社会突现论对社会因果的研究

社会突现论是基于系统论与心灵哲学等学科而发展起来的关于社会本质与社会现象解释的方法的一种新型整体主义理论。社会突现论认为,社会一方面由个体聚集突现而成,前者具有后者所不具有的特殊属性;另一方面,社会与个体属于不同的层次,前者不能化归为后者。社会突现论视域中的社会因果研究是以个体主义与整体主义之争为背景,对于社会层次是否具有因果效力的研究。社会突现论所关注的社会因果问题是某个社会事件是否能够作为不以个体意志为转移的因素对另一社会事件或社会中的个体产生影响。社会突现论认为,某个社会事件能够作为一个"独立"的因素影响其他的社会事件或社会中的个体。社会因果既与个体密切相关又不可化归为个体的属性。     

Can the Causal Paradoxes of QM be Explained in the Framework of QED?

Attemts to explain causal paradoxes of Quantum Mechanics (QM) have tried to solve the problems within the framework of Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). We will show, that this is impossible. The original theory of QED by Dirac (Proc Roy Soc A117:610, 1928) formulated in its preamble four preliminary requirements that the new theory should meet. The first of these requirements was that the theory must be causal. Causality is not to be derived as a consequence of the theory since it was a precondition for the formulation of the theory; it has been constructed so that it be causal. Therefore, causal paradoxes logically cannot be explained within the framework of QED. To transcend this problem we should consider the following points: Dirac himself stated in his original paper (1928) that his theory was only an approximation. When he returned to improve the theory later (Proc Roy Soc A209, 1951), he noted that the new theory “involves only the ratio e/m, not e and m separately”. This is a sign that although the electromagnetic effects (whose source is e) are magnitudes stronger than the gravitational effects (whose source is m), the two are coupled. Already in 1919, Einstein noted that “the elementary formations which go to make up the atom” are influenced by gravitational forces. Although in that form the statement proved not to be exactly correct, the effects of gravitation on QM phenomena have been established. The conclusion is that we should seek a resolution for the causal paradoxes in the framework of the General Theory of Relativity (GTR)—in contrast to QED, which involves only the Special Theory of Relativity (STR). We show that causality is necessarily violated in GTR. This follows from the curvature of the space-time. Although those effects are very small, one cannot ignore their influence in the case of the so-called “paradox phenomena”.     

The Self-Organization of Time and Causality: Steps Towards Understanding the Ultimate Origin

Possibly the most fundamental scientific problem is the origin of time and causality. The inherent difficulty is that all scientific theories of origins and evolution consider the existence of time and causality as given. We tackle this problem by starting from the concept of self-organization, which is seen as the spontaneous emergence of order out of primordial chaos. Self-organization can be explained by the selective retention of invariant or consistent variations, implying a breaking of the initial symmetry exhibited by randomness. In the case of time, we start from a random graph connecting primitive “events”. Selection on the basis of consistency eliminates cyclic parts of the graph, so that transitive closure can transform it into a partial order relation of precedence. Causality is assumed to be carried by causal “agents” which undergo a more traditional variation and selection, giving rise to causal laws that are partly contingent, partly necessary.     

论因果性

因果联系之所以存在,是因为世间存在着有可能经历变化的持久事物,而且人们拥有关于持久事物本性的知识。如果一个持久事物经历了一种变化,人们就能够借助他们关于该事物本性的知识确认它经历了这一变化,从而能够为该事物为什么经历这一变化提供因果解释。因果联系可以分为自然与理性两类,二者间的一个重要区别在于,前者可以为合理预测提供根据,但后者不能。     

Symmetries and Symmetry-Breakings: The Fabric of Physical Interactions and the Flow of Time

This short note develops some ideas along the lines of the stimulating paper by Heylighen (Found Sci 15 4(3):345–356, 2010a). It summarizes a theme in several writings with Francis Bailly, downloadable from this author’s web page. The “geometrization” of time and causality is the common ground of the analysis hinted here and in Heylighen’s paper. Heylighen adds a logical notion, consistency, in order to understand a possible origin of the selective process that may have originated this organization of natural phenomena. We will join our perspectives by hinting to some gnoseological complexes, common to mathematics and physics, which may shed light on the issues raised by Heylighen.     

功能性规律的逻辑解读及可检验性分析

对于功能性规律陈述的形式特征,可以给出三种方式的逻辑解读及可检验性分析,由此与具有“如果……则”形式的因果性陈述相联系,从而可以得出结论：没有理由把因果性规律与功能性规律的根本区别根植于时间正向的因果性关系和时间逆向的因果性关系的语义区别上,两类规律陈述的区别实际上与条件句中的前件子句与后件子句之间的充分性关系相联系的。     

“介入之下的不变性”——论可操控性因果概念及其社会科学哲学意蕴

可操控性概念将因果关系刻画为介入之下的不变性,这是近些年越来越被主流科学哲学的讨论所接受的视角。它一方面跳出了能动性因果理论的人类中心主义窠臼,另一方面又避免了律则性因果理论的缺陷,能够主张有限程度的因果意义。这对于刻画社会科学的因果定律与说明有较大的优越性。     

On Gene’s Action and Reciprocal Causation

Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by wholly physical properties, e.g., geometrical structures of molecular aggregates (cells). In response, we argue that contrary to his expectations one cannot infer reductionist assumptions even from detailed biological explanations that invoke the molecular level, as interlevel causal reciprocity is essential to these explanations. Recent very detailed explanations that concern the structure and function of chromatin—the intricacies of supposedly basic molecular level—demonstrate this. They show that what seem to be basic physical parameters extend into a more general biological context, thus rendering elusive the concepts of the basic level and causal hierarchy postulated by the reductionists. In fact, relevant phenomena are defined across levels by entangled, extended parameters. Nor can the biological context be explained away by basic physical parameters defining molecular level shaped by evolution as a physical process. Reductionists claim otherwise only because they overlook the evolutionary significance of initial conditions best defined in terms of extended biological parameters. Perhaps the reductionist assumptions (as well as assumptions that postulate any particular levels as causally fundamental) cannot be inferred from biological explanations because biology aims at manipulating organisms rather than producing explanations that meet the coherence requirements of general ontological models. Or possibly the assumptions of an ontology not based on the concept of causal powers stratified across levels can be inferred from biological explanations. The incoherence of downward causation is inevitable, given reductionist assumptions, but an ontological alternative might avoid this. We outline desiderata for the treatment of levels and properties that realize interlevel causation in such an ontology.     

A Non-Aristotelian Model: Time as Space and Landscape in Postmodern Theatre

In his Poetics, Aristotle articulated certain ideas on the structure of drama that dominated both dramatic literature and theatre practices for the centuries to come. In this article I show how the thorough analysis of his statements leads us to believe that he endorses causality, narrativity, and temporal linearity as primary factors in the organization of dramatic and stage texts. Tracing various modifications of causality throughout theatre history, I use the work of the two prominent contemporary directors, Eimuntas Nekrosius and Anatoly Vasilyev, to demonstrate how postmodernist theatre has arrived at non-Aristotelian theatrical model based on the unity of a time–space continuum rather than temporal development.     

The situation of causality

Causality in the abstract is a grand theme. We take it up when we want to penetrate to the bottom of things to understand general laws that govern the working at the world of the deepest and most detailed level.In this essay, I argue for a more situated understanding of causality. To counter our desire for ever greater generality, I suggest that causal relations, even those that hold only on average, require context. To counter our desire for ever greater detail, I suggest that causal relations may exist only at a certain level of granularity.     

A Defense Of A Unificationist Theory Of Explanation

This paper defends a unificationist theory of explanation. I first explore the notion of understanding entrenched by the unificationist. Then I present an overview of various kinds of causal statements and explanations. It is claimed that only genuine causal law statements have explanatory power. Finally, I attempt to fit causal explanations into the unificationist theory of explanation. In this way, I try to provide an account of how causal explanations provide understanding of the phenomena that they explain.     

关于归纳法的合理性问题——康德对休谟问题的解决及其改进

休谟首先对归纳法的合理性提出质疑,并给以否定性的结论。在康德看来,休谟问题的产生是传统哲学自身的缺陷所致,即让人的理智符合经验。康德则把这个次序颠倒过来,让经验符合理智,是理智把因果必然性加到前后相继的两类经验事件之中。这样的因果性属于康德的先验范畴。康德自认为他的先验哲学已经对休谟问题给以完满的解决,然而,许多学者认为,情况并非如此。本文进而把"随机性"和"统计性"作为先验范畴,同因果性构成一组。同时提出两条范导原则即"普遍因果性原则"和"普遍随机性原则",并为之进行辩护,以此作为关于休谟问题的康德方案的改进。     

宇宙射线的早期研究

宇宙射线研究是天体物理学和粒子物理学的重要研究课题。对宇宙射线早期研究文献进行整理、分析 ,证明宇宙射线发现、确认的历史过程为 :(1 )库仑从验电器漏电中发现 ,电荷不可能长久保持 ,最终将会消失。根据验电器漏电现象 ,卢瑟福认为 ,漏电是由空气中穿透性极强的辐射引起的 ,成为研究的一个转折点。 (2 )沃尔夫对原有验电器进行改进 ,大大提高了实验的精度 ,为以后的研究奠定了实验基础。 (3) 1 91 1年至 1 91 3年 ,黑斯经过十次高空气球飞行 ,认为这种极强的穿透性辐射来自地球之外的空间 ,从而打开了物理学一个新的研究领域。 (4 )密立根怀疑黑斯的结论 ,在美洲大陆进行了更广泛的实验工作。实验中 ,密立根首次使用了探测气球技术 ,导致黑斯的结论得到承认     

Physics, Theoretical Knowledge and Weinberg's Grand Reductionism

The two main points of this contribution are the following: (1) Applied mathematical theories might complement physical theories in an essential way; some applied mathematical theories allow us to understand phenomena we are unable to explain by resorting to physical theories alone, (2) In the case of social sciences it might be necessary to account for examined phenomena by resorting to the idea of goal-oriented activity (the causal approach typical for natural science might be unsatisfactory). Weinberg's idea of grand reductionism ignores the two above mentioned facts and hence overestimates the foundational role of physics and its methodology.     

"Białkowski Panel" - Introduction and Acknowledgements

The two main points of this contribution are the following: (1) Applied mathematical theories might complement physical theories in an essential way; some applied mathematical theories allow us to understand phenomena we are unable to explain by resorting to physical theories alone, (2) In the case of social sciences it might be necessary to account for examined phenomena by resorting to the idea of goal-oriented activity (the causal approach typical for natural science might be unsatisfactory). Weinberg's idea of grand reductionism ignores the two above mentioned facts and hence overestimates the foundational role of physics and its methodology. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Stretching the In-between: Embodiment and Beyond

Today??s scientific imaging technologies are able to detect and image emissions and radiations from a much wider range of the electromagnetic spectrum than ever before. Such phenomena lie beyond the horizons of ordinary human perceptibility. I examine here the implications of such ??translation mediations?? for the production of scientific knowledge and show how human embodiment is implicit for all perceptual observational possibilities. The framework is that of a postphenomenology which is able to relate these new phenomena to human embodiment.     

从Simpson悖论看群体生物学中统计解释和因果解释之争

在理论的群体生物学中,有三种模型都是通过性状适合度(trait fitness)的分布来解释和预见种群结构变化的量和方向。双因子和单因子模型都将性状适合度看成是一种因果属性,而丹尼斯.沃尔什(Denis Walsh)等则指出它们仅仅是一种统计学的属性。笔者通过分析沃尔什的有力论证,尝试表明如果将性状适合度看成是一种因果属性的话,将导致Simpson悖论,因而是不融贯的。所以,关于种群结构变化的统计学解释要优于因果解释。     

自然主义的意向性难题与信息语义学

自然主义或广义的物理主义是现当代西方心灵哲学中占主导地位的思潮。它能较令人满意地将大多数心理现象自然化,但意向性却负隅抵制,被公认为自然化的一大难题。哲学是解难题的活动,因此意向性自然成了当今心灵哲学中的热点和焦点问题之一。德雷斯基的信息语义学不仅根据自己所倡导的自然主义方案对意向性作了独到的阐发,而且对信息和因果性等问题发表了发人深省的看法。     

Forms of Causal Explanation

In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we claim that the structure of a causal explanation depends on the causal structure of the relevant fragment of the world and on the interests of the explainer.