论心智逻辑理论与心智模型理论融合的可能途径

文献表明，到目前为止，还没有一个全面的、精确的和统一的研究人类推理心理学理论，而心智逻辑理论和心智模型理论是近20年来发展最快的两个主流理论。心智逻辑理论认为人类运用推理图式进行推理；心智模型理论则认为人类通过构造心智模型实现推理。本文讨论了两个理论各自的适用范围和局限性，并提出未来两理论融合的可能方向。     

复杂系统的隐喻描述与模型描述

由隐喻描述走向模型描述是复杂性科学成熟的标志.本文重点介绍了复杂系统的两种模型描述方法:形式化系统模型与关联论模型,并比较它们各自的优缺点.两种模型是从不同的角度对复杂系统的描述,在复杂系统的理论研究与实际运用中都有着重要的、不可替代的意义.复杂系统的未来研究方向并不是对于两种模型的"整合",而是两种模型交替并用,以多元视角科学地揭示复杂系统的本质.     

类比建模的贝叶斯分析

通过质疑基于模型推理的认知论题,尝试对在自然化认识论纲领下的认知-历史分析方法进行规范性研究。类比建模是基于模型(Model-based)推理的主要形式之一,类比建模的基本机制主要包括两个部分:一是对模型来源的泛化抽象,二是基于目标域的特征对模型来源进行限制或修正。这两步反复操作,最终构造出适用于目标对象域的模型。模型与对象域的适切性(fitness)则是对以上机制恰当性的基本评价标准,类型层级理论对相似性和差异性的分析,为测度适切性提供了一条可操作的方法。基于类型层级理论,并结合贝叶斯方法可以解释类比建模何以能够提高模型的可信度,以及类比的创造性与科学合理性之间的关系。这一工作对基于模型推理的科学认知论题的提出了一种可能的反驳。     

对科学发现推理的再认识

科学发现是科学的生命。科学发现的推理问题一直是科学方法论的一个重要内容。本文提出，科学发现中的模型化推理对于科学发现的创造性具有至关重要的意义，理应纳入现代科学发现推理的研究领域。作者从人类思维的起源和发生认识论角度进行了考察，结合科学家的典型实践活动深入探讨了这一问题，并且预测其未来的发展前景是十分广阔的。     

推理的广义概念——推理理论的基本问题

拉尔夫·约翰逊指出推理理论的研究是哲学领域亟待填补的空白,并指出对推理概念本身的探讨是推理理论研究中至关重要的基本问题。文章讨论了目前学者对这个概念的各种用法并试图解释推理与论证之间的概念混淆。为了澄清推理的概念,文章试图从形式逻辑研究抽象推理形式的角度和非形式逻辑研究真实推理的具体特征进行论述,提出了一个相对广义的推理之概念,以涵盖更多推理理论研究试图探讨的理论内涵。最后,文章再次指出了推理理论研究的学术意义。     

形式模型、机制与实际因果的分类

实际因果是一元的还是多元的，是当前因果研究中一个争议的热点。最近，费舍尔基于结构方程模型发展出一种多元论的观点；与其他多元论立场相比较，费舍尔的工作的优点在于使用了形式化方法，使得相关分析清晰而深入。但是，基于新机制主义的框架，本文论证，费舍尔的分类主要是针对群体机制型实际因果进行的，除此之外，还有个体机制型实际因果以及非机制型实际因果，并且对于后两类实际因果，可能需要使用不同于结构方程模型的形式化方法。     

三维驱动的创新驱动力网络:一个元模型——设计驱动创新与技术创新的理论整合

本文在回顾技术创新驱动理论的发展和与评价新兴设计驱动创新理论的基础上,总结了创新领域设计环节作用日益突出的发展趋势,引入"技术—文化"系统观,突破创新动力的工具化诠释,对功能与创新的概念进行广义化,提出设计与技术的解耦和分拆概念,把创新驱动模型区分为驱动因素模型和创新模型两类,初步建构两类模型驱动关系和机制的元模型,建立了技术推动、市场拉动和设计驱动的6条路径。     

科技知识的地方性与全球性——走向后殖民技科学观研究

在关于科技跨文化和跨国家传播的研究中,巴萨拉模型和佩尔森的文化帝国主义,是一种全球西方化的实证主义科技观;后殖民科学观,其理论基础是社会建构主义,强调地方性科技之间的永久隔阂,走向文化相对主义;当前的后殖民技科学观从全球性与地方性之间相互冲撞的关系视角去关注着全球性与地方性之间各种异质性要素的辩证冲撞与互利发展,这种视角的理论基础实际就是拉图尔的行动者网络理论。     

GIS模型库关键技术及其在滑坡预警预报中的应用

GIS模型和模型库是实现地理信息系统与应用分析模型集成的关键技术。本文采用面向对象的思想，对支持模型复合的模型形式化方法开展研究，并以文件与数据库相结合的方式实现模型组织与存储。各项研究成果在深圳滑坡灾害预警预报系统开发建设中得到了实际应用，取得了良好效果。     

实际因果的反事实定义

实际因果指的是实际的事件之间的因果关系,美国哲学家路易斯开创了对实际因果的基于反事实框架的形式化研究。路易斯的定义被认为存在着不足,特别的,这一定义面临着传递性问题。当前对实际因果的形式化讨论主要基于两类形式模型:结构方程模型与神经元图,但是结构方程模型方法可能与实际因果并不融洽;在梳理了三个基于神经元图的反事实定义后,本文引入了一个新的定义;如果这个定义是合理的,那么传递性问题将得到消解。     

Multiple Roles for Analogies in the Genesis of Fluid Mechanics: How Analogies Can Cooperate with Other Heuristic Strategies

When Johann and Daniel Bernoulli founded fluid dynamics they encountered several problems. To go beyond the vision of Newtonian particles, a new set of images was needed in order to deal with the spatial extensibility and lack of form of fluids. I point to evidence that analogy was an essential abductive strategy in the creation of this imagery. But its heuristic behavior is complex: analogy can provide an initial model or proto-model that establishes the starting point of a theoretical process, but it can play other roles as well. The historical genesis analyzed here shows that the participation of analogy in physicists’ creativity is not so restricted and that its richness opens up the field for very different roles and strategies in model-based discovery processes. Analogies can crop up intermittently in the evolution of a theory; and they can cooperate with images, extreme case reasoning and thought experiments, and even activate these processes at origin. Although it may seem that the contributions of analogy are generative in the sense of helping to discover new aspects of reality, we must stress the evaluative function that sometimes is performed by analogical reasoning in order to gain confidence. The study of the Bernoulli’s genesis of the foundations of fluid dynamics generates interesting hypotheses about the multiple roles that analogy can play in scientific model-based reasoning.     

A New Mechanism for Transfer Between Conceptual Domains in Scientific Discovery and Education

Confronted with problems or situations that do not yield toknown theories and world views, scientists and students are alike. Theyare rarely able to directly build a model or a theory thereof. Rather,they must find ways to make sense of the circumstances using theircurrent knowledge and adjusting what is recognized in the process. Thisway of thinking, using past ways of perceiving the physical world tobuild new ones does not follow a logical path and cannot be described astheory revision. Likewise, in many situations it is awkward, indeedoften impossible, to resort to analogical reasoning to account for it.This paper presents a new mechanism, called `tunnel effect', that mayexplain, in part, how scientists and students reason while constructinga new conceptual domain. `Tunnel effect' is also contrasted withanalogical reasoning.     

Towards a Theory of Mathematical Argument

In this paper, I assume, perhaps controversially, that translation into a language of formal logic is not the method by which mathematicians assess mathematical reasoning. Instead, I argue that the actual practice of analyzing, evaluating and critiquing mathematical reasoning resembles, and perhaps equates with, the practice of informal logic or argumentation theory. It doesn’t matter whether the reasoning is a full-fledged mathematical proof or merely some non-deductive mathematical justification: in either case, the methodology of assessment overlaps to a large extent with argument assessment in non-mathematical contexts. I demonstrate this claim by considering the assessment of axiomatic or deductive proofs, probabilistic evidence, computer-aided proofs, and the acceptance of axioms. I also consider Jody Azzouni’s ‘derivation indicator’ view of proofs because it places derivations—which may be thought to invoke formal logic—at the center of mathematical justificatory practice. However, when the notion of ‘derivation’ at work in Azzouni’s view is clarified, it is seen to accord with, rather than to count against, the informal logical view I support. Finally, I pose several open questions for the development of a theory of mathematical argument.     

从符合论的观点看逻辑真理

从真理符合论的观点看,逻辑真理与一般的事实真理有本质的不同.我们认为,逻辑真理不应看作是真理,而只是一类逻辑有效式,它们与逻辑推理的普遍有效式是一致的.逻辑学的任务就是探寻逻辑真理.     

Reasoning to Hypotheses: Where Do Questions Come?

Detectives and scientists are in the business of reasoning from observations to explanations. This they often do by raising cunning questionsduring their inquiries. But to substantiate this claim we need to know how questions arise and how they are nurtured into more specific hypotheses. I shall discuss what the problem is, and then introduce the so-called interrogative model of inquiry which makes use of an explicit logic of questions. On this view, a discovery processes can be represented as a model-based game in which an inquirer subjects a source of information to a series of strategically organized questions. Strategic principles and why-questions are especially important in heuristical reasoning. Why-questions have their own peculiar nature among questions. They indicate that the inquirer's expectations are somehow disappointed, and that is cognitively challenging. In a finished argument why-questions can be omitted, but in the search for more specific questions they are highly important. As a detetective example I shall analyze Sherlock Holmes reasoning in Silver Blace, the scientific one is A.R. Wallace's discovery of the principle of natural selection. In both of these examples the meaning of questions, especially of well-chosen why-questions, of strategic principles, and of highly structured background knowledge come to the fore. Good questions frequent those who have orderly expectations, based on experience and expertise (detectives!) or highly structured background theories (scientists!).     

The Emergence of Symbolic Algebra as a Shift in Predominant Models

Historians of science find it difficult to pinpoint to an exact period in which symbolic algebra came into existence. This can be explained partly because the historical process leading to this breakthrough in mathematics has been a complex and diffuse one. On the other hand, it might also be the case that in the early twentieth century, historians of mathematics over emphasized the achievements in algebraic procedures and underestimated the conceptual changes leading to symbolic algebra. This paper attempts to provide a more precise setting for the historical context in which this decisive step to symbolic reasoning took place. For that purpose we will consider algebraic problem solving as model-based reasoning and symbolic representation as a model. This allows us to characterize the emergence of symbolic algebra as a shift from a geometrical to a symbolic mode of representation. The use of the symbolic as a model will be situated in the context of mercantilism where merchant activity of exchange has led to reciprocal relations between money and wealth.

Logics in Scientific Discovery

In this paper I argue for a place for logic inscientific methodology, at the same level asthat of computational and historicalapproaches. While it is well known that a awhole generation of philosophers dismissedLogical Positivism (not just for the logicthough), there are at least two reasons toreconsider logical approaches in the philosophyof science. On the one hand, the presentsituation in logical research has gone farbeyond the formal developments that deductivelogic reached last century, and new researchincludes the formalization of several othertypes of reasoning, like induction andabduction. On the other hand, we call for abalanced Philosophy of Science, one inwhich both methods, the formal and thehistorical may be complementary, togetherproviding a pluralistic view of science, inwhich no method is the predominant one.     

梅文鼎的日月五星左旋说及其弊端

在中国古代日月五星左、右旋之争中，左旋说到了明清之际已几成沉寂之势。清初，受到传入的西方天文学特别是其多重天说的影响，梅文鼎又提出了一种新的左旋说。梅文鼎的左旋说，是建立在“天”有重数且是一个整体等说法基础上的——故承载日月五星甚至恒星的“各重之天”不得不在外层“动天”的掣动下一起左旋；同时，梅文鼎还有一个重要的辅助创见，即认为起制动作用的“宗动天”的枢纽是北极，而日月五星甚至恒星所在的“各重之天”的枢纽是黄极。这样，就解释了日月五星等在东西向的视运动之外还存在着南北向的视运动以及它们视运动迟疾的差异问题。此外，梅文鼎的模式尽管较诸传统的左旋说更具自洽性，在力学机制上也有所长，但与右旋说尤其是黄百家的右旋说相比，则具有更多的缺陷——主要是论理、实测和应用方面。最后，还探讨了梅文鼎左旋说的思想根源及其影响。     

古希腊哲学:“实体”与“关系”的提出

古代希腊自然哲学体系以"实体"为核心展开,同时也包含着"关系"思想的萌芽。它包括"始基"本原说、自然类观念、形式论、部分和整体的"关系"等,呈现出严密的逻辑关系。无论是近代经典科学的"实体"问题,还是当今系统科学的"关系"问题,在古希腊就已经提出。它不仅为中世纪及近现代的哲学研究开辟了道路,而且为近代产生的——作为研究的——科学奠定了基础。