Hermeneutic strategies in Gerd Buchdahl’s Kantian philosophy of science

Gerd Buchdahl’s international reputation rests on his masterly writings on Kant. In them he showed how Kant transformed the philosophical problems of his predecessors and he minutely investigated the ways in which Kant related his critical philosophy to the contents and methods of natural science. Less well known, if only because in large part unpublished, are the writings in which Buchdahl elaborated his own views on the methods and status of the sciences. In this paper I examine the roles of hermeneutics in Buchdahl’s reconstruction of Kant’s philosophical system and in his own ‘transcendental methodological’ approach to the philosophy of science. The first section looks at Buchdahl’s views on the theory and practice of historical interpretation and at the Husserlian hermeneutic scheme of reduction and realisation that he used in his later accounts of the philosophies of science of Kant and himself. The second section concentrates on Buchdahl’s treatment of the grounds of science in Kant; and the third on the hermeneutic strategies Buchdahl employed in articulating and justifying his own views. The paper closes with reflections on the impact and importance of Buchdahl’s interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy in relation to the sciences and of his own hermeneutically based philosophy of science.     

The metaphor of epigenesis: Kant,Blumenbach and Herder

Over the last few decades, the meaning of the scientific theory of epigenesis and its significance for Kant's critical philosophy have become increasingly central questions. Most recently, scholars have argued that epigenesis is a key factor in the development of Kant's understanding of reason as self-grounding and self-generating. Building on this work, our claim is that Kant appealed to not just any epigenetic theory, but specifically Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's account of generation, and that this appeal must be understood not only in terms of self-organization, but also in terms of the demarcation of a specific domain of inquiry: for Blumenbach, the study of life; for Kant, the study of reason. We argue that Kant adopted this specific epigenetic model as a result of his dispute with Herder regarding the independence of reason from nature. Blumenbach's conception of epigenesis and his separation of a domain of the living from the non-living lent Kant the tools to demarcate metaphysics, and to guard reason against Herder's attempts to naturalize it.     

Epigenesis in Kant: Recent reconsiderations

Epigenesis has become a far more exciting issue in Kant studies recently, especially with the publication of Jennifer Mensch's Kant’ Organicism. In my commentary, I propose to clarify my own position on epigenesis relative to that of Mensch and others by once again considering the discourse of epigenesis in the wider eighteenth century. Historically, I maintain that Kant was never fully an epigenesist because he feared its materialist implications. This makes it highly unlikely that he drew heavily, as other interpreters like Dupont and Huneman have suggested, on Caspar Friedrich Wolff for his ultimate theory of “generic preformation.” In order to situate more precisely what Kant made of epigenesis, I distinguish his metaphysical use, as elaborated by Mensch, from his view of it as a theory for life science. In that light, I raise questions about the scope and authority of philosophy vis a vis natural science.     

Cartesian echoes in Kant’s philosophy of nature

In this paper, we take the cue from a recent observation of Dan Warren about pre-Newtonian elements in Kant’s philosophy of nature to argue that there are two puzzles concerning Kant’s claim that mechanical laws presuppose dynamical laws in Chapter Three of Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. We offer responses on Kant’s behalf to these puzzles. These responses take us through a journey via Kant’s first pre-Critical work, True Estimation of Living Forces, and the then lively debate between Cartesians and Leibnizians. We show how some important Cartesian echoes, clearly evident in True Estimation, have played a role in shaping some seminal ideas of Kant on dynamical forces.     

‘Good Sense’ in context: A response to Kidd

In his response to my (2010), Ian Kidd claims that my argument against Stump’s interpretation of Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is unsound because it ignores an important distinction within virtue epistemology. In light of the distinction between reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemology, Kidd argues that Duhem can be seen as supporting the latter, which he further illustrates with a discussion of Duhem’s argument against ‘perfect theory’. I argue that no substantive argument is offered to show that the distinction is relevant and can establish that Duhem’s ‘good sense’ can be understood within responsibilist virtue epistemology. I furthermore demonstrate that Kidd’s attempt to support his contention relies on a crucial misreading of Duhem’s general philosophy of science, and in doing so highlight the importance of understanding ‘good sense’ in its original context, that of theory choice.     

Forces and causes in Kant’s early pre-Critical writings

This paper considers Kant’s conception of force and causality in his early pre-Critical writings, arguing that this conception is best understood by way of contrast with his immediate predecessors, such as Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, Georg Friedrich Meier, Martin Knutzen, and Christian August Crusius, and in terms of the scientific context of natural philosophy at the time. Accordingly, in the True estimation Kant conceives of force in terms of activity rather than in terms of specific effects, such as motion (as unnamed Wolffians had done). Kant’s explicit arguments in the Nova dilucidatio for physical influx (in the guise of the principle of succession) are directed primarily against the conception of grounds and existence held by Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier, and only secondarily against Leibniz (by asserting the priority of bodies over mind rather than vice versa). Finally, Kant’s reconciliation of the infinite divisibility of space and the unity of monads in the Physical monadology is designed to respond to objections that could be raised naturally by Wolff and Baumgarten.     

Poincaréan intuition revisited: what can we learn from Kant and Parsons?

This paper provides a comprehensive critique of Poincaré’s usage of the term intuition in his defence of the foundations of pure mathematics and science. Kant’s notions of sensibility and a priori form and Parsons’s theory of quasi-concrete objects are used to impute rigour into Poincaré’s interpretation of intuition. In turn, Poincaré’s portrayal of sensible intuition as a special kind of intuition that tolerates the senses and imagination is rejected. In its place, a more harmonized account of how we perceive concrete objects is offered whereby intuitive knowledge is consistently a priori whatever the domain of application.     

Kant’s dynamical theory of matter in 1755, and its debt to speculative Newtonian experimentalism

This paper explores the scientific sources behind Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755, with a focus on two main Kant’s writings: Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and On Fire. The year 1755 has often been portrayed by Kantian scholars as a turning point in the intellectual career of the young Kant, with his much debated conversion to Newton. Via a careful analysis of some salient themes in the two aforementioned works, and a reconstruction of the scientific sources behind them, this paper shows Kant’s debt to an often overlooked scientific tradition, i.e. speculative Newtonian experimentalism. The paper argues that more than the Principia, it was the speculative experimentalism that goes from Newton’s Opticks to Herman Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae via Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks that played a central role in the elaboration of Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755.     

Conventionalism in Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’

The subject of this investigation is the role of conventions in the formulation of Thomas Reid’s theory of the geometry of vision, which he calls the ‘geometry of visibles’. In particular, we will examine the work of N. Daniels and R. Angell who have alleged that, respectively, Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’ and the geometry of the visual field are non-Euclidean. As will be demonstrated, however, the construction of any geometry of vision is subject to a choice of conventions regarding the construction and assignment of its various properties, especially metric properties, and this fact undermines the claim for a unique non-Euclidean status for the geometry of vision. Finally, a suggestion is offered for trying to reconcile Reid’s direct realist theory of perception with his geometry of visibles.While Thomas Reid is well-known as the leading exponent of the Scottish ‘common-sense’ school of philosophy, his role in the history of geometry has only recently been drawing the attention of the scholarly community. In particular, several influential works, by N. Daniels and R. B. Angell, have claimed Reid as the discoverer of non-Euclidean geometry; an achievement, moreover, that pre-dates the geometries of Lobachevsky, Bolyai, and Gauss by over a half century. Reid’s alleged discovery appears within the context of his analysis of the geometry of the visual field, which he dubs the ‘geometry of visibles’. In summarizing the importance of Reid’s philosophy in this area, Daniels is led to conclude that ‘there can remain little doubt that Reid intends the geometry of visibles to be an alternative to Euclidean geometry’;¹ while Angell, similarly inspired by Reid, draws a much stronger inference: ‘The geometry which precisely and naturally fits the actual configurations of the visual field is a non-Euclidean, two-dimensional, elliptical geometry. In substance, this thesis was advanced by Thomas Reid in 1764 ...’² The significance of these findings has not gone unnoticed in mathematical and scientific circles, moreover, for Reid’s name is beginning to appear more frequently in historical surveys of the development of geometry and the theories of space.³Implicit in the recent work on Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’, or GOV, one can discern two closely related but distinct arguments: first, that Reid did in fact formulate a non-Euclidean geometry, and second, that the GOV is non-Euclidean. This essay will investigate mainly the latter claim, although a lengthy discussion will be accorded to the first. Overall, in contrast to the optimistic reports of a non-Euclidean GOV, it will be argued that there is a great deal of conceptual freedom in the construction of any geometry pertaining to the visual field. Rather than single out a non-Euclidean structure as the only geometry consistent with visual phenomena, an examination of Reid, Daniels, and Angell will reveal the crucial role of geometric ‘conventions’, especially of the metric sort, in the formulation of the GOV (where a ‘metric’ can be simply defined as a system for determining distances, the measures of angles, etc.). Consequently, while a non-Euclidean geometry is consistent with Reid’s GOV, it is only one of many different geometrical structures that a GOV can possess. Angell’s theory that the GOV can only be construed as non-Euclidean, is thus incorrect. After an exploration of Reid’s theory and the alleged non-Euclidean nature of the GOV, in 1 and 2 respectively, the focus will turn to the tacit role of conventionalism in Daniels’ reconstruction of Reid’s GOV argument, and in the contemporary treatment of a non-Euclidean visual geometry offered by Angell ( 3 and 4). Finally, in the conclusion, a suggestion will be offered for a possible reconstruction of Reid’s GOV that does not violate his avowed ‘direct realist’ theory of perception, since this epistemological thesis largely prompted his formulation of the GOV.     

Transcendental philosophy and mathematical physics

This paper explores the relationship between Kant’s views on the metaphysical foundations of Newtonian mathematical physics and his more general transcendental philosophy articulated in the Critique of pure reason. I argue that the relationship between the two positions is very close indeed and, in particular, that taking this relationship seriously can shed new light on the structure of the transcendental deduction of the categories as expounded in the second edition of the Critique.     

Kant’s third law of mechanics: The long shadow of Leibniz

This paper examines the origin, range and meaning of the Principle of Action and Reaction in Kant’s mechanics. On the received view, it is a version of Newton’s Third Law. I argue that Kant meant his principle as foundation for a Leibnizian mechanics. To find a ‘Newtonian’ law of action and reaction, we must look to Kant’s ‘dynamics,’ or theory of matter.     

How to tell causes from effects: Kant’s causal theory of time and modern approaches

I attempt a reconstruction of Kant’s version of the causal theory of time that makes it appear coherent. Two problems are at issue. The first concerns Kant’s reference to reciprocal causal influence for characterizing simultaneity. This approach is criticized by pointing out that Kant’s procedure involves simultaneous counterdirected processes—which seems to run into circularity. The problem can be defused by drawing on instantaneous processes such as the propagation of gravitation in Newtonian mechanics. Another charge of circularity against Kant’s causal theory was leveled by Schopenhauer. His objection was that Kant’s approach is invalidated by the failure to deliver non-temporal criteria for distinguishing between causes and effects. I try to show that the modern causal account has made important progress toward a successful resolution of this difficulty. The fork asymmetry, as based on Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause, provides a means for the distinction between cause and effect that is not based on temporal order (if some preconditions are realized).     

Grasping the spirit in nature: Anschauung in Ørsted's epistemology of science and beauty

The intersection between art, poetry, philosophy and science was the leitmotif which guided the lives and careers of romantic natural philosophers including that of the Danish natural philosopher, H. C. Ørsted. A simple model of Ørsted’s career would be one in which it was framed by two periods of philosophical speculation: the youth’s curious and idealistic interest in new attractive thoughts and the experienced man’s mature reflections at the end of his life. We suggest that a closer look at the epistemological aspects of his works on the theory of beauty reveals a connection between this late work and his early philosophical work including experimental philosophy, but also with the work in teaching and textbook writing, that lies in between. The latter includes Ørsted’s view on the application of mathematics in natural philosophy as well as his failed attempt at a genetic presentation of elementary geometry.     

The influence of Spinoza’s concept of infinity on Cantor’s set theory

Georg Cantor, the founder of set theory, cared much about a philosophical foundation for his theory of infinite numbers. To that end, he studied intensively the works of Baruch de Spinoza. In the paper, we survey the influence of Spinozean thoughts onto Cantor’s; we discuss Spinoza’s philosophy of infinity, as it is contained in his Ethics; and we attempt to draw a parallel between Spinoza’s and Cantor’s ontologies. Our conclusion is that the study of Spinoza provides deepening insights into Cantor’s philosophical theory, whilst Cantor can not be called a ‘Spinozist’ in any stricter sense of that word.     

Hegel and Naturphilosophie

Against current non-metaphysical interpretations, I argue that Naturphilosophie is central to Hegel’s philosophy. This is so for three reasons. First, it was crucial to Hegel’s program to create a holistic culture. Second, Naturphilosophie is pivotal to absolute idealism, Hegel’s characteristic philosophical doctrine. Third, the idea of organic development, so central to Naturphilosophie, is pervasive throughout Hegel’s system. This idea is essential to Hegel’s concepts of spirit, dialectic, and identity-in-difference. Finally, I take issue with the neo-Kantian critique of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie on the grounds that it fails to appreciate the underlying motive behind Hegel’s system: the attempt to resolve the aporia of Kant’s epistemology.     

Euler, vis viva, and equilibrium

Euler’s ‘On the force of percussion and its true measure’, published in 1746, shows that not only had the issue of vis viva not been settled, but that the concepts of inertia and even force were still very much up for grabs. This paper details Euler’s treatment of the vis viva problem. Within those details we find differences between his physics and that of Newton, in particular the rejection of empty space and reduction of all forces to the operation of inertia through contact. One can further see how Euler’s philosophy of science embraced explanation through mechanisms and equilibrium conditions.     

Whewell’s tidal researches: scientific practice and philosophical methodology

Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented.     

‘The long-lost truth’: Sir Isaac Newton and the Newtonian pursuit of ancient knowledge

In the 1720s the antiquary and Newtonian scholar Dr. William Stukeley (1687-1765) described his friend Isaac Newton as ‘the Great Restorer of True Philosophy’. Newton himself in his posthumously published Observations upon the prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John (1733) predicted that the imminent fulfilment of Scripture prophecy would see ‘a recovery and re-establishment of the long-lost truth’. In this paper I examine the background to Newton’s interest in ancient philosophy and theology, and how it related to modern natural philosophical discovery. I look at the way in which the idea of a ‘long-lost truth’ interested others within Newton’s immediate circle, and in particular how it was carried forward by Stukeley’s researches into ancient British antiquities. I show how an interest in and respect for ancient philosophical knowledge remained strong within the first half of the eighteenth century.     

The transcendental method from Newton to Kant

Kant’s transcendental method, as applied to natural philosophy, considers the laws of physics as conditions of the possibility of experience. A more modest transcendental project is to show how the laws of motion explicate the concepts of motion, force, and causal interaction, as conditions of the possibility of an objective account of nature. This paper argues that such a project is central to the natural philosophy of Newton, and explains some central aspects of the development of his thinking as he wrote the Principia. One guiding scientific aim was the dynamical analysis of any system of interacting bodies, and in particular our solar system; the transcendental question was, what are the conceptual prerequisites for such an analysis? More specifically, what are the conditions for determining “true motions” within such a system—for posing the question of “the frame of the system of the world” as an empirical question? A study of the development of Newton’s approach to these questions reveals surprising connections with his developing conceptions of force, causality, and the relativity of motion. It also illuminates the comparison between his use of the transcendental method and that of Euler and Kant.