Leibniz and Newton on Space

This paper reexamines the historical debate between Leibniz and Newton on the nature of space. According to the traditional reading, Leibniz (in his correspondence with Clarke) produced metaphysical arguments (relying on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles) in favor of a relational account of space. Newton, according to the traditional account, refuted the metaphysical arguments with the help of an empirical argument based on the bucket experiment. The paper claims that Leibniz’s and Newton’s arguments cannot be understood apart from the distinct dialectics of their respective positions vis-à-vis Descartes’ theory of space and physics. Against the traditional reading, the paper argues that Leibniz and Newton are operating within a different metaphysics and different conceptions of “place,” and that their respective arguments can largely remain intact without undermining the other philosopher’s conception of space. The paper also takes up the task of clarifying the distinction between true and absolute motion, and of explaining the relativity of motion implied by Leibniz’s account. The paper finally argues that the two philosophers have different conceptions of the relation between metaphysics and science, and that Leibniz’s attempt to base physical theory on an underlying metaphysical account of forces renders his account of physics unstable.     

技术理性与现代性的文化嬗变

理性是人性的一种展现，是人类社会的一种历史性的文化生成。技术理性在现代社会行使着单向度、集权化、合法性控制的职能，是现代性的理性根源；同时，它也注定了现代性文化嬗变的内在逻辑，驱动着现代性文化的变迁。解决传统与现代以及后现代文化之间的矛盾和危机，根本上在于技术理性的规避。     

“弱者的话语”:列维纳斯的伦理学逻辑分析

一般认为:科学是工具理性,伦理是价值理性;原本这二者是和谐的,但随着时空的转换,似乎其矛盾不可调和;今天的结果是价值理性不仅没有规范工具理性而且沦落为婢女;科学就是主体,拥有支配权力。在哲学史上,列维纳斯独树一帜,第一次提出了绝对先在性的他者哲学,从而不仅批判了西方传统的为我的自我授权的权力哲学,而且为哲学之思打开了一条新的通道——他者责任伦理学——他人的存在权比我自己的更重要。但这种他者的声音既是弱者的声音也是脆弱的呻吟——你不能杀人。或许,列维纳斯他者哲学的魅力正在这里——他者伦理学是第一哲学,而且在本源上看,人——无论我、你,还是他者,都是弱者;从唯科学角度看,人——无论我、你,还是他者,都是非支配的客体。     

辩证法困境的当代反思--兼评萨特的《辩证理性批判》

辩证法是马克思主义活的灵魂,但辩证法却常常被人的"美好动机"误用.从历史进程来看,辩证法的革命意义没有得到彰显,辩证法面临着发展的困境.辩证法的本体论意义被"悬搁",这已经成为一个普遍现象.不容忽视的是,在"人本"、"实践"等等旗帜下,马克思主义辩证法仍然继续着被误用的命运.本文结合<辩证理性批判>,对人本的、理想化的辩证法进行反思,同时分析了<辨证理性批判>中的客观辨证逻辑与马克思主义辩证法的关系,旨在从时代的问题出发,重新理解并深入研究马克思主义哲学辩证法.     

论莱布尼茨充足理由原则的哲学意蕴

充足理由原则是莱布尼茨哲学思想大厦的基石。莱布尼茨的充足理由原则包含三层涵义:作为本体论意义的充足理由,以说明每一存在的理由来自于自身;作为认识论意义的充足理由,以说明每一真理成立的理由;作为方法论原则的充足理由,要求理性思维必须满足充足理由原则。     

技术理性的人文反思

在科学技术迅猛发展的今天，科学技术的两面性也日益凸显出来。科学技术在为社会带来财富的同时也带来了灾祸。作者认为这是由于对技术理性的过分宣扬而导致其人文缺失的结果，因此必须对技术理性进行人文反思。技术理性的人文关联为这种人文反思提供了前提，对技术理性人文缺失根源的分析为此种人文反思的决策提供了思路。况且，技术理性的人文反思，对我们正确认识曾在我国蔓延的“非典”，以及提倡“科教兴国”的中国现代化建设来说有着重大的现实意义。     

康德的知识整体论及其意义初探

传统观点把康德的知识论定位为主观论、现象论、不可知论和建构论是有缺陷的，这从根本上忽视了其知识整体论。康德在“先验分析论”中通过确立“统觉的综合统一性原理”这一人类知识的最高原理建立了知识的整体论，从而不但克服了其前辈休谟的心理原子主义和莱布尼茨单子论的认识论中的原子主义错误，而且表明了包括现代分析哲学在内的认识论上的原子主义必然无法为人类知识和道德的合理性、事实和价值的统一奠基。     

"告别理性"与"制造知识"--费耶阿本德与SSK科学知识观的比较

费氏与第二代SSK后现代科学知识观既相通又不尽相同."告别理性"表征了费耶阿本德的激进历史主义科学知识观,而"制造知识"可谓SSK建构主义科学知识观的典型特征.从前者到后者的历史演变体现了后现代科学知识观的必然进路.后现代科学知识观不仅没能促进科学与人文的统一,反而陷入了非理性主义的泛文化主义泥潭.     

生态危机的宗教根源--莫尔特曼生态思想述论

莫尔特曼认为,用"生态灾难"来描述当今的生态危机是准确的,因为当今的生态危机是整个系统的危机,不仅是人类自然家园的丧失,而且也是人类精神家园的丧失.危机的根源在于人的错误的上帝观,即人认为因为其与上帝的相像而自认为是自然的主人,为此,他提出人类的自然化,认为自然具有主体性,而人类才是客体.莫尔特曼的生态思想突破了传统教会对待生态环境的主要模式,既不是简单的伙伴模式,也不是管理模式,更不是统治模式,而是人与自然充分和谐的生存共同体.这种以生态方式去思考和行动,对于人类改善自我意识和洞察力,对于基督教在现代发展中的中国的生态环境问题思考都具有一定的现实意义.     

The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice

In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors. Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature concerning scientific realism. Arthur Fine and a number of other commentators have argued that the realism debate ought to be abandoned. The rationale for this argument is that the debate is sterile for it has, it is claimed, no consequence for actual scientific practice, and therefore does not advance our understanding of science or its practice. Recent “softer” accounts of social constructivism also hold a similar agnostic stance to the realism question. I provide a survey of these various agnostic stances and show how they form a general position that I shall refer to as “the anti-philosophical stance”. I then demonstrate that the anti-philosophical stance fails by identifying difficulties that attend its proposal to ban philosophical interpretation. I also provide examples of instances where philosophical stances to the realism question affect scientific practice.     

Matter in Z3

In this paper, I will discuss a certain conception of matter that Aristotle introduces in Metaphysics Z3. It is often assumed that Aristotle came to distinguish between matter and form only in his physical writings, and that this lead to a conflict with the doctrine of primary substances in the Categories that he tries to resolve in Z3. I will argue that there is no such conflict. In Z3, Aristotle seems to suggest that matter is what is left over when we strip a thing of all its properties. I take it that he does not want us to strip away these properties by physical means or in our imagination. Rather, we are asked to strip a referring noun phrase of all its predicative parts. We are thus not supposed to be able to refer to something that has no qualities whatsoever, but to construct a phrase that refers to something that has properties without referring to its having them, and without implying which properties it has. The idea that there might be a way of referring to something definite without mentioning any of its qualities is platonic and it still underlies modern predicate logic. In Z3, Aristotle argues against this conception and thus against the basic idea of predicate logic. According to him, matter is at best an inseparable aspect of a primary substance, which substance is best referred to as a compound τóδε τι (“this such”). Matter is what the τóδε refers to as part of this phrase. But it cannot exist in separation from form, and we cannot refer to it by a separated term, without also referring to the substantial form of the substance of which it is an aspect.     

An Observing Science

In this paper I make the arguments that I seesupporting a view of how we can come to knowthe world we live in. I start from a position in second ordercybernetics which turns out to be a RadicalConstructivist position. This position isessentially epistemological, and much of thispaper is concerned with the act of knowing,crucial when we try to develop an understandingof what we mean when we discuss a field ofknowing (knowledge), which is at the root ofscience. The argument follows a path in which I discussthe essential role of the observer inobserving, the creation of constancies betweendifferent observings and their exteriorisationas objects which are then represented and usedin communication with and between otherobservers, each unique (and therefore eachobserving in its own way). This leads to theassertion that the qualities we associate withthe objects of our universes are attributes,rather than properties inherent in the objectsthemselves. At each step in the argument I exploreconsequences for how we understand the world,in particular through science. I showlimitations, new insights and understandings,and re-evaluate what we can expect to gain fromscience. One change is the shift from noun toverb in the consideration of processses – forinstance, the study of living rather than life.In this way, I intend to show not only thatRadical Constructivism is sensible, but that itdoes not preclude us having a science. Incontrast, it can enrich science by taking onboard the sensible.In the process, which science is seen to be themore basic is challenged.     

试析皮克林实践研究转向的根源及意义

安德鲁.皮克林(Andrew Pickering)在20世纪80年代初以托马斯.库恩的新旧范式不可通约论及爱丁堡学派的"利益模式"来解释高能物理学的发展,但随后深入的研究发现,单纯的社会学解释不能解决科学知识增长的动力以及客观性与相对性的矛盾等问题。80年代后期皮克林回到物质实践的维度,以实验室中科学家通过物质仪器的实践活动来理解科学知识的增长,实现了从社会学解释向实践研究的转向。他的实践转向不但给SSK带来了新的活力,也给80年代以来相对比较沉闷的科学哲学新的启发。     

西方思想史上的知识理性历程

本文旨在梳理西方思想史上知识理性发展的脉络,揭示其起源和发展的轨迹。尤其表明,知识理性如何走上西方思想文化上独尊的地位,这种地位又如何被省思和挑战,以及知识理性如何走向同人文精神相融合。     

Displacing Epistemology: Being in the Midst of Technoscientific Practice

Interest the Erklären?CVerstehen debate is usually interpreted as primarily epistemological. By raising the possibility that there are fundamentally different methods for fundamentally different types of science, the debate puts into play all the standard issues??that is, issues concerning scientific explanation and justification, the unity and diversity of scientific disciplines, the reality of their subject matter, the accessibility of various subject matters to research, and so on. In this paper, however, I do not focus on any of these specific issues. I start instead from the fact that the very existence of the debate itself is an issue; in fact, it poses a philosophical problem that almost everyone but the hardest line logical empiricists has come to realize cannot be resolved epistemologically. In my view, however, that it cannot be resolved ontologically, either. I think the problem is at bottom hermeneutical, and its resolution requires that we focus first, not on the objects of science or the methods of studying them, but on the character of the philosophical orientation assumed by those who would try to resolve it. In this paper, I explain why I think this is so by analyzing (1) Dilthey??s contribution to the original debate, (2) Husserl??s reaction to Dilthey, and (3) Heidegger??s critical evaluation of both. This line of philosophical development??this movement of self-understanding from critiques of objectivism to hermeneutical phenomenology??is of course already a central feature of much work in continental philosophy of science. In my conclusion, however, I argue for the less well-established??even if apparently approved??idea that it ought to be a central feature of technoscience studies as well.     

Fish-Farming and the Precautionary Principle: Context and Values in Environmental Science for Policy

The paper starts with the assumption that the Precautionary Principle (PP) is one of the most important elements of the concept of sustainability. It is noted that PP has entered international treaties and national law. PP is widely referred to as a central principle of environmental policy. However, the precise content of PP remains largely unclear. In particular it seems unclear how PP relates to science. In section 2 of the paper a general overview of some historical and systematic features of PP are presented. In section 3 a specific case is discussed in greater detail. It is claimed that the escape of farmed salmon from fish cages in the Sea, and its eventual invasion of the breeding places of the wild salmon up the rivers, must be regarded a proper case for applying PP. Yet there is no single PP-strategy. Instead, four different strategies are presented, and all of them can be regarded precautionary strategies in the light of PP. The choice between these strategies is based upon personal values. In section 4 of the paper a general analysis is given which relates these different value perspectives to basic differences in risk aversion, which in turn are related to differing conceptions of nature and/or society. In the concluding section 5 some general consequences of the foregoing analysis are outlined.     

理性自然化的批驳与辩护

自然主义是自20世纪60、70年代以来科学哲学发展的主要倾向,自蒯因提出其自然化认识论后,许多西方学者围绕其展开激烈的争论。本文梳理了其争论中的一个核心问题,即理性的自然化问题。试图说明自然化认识论者对理性自然化的辩护是的失败,而理性自然化的失败也表明了自然化认识论重构传统认识论的失败,进而认为,解决理性自然化争论的出路在于对理性概念的重构。     

中国西医教育之发端:天津总督医学堂

天津总督医学堂是我国第一所官办的西医学校——北洋水师医学堂的前身。这所学校的成立,对于西方医学在中国的传播和植根,意义重大。在这所学校的成立过程中,伦敦会的传教士马根济和直隶总督李鸿章都发挥了关键性的作用。本文探究了这所学校成立的真正原因和历史过程,认为这所学校的成立,军事上的原因是最主要的,而并非是李鸿章信奉西医的结果。文章分析了学校的教学情况,认为当时在天津的传教士们,为这所学校提供了最新的教材和先进的教学设备,而且,这所学校的毕业生相比于其它教会学校的毕业生,享有特殊的待遇。然而,由于历史的局限性,学生在毕业以后,出路并不理想,学校也面临了很多的困难。因此,这所学校主要的意义在于它的象征性,它是中国西医教育的发端,开拓了中国西医教育领域中西合作的新模式,它起步艰难,然而意义不凡。     

Advantages and limitations of formal expression

Testing the validity of knowledge requires formal expression of that knowledge. Formality of an expression is defined as the invariance, under changes of context, of the expression's meaning, i.e. the distinction which the expression represents. This encompasses both mathematical formalism and operational determination. The main advantages of formal expression are storability, universal communicability, and testability. They provide a selective edge in the Darwinian competition between ideas. However, formality can never be complete, as the context cannot be eliminated. Primitive terms, observation set-ups, and background conditions are inescapable parts of formal or operational definitions, that all refer to a context beyond the formal system. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and Gödel's Theorem provide special cases of this more universal limitation principle. Context-dependent expressions, on the other hand, have the benefit of being more flexible, intuitive and direct, and putting less strain on memory. It is concluded that formality is not an absolute property, but a context-dependent one: different people will apply different amounts of formality in different situations or for different purposes. Some recent computational and empirical studies of formality and contexts illustrate the emerging scientific investigation of this dependence.     

“Who” is a “Topical Measuring” Postphenomenologist and How Does One Get That Way?

Gert Goeminne’s paper is primarily concerned with “the politics of sustainable technology,” but for good reasons he does not start with this topic. He knows that technology studies as he conceives it must clear a space for itself in a philosophical atmosphere that discourages its pursuit. He therefore begins with a critique of this objectivistic and technocratically defined atmosphere, before moving on to embrace a postphenomenology of technological multistabilities, and then further to introduce what he calls (in an adaptation of Rudolf Boehm) the “topical measure” of technoscientific life. The problem I raise is not about Goeminne’s aims, with which I mostly agree, but with his presentation of how to achieve them. I argue that if one were actually to follow his advice—that is, start with critique, move on to postphenomenology, and end with “political” evaluation of technoscientific life, the project would be doomed to failure. For in our world, no one Understands this pluralizing vision. According to the understanding we actually live through and speak from, some of postphenomenology’s multiple disclosures already arrive in our experience with significantly greater ontological power than others, and sincerity about topical measure notwithstanding, the very identification of something as an interest or “value,” especially if it allegedly comes from a “layperson,” already condemns it to secondary status.