynamic model, thereby producing something like a historical narrative. This paper focuses on simulations of the Diels-Alder reaction, which is widely used in organic chemistry. It calls on several well-known works on historical narrative to draw out the ways in which use of these simulations mirrors aspects of narrative understanding: Gallie for “followability” and “contingency”; Mink for “synoptic judgment”; Ricoeur for “temporal dialectic”; and Hawthorn for a related dialectic of the “actual and the possible”. Through these reflections on narrative, the paper aims for a better grasp of the role that temporal development sometimes plays in understanding physical processes and of how considerations of possibility enhance that understanding.     

The making of an intrinsic property: “Symmetry heuristics” in early particle physics

Mathematical invariances, usually referred to as “symmetries”, are today often regarded as providing a privileged heuristic guideline for understanding natural phenomena, especially those of micro-physics. The rise of symmetries in particle physics has often been portrayed by physicists and philosophers as the “application” of mathematical invariances to the ordering of particle phenomena, but no historical studies exist on whether and how mathematical invariances actually played a heuristic role in shaping microphysics. Moreover, speaking of an “application” of invariances conflates the formation of concepts of new intrinsic degrees of freedom of elementary particles with the formulation of models containing invariances with respect to those degrees of freedom. I shall present here a case study from early particle physics (ca. 1930–1954) focussed on the formation of one of the earliest concepts of a new degree of freedom, baryon number, and on the emergence of the invariance today associated to it. The results of the analysis show how concept formation and “application” of mathematical invariances were distinct components of a complex historical constellation in which, beside symmetries, two further elements were essential: the idea of physically conserved quantities and that of selection rules. I shall refer to the collection of different heuristic strategies involving selection rules, invariances and conserved quantities as the “SIC-triangle” and show how different authors made use of them to interpret the wealth of new experimental data. It was only a posteriori that the successes of this hybrid “symmetry heuristics” came to be attributed exclusively to mathematical invariances and group theory, forgetting the role of selection rules and of the notion of physically conserved quantity in the emergence of new degrees of freedom and new invariances. The results of the present investigation clearly indicate that opinions on the role of symmetries in fundamental physics need to be critically reviewed in the spirit of integrated history and philosophy of science.     

For the Glory of Athens: Xenophon’s Hipparchikos <Logos>, a technical treatise and instruction manual on ideal leadership

Xenophon’s Peri hippikes <technees>, “On Horsemanship,” and the Hipparchikos <logos>, “the Cavalry Commander”, writings which can be regarded as technical works with a didactic purpose, are almost unknown. Xenophon was interested in problems of leadership and the exercise of power (For the titles of the both writings and the analogous supplementary terms “technees” and “logos” compare Breitenbach, 1966, 1761. Angled brackets are used by modern editors of ancient texts as text-critical signs and are inserted here because “peri hippikes” and “hipparchikos” are adjectives and cannot stand alone; “technees” and “logos” are supplied as absent, but implied, substantives. The conventional signs “<>” clarify this supplementary act for the modern reader.). The “Cavalry Commander” (ca. 365 B.C.) intended for the instruction of potential hipparchs (calvary commanders) is simultaneously political and didactic and technical; in this text, categories of leadership that had been developed in earlier works are combined in a powerful manner. Xenophon constructed “leaders” as exempla (“examples”) of correct behaviour; military and political theory are synthesised. The Hipparchikos logos, as a didactic work, aims to produce specialists who master their techné (“art” or “skill”), to develop their ideal qualities. Both texts are directed at an Athenian society, in which the cavalry had lost their significance and pride as a result of recent political turbulence. Xenophon hoped to reform the cavalry for the benefit of Athens. The basic question of the didactic work is: how can I become the best hipparch, how can I go beyond simply filling the office, and instead develop it for the well-being of the polis and thus serve the city? The art of leadership consists in dealing with subordinates in such a manner that they obey and follow voluntarily—still an innovative and modern approach today.     

Scientific progress as increasing verisimilitude

According to the foundationalist picture, shared by many rationalists and positivist empiricists, science makes cognitive progress by accumulating justified truths. Fallibilists, who point out that complete certainty cannot be achieved in empirical science, can still argue that even successions of false theories may progress toward the truth. This proposal was supported by Karl Popper with his notion of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Popper’s own technical definition failed, but the idea that scientific progress means increasing truthlikeness can be expressed by defining degrees of truthlikeness in terms of similarities between states of affairs. This paper defends the verisimilitude approach against Alexander Bird who argues that the “semantic” definition (in terms of truth or truthlikeness alone) is not sufficient to define progress, but the “epistemic” definition referring to justification and knowledge is more adequate. Here Bird ignores the crucial distinction between real progress and estimated progress, explicated by the difference between absolute (and usually unknown) degrees of truthlikeness and their evidence-relative expected values. Further, it is argued that Bird’s idea of returning to the cumulative model of growth requires an implausible trick of transforming past false theories into true ones.     

Weak values and consistent histories in quantum theory

A relation is obtained between weak values of quantum observables and the consistency criterion for histories of quantum events. It is shown that “strange” weak values for projection operators (such as values less than zero) always correspond to inconsistent families of histories. It is argued that using the ABL rule to obtain probabilities for counterfactual measurements corresponding to those strange weak values gives inconsistent results. This problem is shown to be remedied by using the conditional weight, or pseudo-probability, obtained from the multiple-time application of Lüders’ Rule. It is argued that an assumption of reverse causality (a form of time symmetry) implies that weak values obtain, in a restricted sense, at the time of the weak measurement as well as at the time of post-selection. Finally, it is argued that weak values are more appropriately characterized as multiple-time amplitudes than expectation values, and as such can have little to say about counterfactual questions.     

Graph-based inductive reasoning

This article discusses methods of inductive inferences that are methods of visualizations designed in such a way that the “eye” can be employed as a reliable tool for judgment. The term “eye” is used as a stand-in for visual cognition and perceptual processing. In this paper “meaningfulness” has a particular meaning, namely accuracy, which is closeness to truth. Accuracy consists of precision and unbiasedness. Precision is dealt with by statistical methods, but for unbiasedness one needs expert judgment. The common view at the beginning of the twentieth century was to make the most efficient use of this kind of judgment by representing the data in shapes and forms in such a way that the “eye” can function as a reliable judge to reduce bias. The need for judgment of the “eye” is even more necessary when the background conditions of the observations are heterogeneous. Statistical procedures require a certain minimal level of homogeneity, but the “eye” does not. The “eye” is an adequate tool for assessing topological similarities when, due to heterogeneity of the data, metric assessment is not possible. In fact, graphical assessments precedes measurement, or to put it more forcefully, the graphic method is a necessary prerequisite for measurement.     

Value management and model pluralism in climate science

Non-epistemic values pervade climate modelling, as is now well documented and widely discussed in the philosophy of climate science. Recently, Parker and Winsberg have drawn attention to what can be termed “epistemic inequality”: this is the risk that climate models might more accurately represent the future climates of the geographical regions prioritised by the values of the modellers. In this paper, we promote value management as a way of overcoming epistemic inequality. We argue that value management can be seriously considered as soon as the value-free ideal and inductive risk arguments commonly used to frame the discussions of value influence in climate science are replaced by alternative social accounts of objectivity. We consider objectivity in Longino's sense as well as strong objectivity in Harding's sense to be relevant options here, because they offer concrete proposals that can guide scientific practice in evaluating and designing so-called multi-model ensembles and, in fine, improve their capacity to quantify and express uncertainty in climate projections.     

基于模型突变检测的管道泄漏检测定位方法

为了改进负压波法在管道微弱泄漏的检测和定位中的效果,提出了基于模型突变检测的特征提取和泄漏定位算法。首先运用广义似然比检测理论,建立压力信号变化的统计检验模型,计算广义似然比比率r和下降幅度d作为压力信号突变发生的敏感特征,并通过求得的压力变化时间点进行泄漏定位。针对缓慢泄漏时压力信号变化的特点,提出了相应的改进模型,更精确的求出缓慢泄漏压力信号的下降拐点。实验证明,参数r和d对不同变化类型的压力信号有较好的区分度,利用管道内压力和流量信号的特征值作为神经网络的特征向量可以实现管道的微弱泄漏识别,且基于改进模型的定位算法在缓慢泄漏定位中有较好的定位结果和稳定度。