Crustal layering, simplicity, and the oil industry: The alteration of an epistemic paradigm by a commercial environment

This paper proposes that the gradual alteration of the predominant epistemic paradigm in crustal seismology in the interwar period—namely, simplicity—came about because of the strong influence of a particular commercial environment, i.e. the oil industry. I begin by demonstrating the interwar predominance of Jeffreys’ ‘simplicity postulate’ and his probabilistic epistemology, highlighting the espousal by several seismologists (Bullen, Stoneley, Byerly), whose crustal models drew on mathematical idealisations. Next, I demonstrate that the renunciation of simplicity in the 1930s came about too quickly, and, above all, too heterodoxically to have been the result of new geological evidence. Rather, I argue, the paradigm shift among seismologists was a result of the significant rise in seismic exploration generated by the oil industry. Driven by market demands, American petroleum companies pioneered new technologies, organised research initiatives, and trained young geophysicists who, through the fusion of experimentalism and field experience, brought about fundamental progress in earthquake seismology. Remarkably, historians of science have almost entirely failed to recognise the interwar primacy of the simplicity paradigm as well as its subsequent renunciation. More importantly, they have failed to acknowledge the role the oil industry played in contributing to this renunciation and to the development of new paradigms in seismology.     

Kepler’s theory of the soul: a study on epistemology

Kepler is mainly known among historians of science for his astronomical theories and his approaches to problems having to do with philosophy of science and ontology. This paper attempts to contribute to Kepler studies by providing a discussion of a topic not frequently considered, namely Kepler’s theory of the soul, a general theory of knowledge whose central problem is what makes knowledge possible, rather than what makes knowledge true, as happens in the case of Descartes’s and Bacon’s epistemologies. Kepler’s theory consists of four issues: the theory of the different sorts of soul—that is, the human soul, the animal soul, the vegetable soul, and the Earth soul—concerning their faculties, the differences and the resemblances emerging among them, the relation they maintain with their own bodies and the world, and the distinction soul–world. The paper discusses these issues from a historical perspective, that is, it reconstructs the way they appear in three periods of Kepler’s career: the period prior to the publication of the Mysterium cosmographicum, the period from 1596 to 1611, and the period of the Harmonices mundi libri V. Finally, Kepler’s epistemology is briefly contrasted with Descartes’s and Bacon’s in order to suggest that Kepler’s could be seen as a third way to understand the philosophical origins of Modernity.     

Copernicus and Fracastoro: the dedicatory letters to Pope Paul III, the history of astronomy, and the quest for patronage

Copernicus’s De revolutionibus (1543) and Girolamo Fracastoro’s Homocentrica (1538) were both addressed to Pope Paul III (1534-1549). Their dedicatory letters represent a rhetorical exercise in advocating an astronomical reform and an attempt to obtain the papal favour. Following on from studies carried out by Westman (1990) and Barker & Goldstein (2003), this paper deals with cultural, intellectual and scientific motives of both texts, and aims at underlining possible relations between them, such as that Copernicus knew of Fracastoro’s Homocentrica, and that at least part of the rhetorical strategy laid out in De revolutionibus’s dedicatory letter can be read as a sophisticated response to Fracastoro’s arguments.     

Aristotle, Copernicus, Bruno: centrality, the principle of movement and the extension of the Universe

This paper¹ studies the different conceptions of both centrality and the principle or starting point of motion in the Universe held by Aristotle and later on by Copernicanism until Kepler and Bruno. According to Aristotle, the true centre of the Universe is the sphere of the fixed stars. This is also the starting point of motion. From this point of view, the diurnal motion is the fundamental one. Our analysis gives pride of place to De caelo II, 10, a chapter of Aristotle’s text which curiously allows an ‘Alpetragian’ reading of the transmission of motion.In Copernicus and the Copernicans, natural centrality is identified with the geometrical centre and, therefore, the Sun is acknowledged as the body through which the Deity acts on the world and it also plays the role of the principle and starting point of cosmic motion. This motion, however, is no longer diurnal motion, but the annual periodical motion of the planets. Within this context, we pose the question of to what extent it is possible to think that, before Kepler, there is a tacit attribution of a dynamic or motive role to the Sun by Copernicus, Rheticus, and Digges.For Bruno, since the Universe is infinite and homogeneous and the relationship of the Deity with it is one of indifferent presence everywhere, the Universe has no absolute centre, for any point is a centre. By the same token, there is no place that enjoys the prerogative of being—as being the seat of God—the motionless principle and starting point of motion.     

Protein misfolding and disease: the case of prion disorders

Recent findings strongly support the hypothesis that diverse human disorders, including the most common neurodegenerative diseases, arise from misfolding and aggregation of an underlying protein. Despite the good evidence for the involvement of protein misfolding in disease pathogenesis, the mechanism by which protein conformational changes participate in the disease is still unclear. Among the best-studied diseases of this group are the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies or prion-related disorders, in which misfolding of the normal prion protein plays a key role in the disease. In this article we review recent data on the link between prion protein misfolding and the pathogensis of spongiform encephalopathies. Received 15 July 2002; received after revision 19 August 2002; accepted 23 August 2002 RID="*" ID="*"Corresponding author.     

Boyle and the origins of modern chemistry: Newman tried in the fire

William Newman construes the Scientific Revolution as a change in matter theory, from a hylomorphic, Aristotelian to a corpuscular, mechanical one. He sees Robert Boyle as making a major contribution to that change by way of his corpuscular chemistry. In this article it is argued that it is seriously misleading to identify what was scientific about the Scientific Revolution in terms of a change in theories of the ultimate structure of matter. Boyle showed, especially in his pneumatics, how empirically accessible, intermediate causes, as opposed to ultimate, mechanical ones can be explored and identified by experiment. Newman is right to observe that Boyle constantly sought intimate links between chemistry and the mechanical philosophy. However, by doing so he did not thereby significantly aid the cause of attaining experimental knowledge of chemical phenomena and the support that Boyle’s chemistry provided for the mechanical philosophy was weaker than both Boyle and Newman imply. Boyle was intent on articulating and defending a strict, mechanical account of the ultimate structure of matter to be sure, but his contributions to the new experimental science in general, and chemistry in particular, are best seen as distinct from that endeavour.     

Realism on the rocks: Novel success and James Hutton's theory of the earth

In this paper, I introduce a new historical case study into the scientific realism debate. During the late-eighteenth century, the Scottish natural philosopher James Hutton made two important successful novel predictions. The first concerned granitic veins intruding from granite masses into strata. The second concerned what geologists now term “angular unconformities”: older sections of strata overlain by younger sections, the two resting at different angles, the former typically more inclined than the latter. These predictions, I argue, are potentially problematic for selective scientific realism in that constituents of Hutton's theory that would not be considered even approximately true today played various roles in generating them. The aim here is not to provide a full philosophical analysis but to introduce the case into the debate by detailing the history and showing why, at least prima facie, it presents a problem for selective realism. First, I explicate Hutton's theory. I then give an account of Hutton's predictions and their confirmations. Next, I explain why these predictions are relevant to the realism debate. Finally, I consider which constituents of Hutton's theory are, according to current beliefs, true (or approximately true), which are not (even approximately) true, and which were responsible for these successes.     

ADAM proteases: ligand processing and modulation of the Notch pathway

ADAM metalloproteases play important roles in development and disease. One of the key functions of ADAMs is the proteolytic processing of Notch receptors and their ligands. ADAM-mediated cleavage of Notch represents the first step in regulated intramembrane proteolysis of the receptor, leading to activation of the Notch pathway. Recent reports indicate that the transmembrane Notch ligands also undergo ADAM-mediated processing in cultured cells and in vivo. The proteolytic processing of Notch ligands modulates the strength and duration of Notch signals, leads to generation of soluble intracellular domains of the ligands, and may support a bi-directional signaling between cells.     

Catching the WAVE: The Weight-Adjusting Account of Values and Evidence

It is commonly argued that values “fill the logical gap” of underdetermination of theory by evidence, namely, values affect our choice between two or more theories that fit the same evidence. The underdetermination model, however, does not exhaust the roles values play in evidential reasoning. I introduce WAVE – a novel account of the logical relations between values and evidence. WAVE states that values influence evidential reasoning by adjusting evidential weights. I argue that the weight-adjusting role of values is distinct from their underdetermination gap-filling role. Values adjust weights in three ways. First, values affect our trust in the testimony of others. Second, values influence the evidential thresholds required for justified epistemic judgments. Third, values influence the relative weight of a certain type of evidence within a body of multimodal discordant evidence. WAVE explains, from an epistemic perspective, rather than psychological, how smokers, for example, can find the same evidence about the dangers of smoking less persuasive than non-smokers. WAVE allows for a wider effect of values on our accepted scientific theories and beliefs than the effect for which the underdetermination model allows alone; therefore, science studies scholars must consider WAVE in their research and analysis of evidential case studies.     

Chemical reductionism revisited: Lewis, Pauling and the physico-chemical nature of the chemical bond

The wave-mechanical treatment of the valence bond, by Walter Heitler and Fritz London, and its ensuing foundational importance in quantum chemistry has been traditionally regarded as the basis for the argument that chemistry may be theoretically reduced to physics. Modern analyses of the reductionist claim focuses on the limitations to achieving full reduction in practice because of the approximations used in modern quantum chemical methods, but neglect the historical importance of the chemical bond as a chemical entity. This paper re-examines these arguments with a study of the development of the valence bond by chemist Gilbert Lewis within a chemically autonomous framework, and its extension by Linus Pauling using Heitler and London’s methods. Here, we see that the chemical bond is best described as a theoretical synthesis or physico-chemical entity, to represent its full interdisciplinary importance from the philosophical and historical perspectives.     

Functions of the testicular gland of blenniid fish: Structural and histochemical investigations

Summary We investigated the functions of the testicular glands of blenniid fishes by fine-structural and histochemical methods. These glands function in the differentiation and nutrition of germ cells, in the secretion of sialomucins, in phagocytosis of germ cells, and in lipid storage.     

Distinctively mathematical explanation and the problem of directionality: A quasi-erotetic solution

The increasing preponderance of opinion that some natural phenomena can be explained mathematically has inspired a search for a viable account of distinctively mathematical explanation. Among the desiderata for an adequate account is that it should solve the problem of directionality —the reversals of distinctively mathematical explanations should not count as members among the explanatory fold but any solution must also avoid the exclusion of genuine explanations. In what follows, I introduce and defend what I refer to as a quasi-erotetic solution which provides a remedy to the problem in the form of an additional necessary condition on explanation.     

Babesia bovis: the effect of acute inflammation and isoantibody production in the detection of babesial antigens

Summary Immunoblots ofBabesia bovis antigen contain dominant antigens which react not only with antisera toB. bovis but with sera from naive calves recovering from an acute inflammatory reaction. It seems likely these antigens are from the host rather than the parasite.     

How incoherent measurement succeeds: Coordination and success in the measurement of the earth's polar flattening

The development of nineteenth-century geodetic measurement challenges the dominant coherentist account of metric success. Coherentists argue that measurements of a parameter are successful if their numerical outcomes convergence across varying contextual constraints. Aiming at numerical convergence, in turn, offers an operational aim for scientists to solve problems of coordination. Geodesists faced such a problem of coordination between two indicators of the earth's polar flattening, which were both based on imperfect ellipsoid models. While not achieving numerical convergence, their measurements produced novel data that grounded valuable theoretical hypotheses. Consequently, they ought to be regarded as epistemically successful. This insight warrants a dynamic revision of coherentism, which allows to judge the success of a metric based on both its coherence and fruitfulness. On that view, scientific measurement aims to coordinate theoretical definitions and produce novel data and theoretical insights.     

Abstract considerations: disciplines and the incoherence of Newton’s natural philosophy

Historians have long sought putative connections between different areas of Newton’s scientific work, while recently scholars have argued that there were causal links between even more disparate fields of his intellectual activity. In this paper I take an opposite approach, and attempt to account for certain tensions in Newton’s ‘scientific’ work by examining his great sensitivity to the disciplinary divisions that both conditioned and facilitated his early investigations in science and mathematics. These momentous undertakings, exemplified by research that he wrote up in two separate notebooks, obey strict distinctions between approaches appropriate to both new and old ‘natural philosophy’ and those appropriate to the mixed mathematical sciences. He retained a fairly rigid demarcation between them until the early eighteenth century. At the same time as Newton presented the ‘mathematical principles’ of natural philosophy in his magnum opus of 1687, he remained equally committed to a separate and more private world or ontology that he publicly denigrated as hypothetical or conjectural. This is to say nothing of the worlds implicit in his work on mathematics and alchemy. He did not lurch from one overarching ontological commitment to the next (for example, moving tout court from radical aetherial explanations to strictly vacuist accounts) but instead simultaneously—and often radically—developed generically distinct concepts and ontologies that were appropriate to specific settings and locations (for example, private, qualitative, causal natural philosophy versus public quantitative mixed mathematics) as well as to relevant styles of argument. Accordingly I argue that the concepts used by Newton throughout his career were intimately bound up with these appropriate generic or quasi-disciplinary ‘structures’. His later efforts to bring together active principles, aethers and voids in various works were not failures that resulted from his ‘confusion’ but were bold attempts to meld together concepts or ontologies that belonged to distinct enquiries. His analysis could not be ‘coherent’ because the structures in which they appeared were fundamentally incompatible.     

Rehabilitating the regulative use of reason: Kant on empirical and chemical laws

In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant asserts that laws of nature “carry with them an expression of necessity” (A159/B198). There is, however, widespread interpretive disagreement regarding the nature and source of the necessity of empirical laws of natural sciences in Kant's system. It is especially unclear how chemistry—a science without a clear, straightforward connection to the a priori principles of the understanding—could contain such genuine, empirical laws. Existing accounts of the necessity of causal laws unfortunately fail to illuminate the possibility of non-physical laws. In this paper, I develop an alternative, ‘ideational’ account of natural laws, according to which ideas of reason necessitate the laws of some non-physical sciences. Chemical laws, for instance, are grounded on ideas of the elements, and the chemist aims to reduce her phenomena to these elements via experimentation. Although such ideas are beyond the possibility of experience, their postulation is necessary for the achievement of reason's theoretical ends: the unification and explanation of the cognitions of science.     

Seven components of judgmental forecasting skill: Implications for research and the improvement of forecasts

A decomposition of the Brier skill score shows that the performance of judgmental forecasts depends on seven components: environmental predictability, fidelity of the information system, match between environment and forecaster, reliability of information acquisition, reliability of information processing, conditional bias, and unconditional bias. These components provide a framework for research on the forecasting process. Selected literature addressing each component is reviewed, and implications for improving judgmental forecasting are discussed.     

Forecasting contemporaneous aggregates and the combination of forecasts: The case of the U.K. monetary aggregates

A number of papers in recent years have investigated the problems of forecasting contemporaneously aggregated time series and of combining alternative forecasts of a time series. This paper considers the integration of both approaches within the example of assessing the forecasting performance of models for two of the U.K. monetary aggregates, £M3 and MO. It is found that forecasts from a time series model for aggregate £M3 are superior to aggregated forecasts from individual models fitted to either the components or counterparts of £M3 and that an even better forecast is obtained by forming a linear combination of the three alternatives. For MO, however, aggregated forecasts from its components prove superior to either the forecast from the aggregate itself or from a linear combination of the two.