Philosophy of science for globalized privatization: Uncovering some limitations of critical contextual empiricism

The purpose of this paper is to uncover some of the limitations that critical contextual empiricism, and in particular Longino's contextualism, faces when trying to provide a normative account of scientific knowledge that is relevant to current scientific research. After presenting the four norms of effective criticism, I show how the norms have limited scope when dealing with cases of current scientific practices. I then present some historical evidence for the claim that the organization of science has changed in recent decades, and I argue that the uncovered limitations emerge from this larger phenomenon. Finally, I conclude by suggesting two ways to overcome the previously uncovered limitations.     

Judgement aggregation in scientific collaborations: The case for waiving expertise

The fragmentation of academic disciplines forces individuals to specialise. In doing so, they become experts over their narrow area of research. However, ambitious scientific projects, such as the search for gravitational waves, require them to come together and collaborate across disciplinary borders. How should scientists with expertise in different disciplines treat each others’ expert claims? An intuitive answer is that the collaboration should defer to the opinions of experts. In this paper we show that under certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, this intuitive answer gives rise to an impossibility result when it comes to aggregating the beliefs of experts to deliver the beliefs of a collaboration as a whole. We then argue that when experts’ beliefs come into conflict, they should waive their expert status.     

Value-entanglement and the integrity of scientific research

Throughout much of the 20th century, philosophers of science maintained a position known as the value-free ideal, which holds that non-epistemic (e.g., moral, social, political, or economic) values should not influence the evaluation and acceptance of scientific results. In the last few decades, many philosophers of science have rejected this position by arguing that non-epistemic values can and should play an important role in scientific judgment and decision-making in a variety of contexts, including the evaluation and acceptance of scientific results. Rejecting the value-free ideal creates some new and vexing problems, however. One of these is that relinquishing this philosophical doctrine may undermine the integrity of scientific research if practicing scientists decide to allow non-epistemic values to impact their judgment and decision-making. A number of prominent philosophers of science have sought to show how one can reject the value-free ideal without compromising the integrity of scientific research. In this paper, we examine and critique their views and offer our own proposal for protecting and promoting scientific integrity. We argue that the literature on research ethics and its focus on adherence to norms, rules, policies, and procedures that together promote the aims of science can provide a promising foundation for building an account of scientific integrity. These norms, rules, policies, and procedures provide a level of specificity that is lacking in most philosophical discussions of science and values, and they suggest an important set of tasks for those working in science and values—namely, assessing, justifying, and prioritizing them. Thus, we argue that bringing together the literature on research ethics with the literature on science and values will enrich both areas and generate a more sophisticated and detailed account of scientific integrity.     

Repertoires: A post-Kuhnian perspective on scientific change and collaborative research

We propose a framework to describe, analyze, and explain the conditions under which scientific communities organize themselves to do research, particularly within large-scale, multidisciplinary projects. The framework centers on the notion of a research repertoire, which encompasses well-aligned assemblages of the skills, behaviors, and material, social, and epistemic components that a group may use to practice certain kinds of science, and whose enactment affects the methods and results of research. This account provides an alternative to the idea of Kuhnian paradigms for understanding scientific change in the following ways: (1) it does not frame change as primarily generated and shaped by theoretical developments, but rather takes account of administrative, material, technological, and institutional innovations that contribute to change and explicitly questions whether and how such innovations accompany, underpin, and/or undercut theoretical shifts; (2) it thus allows for tracking of the organization, continuity, and coherence in research practices which Kuhn characterized as ‘normal science’ without relying on the occurrence of paradigmatic shifts and revolutions to be able to identify relevant components; and (3) it requires particular attention be paid to the performative aspects of science, whose study Kuhn pioneered but which he did not extensively conceptualize. We provide a detailed characterization of repertoires and discuss their relationship with communities, disciplines, and other forms of collaborative activities within science, building on an analysis of historical episodes and contemporary developments in the life sciences, as well as cases drawn from social and historical studies of physics, psychology, and medicine.     

Values,standpoints, and scientific/intellectual movements

Feminist standpoint empiricism contributes to the criticism of the value-free ideal by offering a unique analysis of how non-epistemic values can play not only a legitimate but also an epistemically productive role in science. While the inductive risk argument focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the acceptance of hypotheses, standpoint empiricism focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the production of evidence. And while many other analyses of values in science focus on the role of non-epistemic values either in an individual scientist's decision making or in the distribution of research efforts in scientific communities, standpoint empiricism focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the building of scientific/intellectual movements.     

What is the environment in environmental health research? Perspectives from the ethics of science

Environmental health research produces scientific knowledge about environmental hazards crucial for public health and environmental justice movements that seek to prevent or reduce exposure to these hazards. The environment in environmental health research is conceptualized as the range of possible social, biological, chemical, and/or physical hazards or risks to human health, some of which merit study due to factors such as their probability and severity, the feasibility of their remediation, and injustice in their distribution. This paper explores the ethics of identifying the relevant environment for environmental health research, as judgments involved in defining an environmental hazard or risk, judgments of that hazard or risk's probability, severity, and/or injustice, as well as the feasibility of its remediation, all ought to appeal to non-epistemic as well as epistemic values. I illustrate by discussing the case of environmental lead, a housing-related hazard that remains unjustly distributed by race and class and is particularly dangerous to children. Examining a controversy in environmental health research ethics where researchers tested multiple levels of lead abatement in lead-contaminated households, I argue that the broader perspective on the ethics of environmental health research provided in the first part of this paper may have helped prevent this controversy.     

(Mis)Understanding scientific disagreement: Success versus pursuit-worthiness in theory choice

Scientists often diverge widely when choosing between research programs. This can seem to be rooted in disagreements about which of several theories, competing to address shared questions or phenomena, is currently the most epistemically or explanatorily valuable—i.e. most successful. But many such cases are actually more directly rooted in differing judgments of pursuit-worthiness, concerning which theory will be best down the line, or which addresses the most significant data or questions. Using case studies from 16^th-century astronomy and 20^th-century geology and biology, I argue that divergent theory choice is thus often driven by considerations of scientific process, even where direct epistemic or explanatory evaluation of its final products appears more relevant. Broadly following Kuhn's analysis of theoretical virtues, I suggest that widely shared criteria for pursuit-worthiness function as imprecise, mutually-conflicting values. However, even Kuhn and others sensitive to pragmatic dimensions of theory ‘acceptance’, including the virtue of fruitfulness, still commonly understate the role of pursuit-worthiness—especially by exaggerating the impact of more present-oriented virtues, or failing to stress how ‘competing’ theories excel at addressing different questions or data. This framework clarifies the nature of the choice and competition involved in theory choice, and the role of alternative theoretical virtues.     

They give you the keys and say ‘drive it!’ Managers, referred expertise, and other expertises

On the face of it, the directors of new large scientific projects have an impossible task. They have to make technical decisions about sciences in which they have never made a research contribution—sciences in which they have no contributory expertise. Furthermore, these decisions must be accepted and respected by the scientists who are making research contributions. The problem is discussed in two interviews conducted with two directors of large scientific projects. The paradox is resolved for the managers by their use of interactional and referred expertise. The same analysis might be applicable to management in general. An Appendix, co-authored with Jeff Shrager, compares the notion of referred expertise with contributory expertise.     

关于地方科研院所重点实验室建设发展的战略思考——以广西科研院所重点实验室建设为例

以广西科研院所重点实验室建设为例,概述其建设在引导整合优化科技资源配置,培育区域科研特色优势、创新队伍建设和增强科技创新能力等方面取得的成效与启示;分析并针对其宏观管理、科研及实验室条件建设存在的问题,提出未来建设发展战略地位、发展目标与使命、发展方向与思路、发展战略与策略。     

Chemistry and Chemists at the London Institution 1807-1912

The London Institution, established in the City of London in 1807, was devoted, as its full title proclaimed, to the 'advancement of Literature and the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge'. With its extensive lecture programme, splendid reference library, reading rooms, laboratory and other amenities, it provided for its members a scientific and cultural centre, modelled on the highly successful and fashionable Royal Institution in London's West End. Among its scientific activities, chemistry long maintained a leading role, in terms of both the sheer volume and variety of its presentations, and the high standing of its lecturers; they included Faraday, Playfair, Hofmann, Roscoe, Odling, Norman Lockyer, Meldola, and Sir William Ramsay, as well as other visiting lecturers, specially selected for their ability to present their subject in an interesting and attractive fashion to a wider lay public. The laboratory of the Institution, although limited in size and facilities, was the scene of instruction in practical chemistry, and between 1863 and 1884 attained the reputation of a significant centre of chemical research during the successive tenure of the professorship in chemistry by J. A. Wanklyn and H. E. Armstrong. Their publications, appearing under the device 'From the Laboratory of the London Institution', were a frequent feature of the leading chemical periodicals. Thus, within its many-sided activities, the Institution promoted significantly the public appreciation of the function of chemistry, as a contributor both to pure knowledge, and to technical and economic progress. It achieved this in an environment of influential City merchants, manufacturers and financiers and doubtless led to beneficient, if unrecorded, consequences. It was only towards the close of the nineteenth century, when the universities had become increasingly concerned with the systematic study of the discipline, that chemistry lost its direct impact in the London Institution, but continued to maintain a presence within its cultural framework.     

Can the behavioral sciences self-correct? A social epistemic study

Advocates of the self-corrective thesis argue that scientific method will refute false theories and find closer approximations to the truth in the long run. I discuss a contemporary interpretation of this thesis in terms of frequentist statistics in the context of the behavioral sciences. First, I identify experimental replications and systematic aggregation of evidence (meta-analysis) as the self-corrective mechanism. Then, I present a computer simulation study of scientific communities that implement this mechanism to argue that frequentist statistics may converge upon a correct estimate or not depending on the social structure of the community that uses it. Based on this study, I argue that methodological explanations of the “replicability crisis” in psychology are limited and propose an alternative explanation in terms of biases. Finally, I conclude suggesting that scientific self-correction should be understood as an interaction effect between inference methods and social structures.     

Scientists and their cultural heritage: Knowledge,politics and ambivalent relationships

For many years, scientific heritage has received attention from multiple actors from different spheres of activity—archives, museums, scientific institutions. Beyond the heterogeneity revealed when examining the place of scientific heritage in different places, an authentic patrimonial configuration emerges and takes the form of a nebula of claims and of accomplishments that result, in some cases, in institutional and political recognition at the national level, in various country all around the world. At the international level, the creation of the international committee dedicated to University Museums and Collections (UMAC) within the International Council of Museums (ICOM) certainly testified from this raising interest in academic heritage and the existence of a specific community concern with it.This article presents numerous initiatives for the preservation of scientific heritage in France, with the goal of analysing the relationship scientists have with their heritage. We argue that scientific communities have a special relationship with heritage, which is characterized by a number of ambiguities. We show that such ambivalences allow analysis of identity, discipline, professional, and social issues operative in defining heritage and being redefined by heritage. To explore these dimensions, we have chosen to present three different case studies. The first traces the institutional uses of heritage by a scientific institution, the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA), through the transformation of the first French atomic reactor (ZOE) into a museum. The second example describes the initiatives of French astronomers from the mid-1990s to construct a national programme for the protection of astronomy heritage. Lastly, we recount the case of universities, with the example of the Université de Strasbourg.     

The value-ladenness of transparency in science: Lessons from Lyme disease

Both philosophers and scientists have recently promoted transparency as an important element of responsible scientific practice. Philosophers have placed particular emphasis on the ways that transparency can assist with efforts to manage value judgments in science responsibly. This paper examines a potential challenge to this approach, namely, that efforts to promote transparency can themselves be value-laden. This is particularly problematic when transparency incorporates second-order value judgments that are underwritten by the same values at stake in the desire for transparency about the first-order value judgments involved in scientific research. The paper uses a case study involving research on Lyme disease to illustrate this worry, but it responds by elucidating a range of scenarios in which transparency can still play an effective role in managing value judgments responsibly.     

Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding

What is scientific progress? On Alexander Bird's epistemic account of scientific progress, an episode in science is progressive precisely when there is more scientific knowledge at the end of the episode than at the beginning. Using Bird's epistemic account as a foil, this paper develops an alternative understanding-based account on which an episode in science is progressive precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world at the end of the episode than at the beginning. This account is shown to be superior to the epistemic account by examining cases in which knowledge and understanding come apart. In these cases, it is argued that scientific progress matches increases in scientific understanding rather than accumulations of knowledge. In addition, considerations having to do with minimalist idealizations, pragmatic virtues, and epistemic value all favor this understanding-based account over its epistemic counterpart.     

Values in early-stage climate engineering: The ethical implications of “doing the research”

Calls for research on climate engineering have increased in the last two decades, but there remains widespread agreement that many climate engineering technologies (in particular, forms involving global solar radiation management) present significant ethical risks and require careful governance. However, proponents of research argue, ethical restrictions on climate engineering research should not be imposed in early-stage work like in silico modeling studies. Such studies, it is argued, do not pose risks to the public, and the knowledge gained from them is necessary for assessing the risks and benefits of climate engineering technologies. I argue that this position, which I call the “broad research-first” stance, cannot be maintained in light of the entrance of nonepistemic values in climate modeling. I analyze the roles that can be played by nonepistemic political and ethical values in the design, tuning, and interpretation of climate models. Then, I argue that, in the context of early-stage climate engineering research, the embeddedness of values will lead to value judgments that could harm stakeholder groups or impose researcher values on non-consenting populations. I conclude by calling for more robust reflection on the ethics and governance of early-stage climate engineering research.     

Project knowledge and its resituation in the design of research projects: Seymour Benzer's behavioral genetics, 1965-1974

The article introduces a framework for analyzing the knowledge that researchers draw upon when designing a research project by distinguishing four types of “project knowledge”: goal knowledge, which concerns possible outcomes, and three forms of implementation knowledge that concern the realization of the project: 1) methodological knowledge that specifies possible experimental and non-experimental strategies to achieve the chosen goal; 2) representational knowledge that suggests ways to represent data, hypotheses, or outcomes; and 3) organizational knowledge that helps to build or navigate the material and social structures that enable a project. In the design of research projects such knowledge will be transferred from other successful projects and these processes will be analyzed in terms of modes of resituating knowledge. The account is developed by analyzing a case from the history of biology. In a reciprocal manner, it enables a better understanding of the historical episode in question: around 1970, several researchers who had made successful careers in the emerging field of molecular biology, working with bacterial model systems, attempted to create a molecular biology of the physiological processes in multicellular organisms. One of them was Seymour Benzer, who designed a research project addressing the physiological processes underlying behavior in Drosophila.     

The Price of Success: Sociologist Harry Alpert,the NSF's First Social Science Policy Architect

Harry Alpert (1912–1977), the US sociologist, is best-known for his directorship of the National Science Foundation's social science programme in the 1950s. This study extends our understanding of Alpert in two main ways: first, by examining the earlier development of his views and career. Beginning with his 1939 biography of Emile Durkheim, we explore the early development of Alpert's views about foundational questions concerning the scientific status of sociology and social science more generally, proper social science methodology, the practical value of social science, the academic institutionalisation of sociology, and the unity-of-science viewpoint. Second, this paper illuminates Alpert's complex involvement with certain tensions in mid-century US social science that were themselves linked to major transformations in national science policy, public patronage, and unequal relations between the social and natural sciences. We show that Alpert's views about the intellectual foundations, practical relevance, and institutional standing of the social sciences were, in some important respects, at odds with his NSF policy work. Although remembered as a quantitative evangelist and advocate for the unity-of-science viewpoint, Alpert was in fact an urbane critic of natural-science envy, social scientific certainty, and what he saw as excessive devotion to quantitative methods.     

Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals

In recent papers and a book, Heather Douglas has expanded on the well-known argument from inductive risk, thereby launching an influential contemporary critique of the value-free ideal for science. This paper distills Douglas’s critique into four major claims. The first three claims provide a significant challenge to the value-free ideal for science. However, the fourth claim, which delineates her positive proposal to regulate values in science by distinguishing direct and indirect roles for values, is ambiguous between two interpretations, and both have weaknesses. Fortunately, two elements of Douglas’s work that have previously received much less emphasis (namely, her comments about the goals of scientific activity and the ethics of communicating about values) provide resources for developing a more promising approach for regulating values in science.