Edison and science: a curious result

In November 1875, Thomas Edison made the sensational announcement that he had discovered a new force of nature, etheric force. It was to emerge some years later that the phenomenon Edison described was a form of wireless transmission, but Edison failed both to advance his theory and to exploit his discovery in new inventions. I contrast Edison’s approach to doing science with what he did when inventing, and also with the approach used by his principal scientific opponents. This contrast reveals that he failed, not so much because he was an inventor who did science badly, but because when he ventured into scientific theory-making he abandoned key techniques that made him America’s most successful inventor. From this I argue that we can identify artefact creation processes in science that parallel the process of invention, and that Edison failed because his opponents created better artefacts.     

Emilie du Châtelet’s Institutions de physique as a document in the history of French Newtonianism

This paper discusses the contribution of Madame Du Châtelet to the reception of Newtonianism in France prior to her translation of Newton’s Principia. It focuses on her Institutions de physique, a work normally considered for its contribution to the reception of Leibniz in France. By comparing the different editions of the Institutions, I argue that her interest in Newton antedated her interest in Leibniz, and that she did not see Leibniz’s metaphysics as incompatible with Newtonian science. Her Newtonianism can be seen to be in the course of development between 1738 and 1742 and it was shaped by contemporary French debates (for example the vis viva controversy) and the achievement of French Newtonians like Maupertuis in confirming his theories. Her Institutions therefore is linked to the same drive to disseminate Newtonianism undertaken by popularisations such as Voltaire’s Elements de la philosophie de Newton and Algarotti’s Newtonianismo per le dame.     

The intelligibility of motion and construction: Descartes’ early mathematics and metaphysics, 1619-1637

I argue for an interpretation of the connection between Descartes’ early mathematics and metaphysics that centers on the standard of geometrical intelligibility that characterizes Descartes’ mathematical work during the period 1619 to 1637. This approach remains sensitive to the innovations of Descartes’ system of geometry and, I claim, sheds important light on the relationship between his landmark Geometry (1637) and his first metaphysics of nature, which is presented in Le monde (1633). In particular, I argue that the same standard of clear and distinct motions for construction that allows Descartes to distinguish ‘geometric’ from ‘imaginary’ curves in the domain of mathematics is adopted in Le monde as Descartes details God’s construction of nature. I also show how, on this interpretation, the metaphysics of Le monde can fruitfully be brought to bear on Descartes’ attempted solution to the Pappus problem, which he presents in Book I of the Geometry. My general goal is to show that attention to the standard of intelligibility Descartes invokes in these different areas of inquiry grants us a richer view of the connection between his early mathematics and philosophy than an approach that assumes a common method is what binds his work in these domains together.     

‘This inscrutable principle of an original organization’: epigenesis and ‘looseness of fit’ in Kant’s philosophy of science

Kant’s philosophy of science takes on sharp contour in terms of his interaction with the practicing life scientists of his day, particularly Johann Blumenbach and the latter’s student, Christoph Girtanner, who in 1796 attempted to synthesize the ideas of Kant and Blumenbach. Indeed, Kant’s engagement with the life sciences played a far more substantial role in his transcendental philosophy than has been recognized hitherto. The theory of epigenesis, especially in light of Kant’s famous analogy in the first Critique (B167), posed crucial questions regarding the ‘looseness of fit’ between the constitutive and the regulative in Kant’s theory of empirical law. A detailed examination of Kant’s struggle with epigenesis between 1784 and 1790 demonstrates his grave reservations about its hylozoist implications, leading to his even stronger insistence on the discrimination of constitutive from regulative uses of reason. The continuing relevance of these issues for Kant’s philosophy of science is clear from the work of Buchdahl and its contemporary reception.     

Newton’s “satis est”: A new explanatory role for laws

In this paper I argue that Newton’s stance on explanation in physics was enabled by his overall methodology and that it neither committed him to embrace action at a distance nor to set aside philosophical and metaphysical questions. Rather his methodology allowed him to embrace a non-causal, yet non-inferior, kind of explanation. I suggest that Newton holds that the theory developed in the Principia provides a genuine explanation, namely a law-based one, but that we also lack something explanatory, namely a causal account of the explanandum. Finally, I argue that examining what it takes to have law-based explanation in the face of agnosticism about the causal process makes it possible to recast the debate over action at a distance between Leibniz and Newton as empirically and methodologically motivated on both sides.     

Cartesian analysis and synthesis

This paper aims to provide an explication of the meaning of ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ in Descartes’ writings. In the first part I claim that Descartes’ method is entirely captured by the term ‘analysis’, and that it is a method of theory elaboration that fuses the modern methods of discovery and confirmation in one enterprise. I discuss Descartes’ methodological writings, assess their continuity and coherence, and I address the major shortcoming of previous interpretations of Cartesian methodology. I also discuss the Cartesian method in the context of other conceptions of scientific method of that era and argue that Descartes’ method significantly transforms these conceptions. In the second part I argue that mathematical and natural-philosophical writings exhibit this kind of analysis. To that effect I examine in Descartes’ writings on the method as used in mathematics, and Descartes’ account of the discovery of the nature of the rainbow in the Meteors. Finally, I briefly assess Descartes’ claim regarding the universality of his method.     

The Replication of Hertz's Cathode Ray Experiments

I reappraise in detail Hertz's cathode ray experiments. I show that, contrary to Buchwald's (1995) evaluation, the core experiment establishing the electrostatic properties of the rays was successfully replicated by Perrin (probably) and Thomson (certainly). Buchwald's discussion of ‘current purification’ is shown to be a red herring. My investigation of the origin of Buchwald's misinterpretation of this episode reveals that he was led astray by a focus on what Hertz ‘could do’—his experimental resources. I argue that one should focus instead on what Hertz wanted to achieve—his experimental goals. Focusing on these goals, I find that his explicit and implicit requirements for a successful investigation of the rays’ properties are met by Perrin and Thomson. Thus, even by Hertz's standards, they did indeed replicate his experiment.     

Quantitative realizations of philosophy of science: William Whewell and statistical methods

In this paper, I examine William Whewell’s (1794–1866) ‘Discoverer’s Induction’, and argue that it supplies a strikingly accurate characterization of the logic behind many statistical methods, exploratory data analysis (EDA) in particular. Such methods are additionally well-suited as a point of evaluation of Whewell’s philosophy since the central techniques of EDA were not invented until after Whewell’s death, and so couldn’t have influenced his views. The fact that the quantitative details of some very general methods designed to suggest hypotheses would so closely resemble Whewell’s views of how theories are formed is, I suggest, a strongly positive comment on his views.     

Francesco Patrizi’s two books on space: geometry, mathematics, and dialectic beyond Aristotelian science

Francesco Patrizi was a competent Greek scholar, a mathematician, and a Neoplatonic thinker, well known for his sharp critique of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. In this article I shall present, in the first part, the importance of the concept of a three-dimensional space which is regarded as a body, as opposed to the Aristotelian two-dimensional space or interval, in Patrizi’s discussion of physical space. This point, I shall argue, is an essential part of Patrizi’s overall critique of Aristotelian science, in which Epicurean, Stoic, and mainly Neoplatonic elements were brought together, in what seems like an original theory of space and a radical revision of Aristotelian physics. Moreover, I shall try to show Patrizi’s dialectical method of definition, his geometrical argumentation, and trace some of the ideas and terms used by him back to Proclus’ Commentary on Euclid. This text of Proclus, as will be shown in the second part of the article, was also important for Patrizi’s discussion of mathematical space, where Patrizi deals with the status of mathematics and redefines some mathematical concepts such as the point and the line according to his new theory of space.     

Making sense of Day 1 of the Two New Sciences: Galileo’s Aristotelian-inspired agenda and his Jesuit readers

This study proposes an explanation for the choice of topics Galileo addressed in Day 1 of his 1638 Two New Sciences, a section of the work which has long puzzled historians of science. I argue that Galileo’s agenda in Day 1, that is the topics he discusses and the questions he poses, was shaped by contemporary teaching commentaries on Books 3 through 8 of Aristotle’s Physics. Building on the insights and approach of theorists of reader reception, I confirm this interpretation by examining the response of professors of natural philosophy at the Jesuit Collegio Romano to Galileo’s text.     

Athanasius Kircher’s magical instruments: an essay on ‘science’, ‘religion’ and applied metaphysics

In this paper I endeavour to bridge the gap between the history of material culture and the history of ideas. I do this by focussing on the intersection between metaphysics and technology—what I call ‘applied metaphysics’—in the oeuvre of the Jesuit scholar Athanasius Kircher. By scrutinising the interplay between texts, objects and images in Kircher’s work, it becomes possible to describe the multiplicity of meanings related to his artefacts. I unearth as yet overlooked metaphysical and religious meanings of the camera obscura, for instance, as well as of various other optical and magnetic devices. Today, instruments and artefacts are almost exclusively seen in the light of a narrow economic and technical concept. Historically, the ‘use’ of artefacts is much more diverse, however, and I argue that it is time to historicize the concept of ‘utility’.     

Radical mathematical Thomism: beings of reason and divine decrees in Torricelli’s philosophy of mathematics

Evangelista Torricelli (1608-1647) is perhaps best known for being the most gifted of Galileo’s pupils, and for his works based on indivisibles, especially his stunning cubature of an infinite hyperboloid. Scattered among Torricelli’s writings, we find numerous traces of the philosophy of mathematics underlying his mathematical practice. Though virtually neglected by historians and philosophers alike, these traces reveal that Torricelli’s mathematical practice was informed by an original philosophy of mathematics. The latter was dashed with strains of Thomistic metaphysics and theology. Torricelli’s philosophy of mathematics emphasized mathematical constructs as human-made beings of reason, yet mathematical truths as divine decrees, which upon being discovered by the mathematician ‘appropriate eternity’. In this paper, I reconstruct Torricelli’s philosophy of mathematics—which I label radical mathematical Thomism—placing it in the context of Thomistic patterns of thought.     

Incredulity towards Lyotard: a critique of a postmodernist account of science and knowledge

Philosophers of science have paid little attention, positive or negative, to Lyotard’s book The postmodern condition, even though it has been popular in other fields. We set out some of the reasons for this neglect. Lyotard thought that sciences could be justified by non-scientific narratives (a position he later abandoned). We show why this is unacceptable, and why many of Lyotard’s characterisations of science are either implausible or are narrowly positivist. One of Lyotard’s themes is that the nature of knowledge has changed and thereby so has society itself. However much of what Lyotard says muddles epistemological matters about the definition of ‘knowledge’ with sociological claims about how information circulates in modern society. We distinguish two kinds of legitimation of science: epistemic and socio-political. In proclaiming ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ Lyotard has nothing to say about how epistemic and methodological principles are to be justified (legitimated). He also gives a bad argument as to why there can be no epistemic legitimation, which is based on an act/content confusion, and a confusion between making an agreement and the content of what is agreed to. As for socio-political legitimation, Lyotard’s discussion remains at the abstract level of science as a whole rather than at the level of the particular applications of sciences. Moreover his positive points can be accepted without taking on board any of his postmodernist account of science. Finally we argue that Lyotard’s account of paralogy, which is meant to provide a ‘postmodern’ style of justification, is a failure.     

‘The long-lost truth’: Sir Isaac Newton and the Newtonian pursuit of ancient knowledge

In the 1720s the antiquary and Newtonian scholar Dr. William Stukeley (1687-1765) described his friend Isaac Newton as ‘the Great Restorer of True Philosophy’. Newton himself in his posthumously published Observations upon the prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John (1733) predicted that the imminent fulfilment of Scripture prophecy would see ‘a recovery and re-establishment of the long-lost truth’. In this paper I examine the background to Newton’s interest in ancient philosophy and theology, and how it related to modern natural philosophical discovery. I look at the way in which the idea of a ‘long-lost truth’ interested others within Newton’s immediate circle, and in particular how it was carried forward by Stukeley’s researches into ancient British antiquities. I show how an interest in and respect for ancient philosophical knowledge remained strong within the first half of the eighteenth century.     

Transcendental philosophy and mathematical physics

This paper explores the relationship between Kant’s views on the metaphysical foundations of Newtonian mathematical physics and his more general transcendental philosophy articulated in the Critique of pure reason. I argue that the relationship between the two positions is very close indeed and, in particular, that taking this relationship seriously can shed new light on the structure of the transcendental deduction of the categories as expounded in the second edition of the Critique.     

Understanding as explanatory knowledge: The case of Bjorken scaling

In this paper, we develop and refine the idea that understanding is a species of explanatory knowledge. Specifically, we defend the idea that S understands why p if and only if S knows that p, and, for some q, S’s true belief that q correctly explains p is produced/maintained by reliable explanatory evaluation. We then show how this model explains the reception of James Bjorken’s explanation of scaling by the broader physics community in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The historical episode is interesting because Bjorken’s explanation initially did not provide understanding to other physicists, but was subsequently deemed intelligible when Feynman provided a physical interpretation that led to experimental tests that vindicated Bjorken’s model. Finally, we argue that other philosophical models of scientific understanding are best construed as limiting cases of our more general model.     

‘Good Sense’ in context: A response to Kidd

In his response to my (2010), Ian Kidd claims that my argument against Stump’s interpretation of Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’ is unsound because it ignores an important distinction within virtue epistemology. In light of the distinction between reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemology, Kidd argues that Duhem can be seen as supporting the latter, which he further illustrates with a discussion of Duhem’s argument against ‘perfect theory’. I argue that no substantive argument is offered to show that the distinction is relevant and can establish that Duhem’s ‘good sense’ can be understood within responsibilist virtue epistemology. I furthermore demonstrate that Kidd’s attempt to support his contention relies on a crucial misreading of Duhem’s general philosophy of science, and in doing so highlight the importance of understanding ‘good sense’ in its original context, that of theory choice.     

Interpreting Aristotle on mixture: problems about elemental composition from Philoponus to Cooper

Aristotle’s On generation and corruption raises a vital question: how is mixture, or what we would now call chemical combination, possible? It also offers an outline of a solution to the problem and a set of criteria that a successful solution must meet. Understanding Aristotle’s solution and developing a viable peripatetic theory of chemical combination has been a source of controversy over the last two millennia. We describe seven criteria a peripatetic theory of mixture must satisfy: uniformity, recoverability, potentiality, equilibrium, alteration, incompleteness, and the ability to distinguish mixture from generation, corruption, juxtaposition, augmentation, and alteration. After surveying the theories of Philoponus (d. 574), Avicenna (d. 1037), Averroes (d. 1198), and John M. Cooper (fl. circa 2000), we argue for the merits of Richard Rufus of Cornwall’s theory. Rufus (fl. 1231-1256) was a little known scholastic philosopher who became a Franciscan theologian in 1238, after teaching Aristotelian natural philosophy as a secular master in Paris. Lecturing on Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione, around the year 1235, he offered his students a solution to the problem of mixture that we believe satisfies Aristotle’s seven criteria.