Danes commemorating Darwin: apes and evolution at the 1909 anniversary

This article analyses the Danish 1909 celebrations of the centenary of Charles Darwin's birth on 12 February 1809. I argue that the 1909 meetings, lectures and publications devoted to Darwin and his theory of evolution by natural selection can be characterised by ambivalence: on the one hand, tribute to a great man of science who established a new view of nature and, on the other hand, scepticism towards the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection and the wider religious and political implications drawn from his theory. The article examines both professional and popular commemorative activities, focusing primarily on celebratory articles carried in widely circulated magazines and newspapers. I identify three types of interpretations of Darwin's ideas which I characterise as ‘radical’, ‘evangelical’ and ‘safe’ science. These different positions were closely linked to the political and cultural divisions of the periodical press. Moreover, my analysis of the popular press offers a solid basis for asserting that to most people Darwinism was associated with human evolution, primarily the relationship between man and apes, while more sophisticated discussions about the crisis of Darwinism prominent among naturalists played only a secondary role in the public arena. This article demonstrates the value of using newspapers as historical sources when looking for public images of Darwin, popular receptions of Darwinism and representations of science in general.     

Narratives of Charles Darwin Down Under

Despite the fact that Charles Darwin spent several months in Australia in the final year of his Beagle voyage that circumnavigated the globe, most studies that deal with Darwin's life or his discovery of evolution spend little time discussing his Australian period, if it is mentioned at all. His time there is largely deemed to have produced little of significance in comparison to his visits to other places such as the Galápagos Islands, which has long been mythologized as providing the key sources of observable data that ultimately led Darwin to develop his evolutionary speculations. In recent years, however, Darwin's period in Australia has received more attention, most notably a series of studies detailing the observations and connections Darwin made while in New South Wales, Tasmania, and King George Sound. While much of this literature has provided an important corrective to previous Darwin scholarship that had largely ignored Darwin's period in Australia, it has also worked to perpetuate a romantic and heroic view of scientific discovery by suggesting that Darwin's key “evolutionary revelation” was made not in the Galápagos Islands but in the Blue Mountains, a claim that has been recently made in print and online. This paper therefore examines the historical literature on Darwin Down Under, focussing in particular on this recent romantic turn that seeks to situate Australia as the key site of inspiration for Darwin's theory of evolution.     

Huxley's defence of Darwin

This article ventures a reappraisal of Huxley's role in the Darwinian debates. First, the views on life-history held by Huxley before 1859 are identified. Next, the disharmony between these views and the view put forward by Darwin in the Origin of species (1859) is discussed. Huxley's defence of the Origin is then reviewed in an effort to show that, despite his fervour on Darwin's behalf, his advocacy of the case for natural selection was not particularly compelling, and that his own scientific work took no revolutionary new direction after 1859.     

Three unpublished letters to Charles Darwin: the solution to a ‘geometrico-geological’ problem

While Charles Darwin wrote his Observations on South America, he often sought the advice and help of other scientists in solving specific problems. Three letters that the Cambridge geologist and mathematician William Hopkins wrote to Darwin exemplify such aid. In these letters Hopkins was able to show Darwin how he could calculate the position of the sedimentary beds on the Chonos Archipelago, which Darwin had visited. In his first letter Hopkins sent a solution, part of which eluded Darwin. Darwin's letters to Hopkins have not yet been found, but two additional letters gave Darwin the solution he was looking for.     

The Advantages of Obscurity: Charles Darwin's Negative Inference from the Histories of Domestic Breeds

In The Origin of Species, Charles Darwin famously accounted for the lack of fossil evidence in support of species evolution on the grounds that the fossil record is naturally incomplete. This essay examines a similar argument that Darwin applied to his analogy between natural and artificial selection: the scarcity of data about the historical backgrounds of domestic breeds was the natural by-product of an extremely gradual change process. The point was to enhance the ability of the artificial selection analogy to suggest that nature's species had undergone a similar transformation. Darwin did not depend on this negative inference alone, however, for in his writings he included whatever information he could find about the actual histories of particular breeds. A comparison with Darwin's treatment of the fossil record suggests the reasonableness of this combined use of opposite kinds of evidence to establish a single point. The comparison also suggests the unique qualities of negative inference as applied to the breeding analogy.     

“A dedicated missionary”. Charles Galton Darwin and the new quantum mechanics in Britain

In this paper I discuss the work on quantum physics and wave mechanics by Charles Galton Darwin, a Cambridge wrangler of the last generation, as a case study to better understand the early reception of quantum physics in Britain. I argue that his proposal in the early 1920s to abandon the strict conservation of energy, as well as his enthusiastic embracement of wave mechanics at the end of the decade, can be easily understood by tracing his ontological and epistemological commitments to his early training in the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos. I also suggest that Darwin's work cannot be neglected in a study of quantum physics in Britain, since he was one of very few fellows of the Royal Society able to judge and explain quantum physics and quantum mechanics.     

Syndrome du jour: The historiography and moral implications of Diagnosing Darwin

Diagnosing Darwin's health problems has a long history. Innumerable diagnoses have been proffered in letters, articles, and a handful of dedicated books. Diagnostic speculation has exhibited contrasting somatogenic or psychogenic preferences. Psychogenic accounts dominated mid-century but were soon challenged by somatic explanations citing specific infectious or toxic aetiologies. This tension remains, although psychogenic accounts have tended to be swamped by an array of somatogenic diagnoses championed by biomedical specialists. As a whole, this parade of diagnoses has a striking syndrome du jour quality. Successive conjectures speak of the preoccupations and diagnostic fads of their particular age. Moreover, for many participants in this diagnostic game, unconscious presentism combined with self-serving projection, turning the question of what ailed Darwin into something of a Rorschach test. Never far from the surface was a sometimes-fraught tussle over the man's reputation, animated by the moral valences of the conjectures in play. In a broader sense, this diagnostic game has shaped biographical accounts of Darwin and his career in some significant ways.     

Danes commemorating Darwin: apes and evolution at the 1909 anniversary

This article analyses the Danish 1909 celebrations of the centenary of Charles Darwin's birth on 12 February 1809. I argue that the 1909 meetings, lectures and publications devoted to Darwin and his theory of evolution by natural selection can be characterised by ambivalence: on the one hand, tribute to a great man of science who established a new view of nature and, on the other hand, scepticism towards the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection and the wider religious and political implications drawn from his theory. The article examines both professional and popular commemorative activities, focusing primarily on celebratory articles carried in widely circulated magazines and newspapers. I identify three types of interpretations of Darwin's ideas which I characterise as 'radical', 'evangelical' and 'safe' science. These different positions were closely linked to the political and cultural divisions of the periodical press. Moreover, my analysis of the popular press offers a solid basis for asserting that to most people Darwinism was associated with human evolution, primarily the relationship between man and apes, while more sophisticated discussions about the crisis of Darwinism prominent among naturalists played only a secondary role in the public arena. This article demonstrates the value of using newspapers as historical sources when looking for public images of Darwin, popular receptions of Darwinism and representations of science in general.     

The Price of Success: Sociologist Harry Alpert,the NSF's First Social Science Policy Architect

Harry Alpert (1912–1977), the US sociologist, is best-known for his directorship of the National Science Foundation's social science programme in the 1950s. This study extends our understanding of Alpert in two main ways: first, by examining the earlier development of his views and career. Beginning with his 1939 biography of Emile Durkheim, we explore the early development of Alpert's views about foundational questions concerning the scientific status of sociology and social science more generally, proper social science methodology, the practical value of social science, the academic institutionalisation of sociology, and the unity-of-science viewpoint. Second, this paper illuminates Alpert's complex involvement with certain tensions in mid-century US social science that were themselves linked to major transformations in national science policy, public patronage, and unequal relations between the social and natural sciences. We show that Alpert's views about the intellectual foundations, practical relevance, and institutional standing of the social sciences were, in some important respects, at odds with his NSF policy work. Although remembered as a quantitative evangelist and advocate for the unity-of-science viewpoint, Alpert was in fact an urbane critic of natural-science envy, social scientific certainty, and what he saw as excessive devotion to quantitative methods.     

On Understanding: Maxwell on the Methods of Illustration and Scientific Metaphor

In this paper I examine the notion and role of metaphors and illustrations in Maxwell's works in exact science as a pathway into a broader and richer philosophical conception of a scientist and scientific practice. While some of these notions and methods are still at work in current scientific research—from economics and biology to quantum computation and quantum field theory—, here I have chosen to attest to their entrenchment and complexity in actual science by attempting to make some conceptual sense of Maxwell's own usage; this endeavour includes situating Maxwell's conceptions and applications in his own culture of Victorian science and philosophy. I trace Maxwell's notions to the formulation of the problem of understanding, or interpreting, abstract representations such as potential functions and Lagrangian equations. I articulate the solution in terms of abstract-concrete relations, where the concrete, in tune with Victorian British psychology and engineering, includes the muscular as well as the pictorial. This sets the basis for a conception of understanding in terms of unification and concrete modelling, or representation. I examine the relation of illustration to analogies and metaphors on which this account rests. Lastly, I stress and explain the importance of context-dependence, its consequences for realism-instrumentalism debates, and Maxwell's own emphasis on method.     

The Scientific Interests of Archibald Campbell, 1st Earl of Ilay and 3rd Duke of Argyll (1682-1761)

Amateur scientists were important in the science of the eighteenth century as patrons, investors in talent and new equipment, as the maintainers of gardens and libraries, and, occasionally, as men who could and did make discoveries or significant innovations. The article shows that the 3rd Duke of Argyll was one of these men. He was also much more. Ilay's interests in science, because of his important political position in Scotland, touched not only his immediate friends but helped to reshape Scottish culture itself. This essay looks at his scientific interests, his political career, and his patronage to argue that the results of his long career in politics were to institutionalize a new set of modern values in most Scottish institutions.     

English engineer John Smeaton's experimental method(s): Optimisation,hypothesis testing and exploratory experimentation

In this paper I provide a detailed account of eighteenth-century engineer John Smeaton's experimental methods, with the aim of bringing our understanding of his work into line with recent research in the history and philosophy of science. Starting from his use of the technique of parameter variation, I identify three distinct methodological aims in the research he carried out on waterwheels, windmills and hydraulic mortars. These aims are: optimisation, hypothesis testing and maxim generation. The main claim of this paper is that Smeaton did more than merely improve engineering methods by systematising earlier artisanal approaches, which is the classic view of Smeaton's method developed by historians of technology in the 1990s. I argue instead that his approach bridged the divide between science and technology, by integrating both hypothesis testing and exploratory experimentation. This is borne out, in particular, by the way that Smeaton emphasised the exploratory side of the work he published in the Philosophical Transactions, in contrast to his account of the construction of the Eddystone lighthouse, which was aimed at a broader, non-specialist public. I contribute to recent research on exploratory experimentation by showing – in line with other work on this topic – that exploratory experimentation is not incompatible with hypothesis testing. This new perspective on Smeaton's method will hopefully lead to further research and new insights into the relation between science and technology at the start of the Industrial Revolution.     

Maligned for mathematics: Sir Thomas Urquhart and his Trissotetras

Thomas Urquhart (1611–1660), celebrated for his English translation of Rabelais’ Gargantua et Pantagruel, has earned some notoriety for his eccentric, putatively incomprehensible early book on trigonometry The Trissotetras (1645). The Trissotetras was too impractical to succeed in its own day as a textbook, since it lacked both trigonometric tables and sample calculations. But its current bad reputation is based on literary authors’ amplifications of the verdict prefaced to its 19th century reprinting by one mathematician, William Wallace, who lacked the background to appreciate the book’s historical context. Considering that context (including seventeenth century ‘copious’ prose, and medieval logic and ‘art of memory’), the bad reputation is undeserved: the book is mathematically clear, clever (e.g. in superimposing 16 problems into one diagram), and complete. The Trissotetras may thus be viewed as simply one more of Urquhart’s polymathic projects and involvements – which included education, rise of the middle class, religious and class conflicts, development of science and mathematics, search for patronage, universal language construction, and development of English prose – which serve to make him a lively and instructive intellectual Everyman for his time.     

Pluralism and anarchism in quantum physics: Paul Feyerabend's writings on quantum physics in relation to his general philosophy of science

This paper aims to show that the development of Feyerabend's philosophical ideas in the 1950s and 1960s largely took place in the context of debates on quantum mechanics.In particular, he developed his influential arguments for pluralism in science in discussions with the quantum physicist David Bohm, who had developed an alternative approach to quantum physics which (in Feyerabend's perception) was met with a dogmatic dismissal by some of the leading quantum physicists. I argue that Feyerabend's arguments for theoretical pluralism and for challenging established theories were connected to his objections to the dogmatism and conservatism he observed in quantum physics.However, as Feyerabend gained insight into the physical details and historical complexities which led to the development of quantum mechanics, he gradually became more modest in his criticisms. His writings on quantum mechanics especially engaged with Niels Bohr; initially, he was critical of Bohr's work in quantum mechanics, but in the late 1960s, he completely withdrew his criticism and even praised Bohr as a model scientist. He became convinced that however puzzling quantum mechanics seemed, it was methodologically unobjectionable – and this was crucial for his move towards ‘anarchism’ in philosophy of science.     

Becoming a Darwinian: the Micro‐politics of Sir Francis Galton's Scientific Career 1859–65

In 1865 Francis Galton (1822–1911) published ‘Hereditary Talent and Character’, an elaborate attempt to prove the heritability of intelligence on the basis of pedigree data. It was the start of Galton's lifelong commitment to investigating the statistical patterns and physiological mechanisms of hereditary transmission. Most existing attempts to explain Galton's fascination for heredity have argued that he was driven by a commitment to conservative political ideologies to seek means of naturalizing human inequality. However, this paper shows that another factor of at least equal importance has been overlooked by Galton scholars: his determination during the 1860s to be accepted among the ranks of the Darwinian inner circle. By hitching his career to the fortunes of what looked likely to emerge as a new scientific elite, Galton felt that he could bypass the typically slow and uncertain route to achieving scientific distinction. For this essentially strategic reason, between 1860 and 1865 he drifted away from a set of existing scientific concerns that were failing to deliver the approbation that he desired. Earnestly seeking to ingratiate himself with the Darwinian lobby, he then toyed with a variety of potential research projects relevant to Darwinian evolution. Yet Galton consistently failed to stimulate the enthusiasm of the Darwinians. Finally, however, after several months of ruminating, in 1864 he settled on a study of eminent pedigrees as a subject that was both germane and highly useful to the Darwinian enterprise. Galton's willingness to shift the direction of his scientific career during the 1860s underscores the importance of examining the micro‐politics of scientific careers in addition to their broader social and political context. This account also emphasizes the limitations of class‐based explanations even when considering scientists whose work seems so manifestly indicative of ideological motivation.     

The Munsell Color System: A scientific compromise from the world of art

Color systems make accurate color specification and matching possible in science, art, and industry by defining a coordinate system for all possible color perceptions. The Munsell Color System, developed by the artist Albert Henry Munsell in the early twentieth century, has influenced color science to this day. I trace the development of the Munsell Color System from its origins in the art world to its acceptance in the scientific community.Munsell's system was the first to accurately and quantitatively describe the psychological experience of color. By considering the problems that color posed for Munsell's art community and examining his diaries and published material, I conclude that Munsell arrived at his results by remaining agnostic as to the scientific definition of color, while retaining faith that color perceptions could be objectively quantified. I argue that Munsell was able to interest the scientific community in his work because color had become a controversial topic between physicists and psychologists. Parts of Munsell's system appealed to each field, making it a workable compromise. For contrast, I suggest that three contemporary scientists with whom Munsell had contact – Wilhelm Ostwald, Ogden Rood, and Edward Titchener – did not reach the same conclusions in their color systems because they started from scientific assumptions about the nature of color.     

William Whewell,natural theology and the philosophy of science in mid nineteenth century Britain

This article aims to reveal the moral and theological dimensions of William Whewell's philosophy of science. It suggests that, in addition to an internalist account of Whewell's method and epistemology, there is a need to view his philosophy of science (and knowledge) within the intellectual context constituted by the assumptions of natural theology. It argues that writers of natural theology saw man's ability to know the world as an indication of his special place in nature, and that epistemological theories were therefore invested with moral and theological significance. Whewell's work is interpreted as an attempt to dissociate natural science from Utilitarianism and empiricist philosophy: he sought to promote a philosophy of science which guaranteed the principles of natural theology and the values of Christianity. But the idealist epistemology which he proposed was criticized by both scientists and theologians. In 1853 (in his book Of the plurality of worlds), again within the framework of natural theology, Whewell attempted to justify this epistemology by affirming the metaphysics of a Christian Platonism. From this position, Whewell defended natural theology against the metaphysical scepticism of both Henry Mansel and the positivists.     

Feyerabend's perspectivism

Although, Feyerabend himself seems never to have used the term ‘perspectivism’ to designate a philosophical position, I think his views about science are very well characterized as perspectival. In fact, his later writings contain much that contributes to current thinking about perspectivism. I would like, therefore, to distinguish my own perspectivism from Feyerabend's. In the end, I will argue, his perspectivism is lacking enough of the critical bite that the younger Feyerabend found so attractive in Popper's philosophy.