结构实在论评析

曹天予提出的结构实在论知识论版本在科学哲学界有很大影响，并引发了《综合》期刊专刊讨论。他既批评反实在论的观点，也对结构实在论的知识版本与本体版本有所批判。他从结构、本体、建构这三个概念出发，论证了科学理论的客观性体现为建构性、历史性、整体性、修正性、革命性。本文对曹天予的结构实在论进行了系统的梳理与分析。笔者赞同他对“不充分决定”论旨的批评，对他批评“本体论不连续性”持中立态度，但对他的“普遍语法论证”有所存疑。     

What if Haecceity is not a Property?

In some sense, both ontological and epistemological problems related to individuation have been the focal issues in the philosophy of mathematics ever since Frege. However, such an interest becomes manifest in the rise of structuralism as one of the most promising positions in recent philosophy of mathematics. The most recent controversy between Keränen and Shapiro seems to be the culmination of this phenomenon. Rather than taking sides, in this paper, I propose to critically examine some common assumptions shared by both parties. In particular, I shall focus on their assumptions on (1) haecceity as an individual essence, (2) haecceity as a property, (3) the classification of properties, and thereby (4) the search for the principle of individuation in terms of properties. I shall argue that all these assumptions are mistaken and ungrounded from Scotus’ point of view. Further, I will fathom what consequences would follow, if we reject each of these assumptions.     

Philosophical Issues and their Implications for the Systems Architect

Many system architects select their system methodologies without explicit consideration of the philosophical perspectives that impact their decisions. This paper describes how the concepts of ontology and epistemology apply in systems science. Ontology is how we specify terms of reference for existence, allowing us to understand the theory of existence via an ‘existence framework’. Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, allows us to explore new models and theories of knowledge acquisition so the best system-based methodologies can be deployed to solve complex system problems. After introducing these concepts, the paper presents system science issues and assesses the impact of ontological, axiological and epistemological perspectives on system methodology selection, research, system design and deployment. An ontological viewpoint such as realism, as an objective view is contrasted versus nationalism, a personal perceptional view. An epistemological viewpoint is explored comparing knowledge as a product of sensory perception or rational reflection. The paper’s significant contribution is that it helps system architects understand that their philosophical views of systems science impact their system methodology choices.     

国内外系统科学研究差异的比较研究

"整体研究思路的不同"导致国内外系统科学研究状况出现诸多差异。国内外系统科学界在"系统科学的研究群体"、"对相关学科关系的关注"、"对系统科学功能的理解"、"系统科学的认识论基础"和"系统科学范式"元研究等方面存在明显不同。"比较之后的融合与发展"是系统科学未来研究的必由之路。     

钱三强科学史贡献初探

钱三强不仅是一位杰出的科学家,而且对科学史学科的发展也贡献卓越。本文梳理了钱三强公开发表的有关科学技术史方面的著述,探讨了他对科学史的贡献,认为,钱三强是原子能科学技术史的开拓者和传播者,是中国近现代科学技术发展史的记录者与研究者,是中国科学技术史事业的组织者与推动者。重视科学史的学术价值、科普功能、教育功能和资政功能是钱三强科学史学思想的主要特征。     

朱熹科学研究之特色及当代启示

朱熹的科学研究颇具特色,主要体现为"主宾之辨"的认识论前提、"理一分殊"的宇宙观基奠、"格物致知"的核心方法论以及求真务实的科学理性精神等几方面。这些研究特色成就了作为科学家的朱熹,而同时亦限制着朱熹在科学研究上难有更大的作为。通过对朱熹科学活动的个案研究,对人们正确认识评价朱熹及其科学研究、儒学与科学的关系乃至科学与哲学的关系以及科学哲学学科的建设都有重要的启示作用。     

Towards a Radical Constructivist Understanding of Science

Constructivism is the idea thatwe construct our own world rather than it beingdetermined by an outside reality. Its mostconsistent form, Radical Constructivism (RC),claims that we cannot transcend ourexperiences. Thus it doesn't make sense to saythat our constructions gradually approach thestructure of an external reality. The mind isnecessarily an epistemological solipsist, incontrast to being an ontological solipsist whomaintains that this is all there is, namely asingle mind within which the only world exists.RC recognizes the impossibility of the claimthat the world does not exist. Yet, RC has thepotential to go much further. I claim that RCprovides the foundation of a new world-view inwhich we can overcome hard scientific problems.Thus, the paper is urging us to carry RCfurther, not just on philosophical grounds, butalso into the domain of science.     

Newton’s Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space

This paper investigates Newton’s ontology of space in order to determine its commitment, if any, to both Cambridge neo-Platonism, which posits an incorporeal basis for space, and substantivalism, which regards space as a form of substance or entity. A non-substantivalist interpretation of Newton’s theory has been famously championed by Howard Stein and Robert DiSalle, among others, while both Stein and the early work of J. E. McGuire have downplayed the influence of Cambridge neo-Platonism on various aspects of Newton’s own spatial hypotheses. Both of these assertions will be shown to be problematic on various grounds, with special emphasis placed on Stein’s influential case for a non-substantivalist reading. Our analysis will strive, nonetheless, to reveal the unique or forward-looking aspects of Newton’s approach, most notably, his critical assessment of substance ontologies, that help to distinguish his theory of space from his neo-Platonic contemporaries and predecessors.     

Leibniz and Newton on Space

This paper reexamines the historical debate between Leibniz and Newton on the nature of space. According to the traditional reading, Leibniz (in his correspondence with Clarke) produced metaphysical arguments (relying on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles) in favor of a relational account of space. Newton, according to the traditional account, refuted the metaphysical arguments with the help of an empirical argument based on the bucket experiment. The paper claims that Leibniz’s and Newton’s arguments cannot be understood apart from the distinct dialectics of their respective positions vis-à-vis Descartes’ theory of space and physics. Against the traditional reading, the paper argues that Leibniz and Newton are operating within a different metaphysics and different conceptions of “place,” and that their respective arguments can largely remain intact without undermining the other philosopher’s conception of space. The paper also takes up the task of clarifying the distinction between true and absolute motion, and of explaining the relativity of motion implied by Leibniz’s account. The paper finally argues that the two philosophers have different conceptions of the relation between metaphysics and science, and that Leibniz’s attempt to base physical theory on an underlying metaphysical account of forces renders his account of physics unstable.     

拉图尔社会学的历史认识论检视——走向反思社会学

对拉图尔描述取向的联系社会学,学界多从本体论的角度予以检视,其社会学对主体极的忽视往往被遮蔽了。尽管拉图尔排斥认识论,但是从历史认识论的角度来检视拉图尔社会学则可洞悉这一缺憾,并可揭示后期拉图尔从行动者网络理论(ANT)转向诸存在模式探究(AIME)的意蕴所在。经此转向之后,拉图尔与其对立者(诸如涂尔干、布迪厄以及众多的STS学者)之间的差距,事实上并非通常认为的那么大。     

Aristotle, US Public Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The Work of Carnes Lord

Carnes Lord is an eminent Aristotelian scholar who has since the mid-1970s intermittently occupied positions within the United States government. This article considers the linkages between his writings on Aristotle and the standpoints he has adopted when in government, with particular reference to the period in the early 1980s when he fulfilled an important role in developing a public diplomacy and information strategy against the Soviet Union. Attention is given to Lord’s interpretation and application, in both his writings and his policy-making, of several key aspects of Aristotle’s political thought, such as rhetoric, regimes, and education. The influence of Leo Strauss on Lord’s thinking is also taken into account.     

Lines of Descent: Kuhn and Beyond

Thomas S. Kuhn is famous both for his work on the Copernican Revolution and his ‘paradigm’ view of scientific revolutions. But Kuhn later abandoned the notion of paradigm (and related notions) in favour of a more ‘evolutionary’ view of the history of science. Kuhn’s position therefore moved closer to ‘continuity’ models of scientific progress, for instance ‘chain-of-reasoning’ models, originally championed by D. Shapere. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate around Kuhn’s new ‘developmental’ view and to evaluate these competing models with reference to some major innovations in the history of cosmology, from Copernicanism to modern cosmology. This evaluation is made possible through some unexpected overlap between Kuhn’s earlier discontinuity model and various versions of the later continuity models. It is the thesis of this paper that the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model accounts better for the cosmological evidence than both Kuhn’s early paradigm model and his later developmental view of the history of science.     

皮尔士论知识的基础及其对当代知识论的启示

20世纪中叶开始,奎因、塞拉斯、戴维森等人对经验主义的攻击使得经验失去了证成知识的作用,威廉姆森倡导的"知识优先"论题将知识视为不可被进一步分析、拆解的单位,经验不再起到首要作用,这最终带来了知识和经验在当代知识论中的分裂问题.皮尔士关于知识基础的讨论蕴含了将经验视为限制和塑造知识的力量,以及将知识视为实际探究的起点这...     

薛凤祚科学思想研究的若干问题

关于《历学会通》对哥白尼日心体系的修改问题,科学史工作者提供的证据颇有说服力,应予以认真对待,但尚有探讨余地;明末清初正是中国传统天文历法、数学与占验开始萌发分离动向的时期,薛凤祚是这一潮流的见证人和主要参与者。其占验思想是其科学思想的有机组成部分,应给予宽容而客观的分析和评价;薛凤祚的科学观是其科学思想的核心,研究它须以近代科学观为参照系,如此,方能正确判断其科学观的性质,厘清其中弥足珍贵的近代因素。     

A Realistic Look at Putnam's Argument Against Realism

Putnam's ``model-theoretic' argument against metaphysical realism presupposes that an ideal scientific theory is expressible in a first order language. The central aim of this paper is to show that Putnam's ``first orderization' of science, although unchallenged by numerous critics, makes his argument unsound even for adequate theories, never mind an ideal one. To this end, I will argue that quantitative theories, which dominate the natural sciences, can be adequately interpreted and evaluated only with the help of so-called theories of measurement whose epistemological and methodological purpose is to justify systematic assignments of quantitative values to objects in the world. And, in order to fulfill this purpose, theories of measurement must have an essentially higher order logical structure. As a result, Putnam's argument fails because much of science turns out to rest on essentially higher order theoretical assumptions about the world.     

科学家在决策中的角色选择——兼评《诚实的代理人》

科学家的专业知识在当代政策制定中发挥着越来越重要的作用,但科学家在决策中的角色却面临着越来越多的质疑与挑战。科学家在决策中的角色选择既与决策的具体情境相关,也与科学家自身关于科学和民主的观念密不可分。小罗杰.皮尔克(Roger A.Pielke,Jr.)在《诚实的代理人》中将参与政治和政策过程的科学家分为了4种理想类型:纯粹的科学家、科学的仲裁者、观点的辩护者和政策选择的诚实的代理人,并主张诚实的代理人将是科学家们在政治事务中发挥作用更可靠和更有效的选择。本文进一步对形成这种区分的理论根据展开批判性考察,并在此基础上探讨参与决策的诚实的代理人得以存在且发挥作用的前提条件。     

‘The Economic’ According to Aristotle: Ethical, Political and Epistemological Implications

A renewed concern with Aristotle’s thought about the economic aspects of human life and society can be observed. Aristotle dealt with the economic issues in his practical philosophy. He thus considered ‘the economic’ within an ethical and political frame. This vision is coherent with a specific ontology of ‘the economic’ according to Aristotle. In a recent paper, I analysed this ontology and left its consequences, especially for Ethics and Politics, for another paper. In this article, I firstly summarise the reasoning and conclusions of the aforementioned paper. Then, I extract the ethical and political “lessons” of the Aristotelian conception. I finally add a section with epistemological “lessons”, and consequences for the teaching of Economics.     

论爱因斯坦逻辑简单性思想及其渊源

简单性作为科学家的信念,引起了不少哲学家和科学家的关注。爱因斯坦的逻辑简单性思想不仅是他的科学信念,而且也是科学认识的指导原则和科学研究方法论的基本准则,并且体现在他创立相对论的过程中。本文首先对爱因斯坦之前的简单性思想进行了梳理,为理解爱因斯坦逻辑简单性思想独创性奠定基础;其次,探讨了爱因斯坦逻辑简单性思想的丰富内涵及其对他创立相对论的影响,澄清一些模糊的认识;最后,分析了爱因斯坦逻辑简单性思想的来源,特别是斯宾诺莎哲学的影响,为人们理解哲学与科学之间的互动关系提供了具体的案例。     

生活世界、生活世界知识与科学知识——对齐曼“生活世界知识”论说的考析

生活世界是人类知识生成和发展的基础与背景,是知识理性的家园。遵循其元科学研究的自然主义路子,齐曼从认识论视角和文化语境,考察了基于生活世界所产生的人类最基本的知识———生活世界知识,探讨了生活世界知识的基本特征,有助于我们厘清生活世界知识与科学知识的关系,进一步把握科学知识的本质。