Professional forecasters' expectations,consistency, and international spillovers

This paper focuses on the expectation formation process of professional forecasters by relying on survey data on forecasts regarding gross domestic product growth, consumer price index inflation and 3-month interest rates for a broad set of countries. We examine the interrelation between macroeconomic forecasts and also the impact of uncertainty on forecasts by allowing for cross-country interdependencies and time variation in the coefficients. We find that professional forecasts are often in line with the Taylor rule and identify significant expectation spillovers from monetary policy in the USA.     

Kuhn, the correspondence theory of truth and coherentist epistemology

Kuhn argued against both the correspondence theory of truth and convergent realism. Although he likely misunderstood the nature of the correspondence theory, which it seems he wrongly believed to be an epistemic theory, Kuhn had an important epistemic point to make. He maintained that any assessment of correspondence between beliefs and reality is not possible, and therefore, the acceptance of beliefs and the presumption of their truthfulness has to be decided on the basis of other criteria. I will show that via Kuhn’s suggested epistemic values, specifically via problem-solving, his philosophy can be incorporated into a coherentist epistemology. Further, coherentism is, in principle, compatible with convergent realism. However, an argument for increasing likeness to truth requires appropriate historical continuity. Kuhn maintained that the history of science is full of discontinuity, and therefore, the historical condition of convergent realism is not satisfied.     

Feyerabend,truth, and relativisms: Footnotes to the Italian debate

There is a substantial literature on Feyerabend's relativism—including a few papers in this collection—but fewer specific studies of the ways that his writings and ideas have been taken up among the non-academic public. This is odd, given his obvious interest in the lives and concerns of persons who were not ‘intellectuals’—a term that, for him, had a pejorative ring to it. It is also odd, given the abundance of evidence of how Feyerabend's relativism played a role in a specific national and cultural context—namely, contemporary Italian debates about relativism. This paper offers a study of how Feyerabend's ideas have been deployed by Italian intellectuals and cultural commentators—including the current Pope—and critically assesses them.     

Science,truth and dictatorship: Wishful thinking or wishful speaking?

This paper argues for a novel way of addressing questions about the relationship between politics and science: in terms of norms of communication, rather than norms of cognition. The first half of the paper motivates this general shift through close study of the concept of "wishful speaking"; arguing that this vice - rather than the more familiar "wishful thinking" - better captures real-life cases, such as the Lysenko affair. The second half builds on the ethics of communication to develop an account of the proper role of non-epistemic values in justification in terms of "value-aptness".     

The love of truth

It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense—that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation—it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, I argue that this view is untenable. The truth norm clashes with plausible evidential norms in a wide range of cases, such as when we have excellent but misleading evidence for a falsehood or no evidence for a truth. I will consider various ways to resolve this conflict and argue that none of them work. However, I will ultimately attempt to vindicate the love of truth, by arguing that knowledge is the proper epistemic goal. The upshot is that we should not aim merely to believe the truth; we should aim to know it.     

Science, truth and history, Part I. Historiography, relativism and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

Recently, many historians of science have chosen to present their historical narratives from the ‘actors’-eye view’. Scientific knowledge not available within the actors’ culture is not permitted to do explanatory work. Proponents of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) purport to ground this historiography on epistemological relativism. I argue that they are making an unnecessary mistake: unnecessary because the historiographical genre in question can be defended on aesthetic and didactic grounds; and a mistake because the argument from relativism is in any case incoherent.The argument of the present article is self-contained, but steers clear of metaphysical debates in the philosophy of science. To allay fears of hidden assumptions, the sequel, to be published in the following issue, will consider SSK’s prospects of succour from scientific realism, instrumentalism, and a metaphysical system of Bruno Latour’s own devising.     

Empirical progress and nomic truth approximation revisited

In my From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000) I have shown how an instrumentalist account of empirical progress can be related to nomic truth approximation. However, it was assumed that a strong notion of nomic theories was needed for that analysis. In this paper it is shown, in terms of truth and falsity content, that the analysis already applies when, in line with scientific common sense, nomic theories are merely assumed to exclude certain conceptual possibilities as nomic possibilities.     

The consistency,coherence and calibration of holistic,decomposed and recomposed judgemental probability forecasts

In this paper we make an empirical investigation of the relationship between the consistency, coherence and validity of probability judgements in a real-world forecasting context. Our results indicate that these measures of the adequacy of an individual's probability assessments are not closely related as we anticipated. Twenty-nine of our thirty-six subjects were better calibrated in point probabilities than in odds and our subjects were, in general more coherent using point probabilities than odds forecasts. Contrary to our expectations we found very little difference in forecasting response and performance between simple and compound holistic forecasts. This result is evidence against the ‘divide-and-conquer’ rationale underlying most applications of normative decision theory. In addition, our recompositions of marginal and conditional assessments into compound forecasts were no better calibrated or resolved than their holistic counterparts. These findings convey two implications for forecasting. First, untrained judgemental forecasters should use point probabilities in preference to odds. Second, judgemental forecasts of complex compound probabilities may be as well assessed holistically as they are using methods of decomposition and recomposition. In addition, our study provides a paradigm for further studies of the relationship between consistency, coherence and validity in judgemental probability forecasting.     

A choice-semantical approach to theoretical truth

A central topic in the logic of science concerns the proper semantic analysis of theoretical sentences, that is sentences containing theoretical terms. In this paper, we present a novel choice-semantical account of theoretical truth based on the epsilon-term definition of theoretical terms. Specifically, we develop two ways of specifying the truth conditions of theoretical statements in a choice functional semantics, each giving rise to a corresponding logic of such statements. In order to investigate the inferential strength of these logical systems, we provide a translation of each truth definition into a modal definition of theoretical truth. Based on this, we show that the stronger notion of choice-semantical truth captures more adequately our informal semantic understanding of scientific statements.     

Can the constructive empiricist be a nominalist? Quasi-truth, commitment and consistency

In this paper, I explore Rosen’s (1994) ‘transcendental’ objection to constructive empiricism—the argument that in order to be a constructive empiricist, one must be ontologically committed to just the sort of abstract, mathematical objects constructive empiricism seems committed to denying. In particular, I assess Bueno’s (1999) ‘partial structures’ response to Rosen, and argue that such a strategy cannot succeed, on the grounds that it cannot provide an adequate metalogic for our scientific discourse. I conclude by arguing that this result provides some interesting consequences in general for anti-realist programmes in the philosophy of science.     

Science, truth and history, part II. Metaphysical bolt-holes for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge?

Historians of science have frequently sought to exclude modern scientific knowledge from their narratives. Part I of this paper, published in the previous issue, cautioned against seeing more than a literary preference at work here. In particular, it was argued—contra advocates of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK)—that a commitment to epistemological relativism should not be seen as having straightforward historiographical consequences. Part II considers further SSK-inspired attempts to entangle the currently fashionable historiography with particular positions in the philosophy of science. None, I argue, is promising. David Bloor’s proposed alliance with scientific realism relies upon a mistaken view of contrastive explanation; Andrew Pickering’s appeal to instrumentalism is persuasive for particle physics but much less so for science as a whole; and Bruno Latour’s home-grown metaphysics is so bizarre that its compatibility with SSK is, if anything, a further blow to the latter’s plausibility.     

On the necessary truth of the laws of classical mechanics

The idealization of primitive mechanical experience is shown to lead to four mutually related formulations of classical mechanics based on connections, action at a distance, stresses, and collisions. For a given structure of spacetime and a given characterization of mechanical systems, fundamental laws (including Newton's law of acceleration and d’Alembert's principle) are derived from a few general principles regarding the comprehensibility of motion. Special emphasis is placed on the “secular principle,” according to which the evolution of a system at the relevant time scale should not depend on finer details of the applied forces.