Values in early-stage climate engineering: The ethical implications of “doing the research”

Calls for research on climate engineering have increased in the last two decades, but there remains widespread agreement that many climate engineering technologies (in particular, forms involving global solar radiation management) present significant ethical risks and require careful governance. However, proponents of research argue, ethical restrictions on climate engineering research should not be imposed in early-stage work like in silico modeling studies. Such studies, it is argued, do not pose risks to the public, and the knowledge gained from them is necessary for assessing the risks and benefits of climate engineering technologies. I argue that this position, which I call the “broad research-first” stance, cannot be maintained in light of the entrance of nonepistemic values in climate modeling. I analyze the roles that can be played by nonepistemic political and ethical values in the design, tuning, and interpretation of climate models. Then, I argue that, in the context of early-stage climate engineering research, the embeddedness of values will lead to value judgments that could harm stakeholder groups or impose researcher values on non-consenting populations. I conclude by calling for more robust reflection on the ethics and governance of early-stage climate engineering research.     

An overview of climate change impacts on the society in China

Society could sustain the impact of climate change by adapting to the change and mitigating risks from adverse effects of increasing changes, so that it can continue maintaining its prospect and improving wellbeing. Nevertheless, climate change is more or less affecting society's functions at different scales, including both individuals and communities. In this review, we discuss the relationship between society and climate change in China from the aspects of the needs at different socioeconomic developing stages. The relationship as well as the current spatial pattern and future risks of the climate change impacts on societies are summarized. The complexity of social and climatic systems leads to the spatial heterogeneity of climate impacts and risks in China. To more effectively leverage increasing knowledge about the past, we advocate greater cross-disciplinary collaboration between climate adaption, poverty alleviation and Nature-based Solutions (Nbs). That could provide decision makers with more comprehensive train of thoughts for climate policy making.     

An overview of climate change impacts on the society in China

Society could sustain the impact of climate change by adapting to the change and mitigating risks from adverse effects of increasing changes, so that it can continue maintaining its prospect and improving wellbeing. Nevertheless, climate change is more or less affecting society's functions at different scales, including both individuals and communities. In this review, we discuss the relationship between society and climate change in China from the aspects of the needs at different socioeconomic developing stages. The relationship as well as the current spatial pattern and future risks of the climate change impacts on societies are summarized. The complexity of social and climatic systems leads to the spatial heterogeneity of climate impacts and risks in China. To more effectively leverage increasing knowledge about the past, we advocate greater cross-disciplinary collaboration between climate adaption, poverty alleviation and Nature-based Solutions (Nbs). That could provide decision makers with more comprehensive train of thoughts for climate policy making.     

The epistemology of climate models and some of its implications for climate science and the philosophy of science

I bring out the limitations of four important views of what the target of useful climate model assessment is. Three of these views are drawn from philosophy. They include the views of Elisabeth Lloyd and Wendy Parker, and an application of Bayesian confirmation theory. The fourth view I criticise is based on the actual practice of climate model assessment. In bringing out the limitations of these four views, I argue that an approach to climate model assessment that neither demands too much of such assessment nor threatens to be unreliable will, in typical cases, have to aim at something other than the confirmation of claims about how the climate system actually is. This means, I suggest, that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC׳s) focus on establishing confidence in climate model explanations and predictions is misguided. So too, it means that standard epistemologies of science with pretensions to generality, e.g., Bayesian epistemologies, fail to illuminate the assessment of climate models. I go on to outline a view that neither demands too much nor threatens to be unreliable, a view according to which useful climate model assessment typically aims to show that certain climatic scenarios are real possibilities and, when the scenarios are determined to be real possibilities, partially to determine how remote they are.     

It starts at home? Climate policies targeting household consumption and behavioral decisions are key to low-carbon futures

Through their consumption behavior, households are responsible for 72% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, they are key actors in reaching the 1.5 °C goal under the Paris Agreement. However, the possible contribution and position of households in climate policies is neither well understood, nor do households receive sufficiently high priority in current climate policy strategies. This paper investigates how behavioral change can achieve a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in European high-income countries. It uses theoretical thinking and some core results from the HOPE research project, which investigated household preferences for reducing emissions in four European cities in France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. The paper makes five major points: First, car and plane mobility, meat and dairy consumption, as well as heating are the most dominant components of household footprints. Second, household living situations (demographics, size of home) greatly influence the household potential to reduce their footprint, even more than country or city location. Third, household decisions can be sequential and temporally dynamic, shifting through different phases such as childhood, adulthood, and illness. Fourth, short term voluntary efforts will not be sufficient by themselves to reach the drastic reductions needed to achieve the 1.5 °C goal; instead, households need a regulatory framework supporting their behavioral changes. Fifth, there is a mismatch between the roles and responsibilities conveyed by current climate policies and household perceptions of responsibility. We then conclude with further recommendations for research and policy.     

It starts at home? Climate policies targeting household consumption and behavioral decisions are key to low-carbon futures

Through their consumption behavior, households are responsible for 72% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, they are key actors in reaching the 1.5 °C goal under the Paris Agreement. However, the possible contribution and position of households in climate policies is neither well understood, nor do households receive sufficiently high priority in current climate policy strategies. This paper investigates how behavioral change can achieve a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in European high-income countries. It uses theoretical thinking and some core results from the HOPE research project, which investigated household preferences for reducing emissions in four European cities in France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. The paper makes five major points: First, car and plane mobility, meat and dairy consumption, as well as heating are the most dominant components of household footprints. Second, household living situations (demographics, size of home) greatly influence the household potential to reduce their footprint, even more than country or city location. Third, household decisions can be sequential and temporally dynamic, shifting through different phases such as childhood, adulthood, and illness. Fourth, short term voluntary efforts will not be sufficient by themselves to reach the drastic reductions needed to achieve the 1.5 °C goal; instead, households need a regulatory framework supporting their behavioral changes. Fifth, there is a mismatch between the roles and responsibilities conveyed by current climate policies and household perceptions of responsibility. We then conclude with further recommendations for research and policy.     

Model uncertainty and policy choice: A plea for integrated subjectivism

A question at the intersection of scientific modeling and public choice is how to deal with uncertainty about model predictions. This “high-level” uncertainty is necessarily value-laden, and thus must be treated as irreducibly subjective. Nevertheless, formal methods of uncertainty analysis should still be employed for the purpose of clarifying policy debates. I argue that such debates are best informed by models which integrate objective features (which model the world) with subjective ones (modeling the policy-maker). This integrated subjectivism is illustrated with a case study from the literature on monetary policy. The paper concludes with some morals for the use of models in determining climate policy.     

Multi-model ensembles in climate science: Mathematical structures and expert judgements

Projections of future climate change cannot rely on a single model. It has become common to rely on multiple simulations generated by Multi-Model Ensembles (MMEs), especially to quantify the uncertainty about what would constitute an adequate model structure. But, as Parker points out (2018), one of the remaining philosophically interesting questions is: “How can ensemble studies be designed so that they probe uncertainty in desired ways?” This paper offers two interpretations of what General Circulation Models (GCMs) are and how MMEs made of GCMs should be designed. In the first interpretation, models are combinations of modules and parameterisations; an MME is obtained by “plugging and playing” with interchangeable modules and parameterisations. In the second interpretation, models are aggregations of expert judgements that result from a history of epistemic decisions made by scientists about the choice of representations; an MME is a sampling of expert judgements from modelling teams. We argue that, while the two interpretations involve distinct domains from philosophy of science and social epistemology, they both could be used in a complementary manner in order to explore ways of designing better MMEs.     

Existential risk,creativity & well-adapted science

Existential risks, particularly those arising from emerging technologies, are a complex, obstinate challenge for scientific study. This should motivate studying how the relevant scientific communities might be made more amenable to studying such risks. I offer an account of scientific creativity suitable for thinking about scientific communities, and provide reasons for thinking contemporary science doesn't incentivise creativity in this specified sense. I'll argue that a successful science of existential risk will be creative in my sense. So, if we want to make progress on those questions we should consider how to shift scientific incentives to encourage creativity. The analysis also has lessons for philosophical approaches to understanding the social structure of science. I introduce the notion of a ‘well-adapted’ science: one in which the incentive structure is tailored to the epistemic situation at hand.     

Computer models and the evidence of anthropogenic climate change: An epistemology of variety-of-evidence inferences and robustness analysis

To study climate change, scientists employ computer models, which approximate target systems with various levels of skill. Given the imperfection of climate models, how do scientists use simulations to generate knowledge about the causes of observed climate change? Addressing a similar question in the context of biological modelling, Levins (1966) proposed an account grounded in robustness analysis. Recent philosophical discussions dispute the confirmatory power of robustness, raising the question of how the results of computer modelling studies contribute to the body of evidence supporting hypotheses about climate change. Expanding on Staley’s (2004) distinction between evidential strength and security, and Lloyd’s (2015) argument connecting variety-of-evidence inferences and robustness analysis, I address this question with respect to recent challenges to the epistemology robustness analysis. Applying this epistemology to case studies of climate change, I argue that, despite imperfections in climate models, and epistemic constraints on variety-of-evidence reasoning and robustness analysis, this framework accounts for the strength and security of evidence supporting climatological inferences, including the finding that global warming is occurring and its primary causes are anthropogenic.     

Realism bit by bit: Part II. Disjunctive partial reference

In this second paper, I continue my discussion of the problem of reference for scientific realism. First, I consider a final objection to Kitcher’s account of reference, which I generalise to other accounts of reference. Such accounts make attributions of reference by appeal to our pretheoretical intuitions about how true statements ought to be distibuted among the scientific utterances of the past. I argue that in the cases that merit discussion, this strategy fails because our intuitions are unstable. The interesting cases are importantly borderline—it really isn’t clear what we ought to say about how those terms referred. I conclude that in many relevant cases, our grounds for thinking that the theoretical terms of the past referred are matched by our grounds for thinking that they failed to refer, in such a way that deciding on either result is arbitrary and bad news for the realist. In response to this problem, in the second part of the paper I expand upon Field’s (1973) account of partial reference to sketch a new way of thinking about the theoretical terms of the past—that they partially referred and partially failed to refer.     

Model robustness as a confirmatory virtue: The case of climate science

I propose a distinct type of robustness, which I suggest can support a confirmatory role in scientific reasoning, contrary to the usual philosophical claims. In model robustness, repeated production of the empirically successful model prediction or retrodiction against a background of independently-supported and varying model constructions, within a group of models containing a shared causal factor, may suggest how confident we can be in the causal factor and predictions/retrodictions, especially once supported by a variety of evidence framework. I present climate models of greenhouse gas global warming of the 20th Century as an example, and emphasize climate scientists' discussions of robust models and causal aspects. The account is intended as applicable to a broad array of sciences that use complex modeling techniques.     

Severe weather event attribution: Why values won't go away

We start by reviewing the complicated situation in methods of scientific attribution of climate change to extreme weather events. We emphasize the social values involved in using both so-called ″storyline″ and ordinary probabilistic or ″risk-based″ methods, noting that one important virtue claimed by the storyline approach is that it features a reduction in false negative results, which has much social and ethical merit, according to its advocates. This merit is critiqued by the probabilistic, risk-based, opponents, who claim the high ground; the usual probabilistic approach is claimed to be more objective and more ″scientific″, under the grounds that it reduces false positive error. We examine this mostly-implicit debate about error, which apparently mirrors the old Jeffrey-Rudner debate. We also argue that there is an overlooked component to the role of values in science: that of second-order inductive risk, and that it makes the relative role of values in the two methods different from what it first appears to be. In fact, neither method helps us to escape social values, and be more scientifically ″objective″ in the sense of being removed or detached from human values and interests. The probabilistic approach does not succeed in doing so, contrary to the claims of its proponents. This is important to understand, because neither method is, fundamentally, a successful strategy for climate scientists to avoid making value judgments.     

What do numerical (climate) models really represent?

The translation of a mathematical model into a numerical one employs various modifications in order to make the model accessible for computation. Such modifications include discretizations, approximations, heuristic assumptions, and other methods. The paper investigates the divergent styles of mathematical and numerical models in the case of a specific piece of code in a current atmospheric model. Cognizance of these modifications means that the question of the role and function of scientific models has to be reworked. Neither are numerical models pure intermediaries between theory and data, nor are they autonomous tools of inquiry. Instead, theory and data are transformed into a new symbolic form of research due to the fact that computation has become an essential requirement for every scientific practice. Therefore the question is posed: What do numerical (climate) models really represent?     

“Global warming” versus “climate change”: A replication on the association between political self-identification,question wording,and environmental beliefs

Climate change is one of the greatest threats to humanity and requires immediate action. Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) suggested that beliefs in environmental phenomena can be influenced by the terminology used to describe it: changing question wording from global warming to climate change resulted in a 6.3 percentage point increase in belief in environmental phenomena. This association was moderated by political self-identification, with Republicans being 16.2 percentage points more likely to believe in climate change than in global warming, with Democrats showing no difference. The potential for connotative meanings to shift over time and the sociopolitical changes since the original study, potential policy and environmental campaign implications, and an expansion of these findings to other countries, motivated an attempt to replicate this important finding. This pre-registered study repeated the original procedures in the United States of America and two other countries (United Kingdom and Australia; total N = 5,717). Although question wording no longer had a significant effect on beliefs in climate change/global warming, the association of political self-identification with beliefs in environmental phenomena replicated in all three countries, with Conservatives consistently believing less in climate change/global warming than Liberals. The potential impacts of temporal and methodological differences on the discrepancies between this study's and the original's findings are discussed.     

“Global warming” versus “climate change”: A replication on the association between political self-identification,question wording,and environmental beliefs

Climate change is one of the greatest threats to humanity and requires immediate action. Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) suggested that beliefs in environmental phenomena can be influenced by the terminology used to describe it: changing question wording from global warming to climate change resulted in a 6.3 percentage point increase in belief in environmental phenomena. This association was moderated by political self-identification, with Republicans being 16.2 percentage points more likely to believe in climate change than in global warming, with Democrats showing no difference. The potential for connotative meanings to shift over time and the sociopolitical changes since the original study, potential policy and environmental campaign implications, and an expansion of these findings to other countries, motivated an attempt to replicate this important finding. This pre-registered study repeated the original procedures in the United States of America and two other countries (United Kingdom and Australia; total N = 5,717). Although question wording no longer had a significant effect on beliefs in climate change/global warming, the association of political self-identification with beliefs in environmental phenomena replicated in all three countries, with Conservatives consistently believing less in climate change/global warming than Liberals. The potential impacts of temporal and methodological differences on the discrepancies between this study's and the original's findings are discussed.     

Seepage,objectivity, and climate science

Based on the disproportionate amount of attention paid by climate scientists to the supposed global warming hiatus, it has recently been argued that contrarian discourse has “seeped into” climate science. While I agree that seepage has occurred, its effects remain unclear. This lack of clarity may give the impression that climate science has been compromised in a way that it hasn't—such a conclusion should be defended against. To do this I argue that the effects of seepage should be analyzed in terms of objectivity. I use seven meanings of objectivity to analyze contrarian discourse's impact on climate science. The resulting account supports the important point that climate science has not been compromised in a way that invalidates the conclusions its scientists have drawn, despite the reality of seepage having occurred.     

Impact of climate change on wetland ecosystems: A critical review of experimental wetlands

Climate change is identified as a major threat to wetlands. Altered hydrology and rising temperature can change the biogeochemistry and function of a wetland to the degree that some important services might be turned into disservices. This means that they will, for example, no longer provide a water purification service and adversely they may start to decompose and release nutrients to the surface water. Moreover, a higher rate of decomposition than primary production (photosynthesis) may lead to a shift of their function from being a sink of carbon to a source. This review paper assesses the potential response of natural wetlands (peatlands) and constructed wetlands to climate change in terms of gas emission and nutrients release. In addition, the impact of key climatic factors such as temperature and water availability on wetlands has been reviewed. The authors identified the methodological gaps and weaknesses in the literature and then introduced a new framework for conducting a comprehensive mesocosm experiment to address the existing gaps in literature to support future climate change research on wetland ecosystems. In the future, higher temperatures resulting in drought might shift the role of both constructed wetland and peatland from a sink to a source of carbon. However, higher temperatures accompanied by more precipitation can promote photosynthesis to a degree that might exceed the respiration and maintain the carbon sink role of the wetland. There might be a critical water level at which the wetland can preserve most of its services. In order to find that level, a study of the key factors of climate change and their interactions using an appropriate experimental method is necessary. Some contradictory results of past experiments can be associated with different methodologies, designs, time periods, climates, and natural variability. Hence a long-term simulation of climate change for wetlands according to the proposed framework is recommended. This framework provides relatively more accurate and realistic simulations, valid comparative results, comprehensive understanding and supports coordination between researchers. This can help to find a sustainable management strategy for wetlands to be resilient to climate change.     

Impact of climate change on wetland ecosystems: A critical review of experimental wetlands

Climate change is identified as a major threat to wetlands. Altered hydrology and rising temperature can change the biogeochemistry and function of a wetland to the degree that some important services might be turned into disservices. This means that they will, for example, no longer provide a water purification service and adversely they may start to decompose and release nutrients to the surface water. Moreover, a higher rate of decomposition than primary production (photosynthesis) may lead to a shift of their function from being a sink of carbon to a source. This review paper assesses the potential response of natural wetlands (peatlands) and constructed wetlands to climate change in terms of gas emission and nutrients release. In addition, the impact of key climatic factors such as temperature and water availability on wetlands has been reviewed. The authors identified the methodological gaps and weaknesses in the literature and then introduced a new framework for conducting a comprehensive mesocosm experiment to address the existing gaps in literature to support future climate change research on wetland ecosystems. In the future, higher temperatures resulting in drought might shift the role of both constructed wetland and peatland from a sink to a source of carbon. However, higher temperatures accompanied by more precipitation can promote photosynthesis to a degree that might exceed the respiration and maintain the carbon sink role of the wetland. There might be a critical water level at which the wetland can preserve most of its services. In order to find that level, a study of the key factors of climate change and their interactions using an appropriate experimental method is necessary. Some contradictory results of past experiments can be associated with different methodologies, designs, time periods, climates, and natural variability. Hence a long-term simulation of climate change for wetlands according to the proposed framework is recommended. This framework provides relatively more accurate and realistic simulations, valid comparative results, comprehensive understanding and supports coordination between researchers. This can help to find a sustainable management strategy for wetlands to be resilient to climate change.     

Values and uncertainties in climate prediction,revisited

Philosophers continue to debate both the actual and the ideal roles of values in science. Recently, Eric Winsberg has offered a novel, model-based challenge to those who argue that the internal workings of science can and should be kept free from the influence of social values. He contends that model-based assignments of probability to hypotheses about future climate change are unavoidably influenced by social values. I raise two objections to Winsberg’s argument, neither of which can wholly undermine its conclusion but each of which suggests that his argument exaggerates the influence of social values on estimates of uncertainty in climate prediction. I then show how a more traditional challenge to the value-free ideal seems tailor-made for the climate context.